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Introduction
The transnational1 realm is composed of many different individual and collec-tive actors such as complex international bureaucracies, national government representatives, social movement coalitions and multinational corporations, which are connected through more or less formalized relations and a myriad 
of	interactions,	practices	and	dynamics.	This	configuration	of	the	transnational	space evolved over recent decades. The growing number of intergovernmen-tal forums and transnational networks, which often consist of representatives from national executive organs and mainly unelected private actors (Chilton 
1995;	Dingwerth	2006;	Tallberg	et al.	2008)	marks	a	disempowerment	of	na-tional parliaments and an empowerment of executive authorities, who are sit-ting together as ministers, prime ministers or presidents at the negotiation tables (see e.g. Zürn 2002). At the same time, civil society organizations have 
built	 transnational	 coalitions,	 increased	 their	 influence	 as	 voices	 in	 global	discourses as well as in formal hearings of international organizations and consequently managed to diversify and strengthen their relationships in the transnational arena. In this space of multi-faceted transnational relations, a democratic “system” is hardly imaginable. However, democratic theorists and International Relations (IR) scholars attempted to approach transnational 
democracy	as	a	normative	concept	as	well	as	an	empirical	study	field.	While	normative concepts focus on the institutional architecture of a possible dem-
ocratic	 system	(Held	1995;	Archibugi	et al.	1998;	Bohman	2007),	empirical	research mainly concentrates on the transnational civil society which is sup-posed to democratize the governance of international organizations and the 
transnational	sphere	more	generally	(see	Beisheim	2001,	Scholte	2007,	Frie-
drich	2008,	Beauzamy	2010,	Macdonald	and	Macdonald	2010,	Steffek	et al.	2010, Hahn and Holzscheiter 2013).Global governance scholars have already claimed that the different institu-tional preconditions of the global order demand a distinct institutional archi-tecture of global democracy (MacDonald and Macdonald 2010). Nation state democratic institutions could not democratically control the multiple forms of public power of different state and non-state actors (ibid.). While democratic 
1  The term “transnational“ refers to “interactions that cross national boundaries at levels other than sovereign-to-sovereign”, whereas the term “international” is used to describe interactions between sovereign nation states. As a more general term “global” refers to any “transborder interactions that include (approximately) the entire world system” 
(Hale	and	Held	2011:	4–5).
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institutions work in centralized and hierarchically organized nation state con-texts, transnational relations are characterized by complex and overlapping 
spheres	of	influence	and	power.	An	institution-oriented	democratic	theory	is	thus hardly applicable in the context of transnational relations. Practices and 
processes rather than institutions form the sphere of transnational relations. Thus, this study attempts to shift the perspective from institutional ideas of democratic legitimation to a practice-oriented approach to democracy and thus contributes to the debate about the democratic legitimation of transna-tional civil society in global governance and new forms of democratic practice in transnational relations.The aim of this study is to explore political practices inside transnational civil society networks and to investigate the potential of a transnational de-mocracy in one of the main areas of transnational relations, namely civil socie-ty networks. Civil society coalitions and networks as one group of main actors 
in	the	transnational	sphere,	act	in	an	unclear	and	fluid	sphere	with	many	“for-mally-constituted political bodies such as the United Nations” that are either opponents or collaboration partners of civil society organizations (Dryzek 
1999:	45).	As	civil	society	actors	have	the	potential	to	democratize	transna-tional relations and at the same time need to be critically scrutinized from a normative democratic perspective, this study attempts to deepen the under-standing of the chances and problems of a transnational democracy brought in by civil society actors.
Transnational Civil Society
Civil	society	shall	be	defined	in	empirical	terms	and	divided	into	social	move-ment organizations (SMOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). So-
cial	movements	are	investigated	as	a	phenomenon	since	the	1970’s,	whereas	non-governmental organizations and research about them has emerged only 
in	the	1990’s,	with	the	growing	internationalization	and	institutionalization	of social movements. Both types of organizations are members in the two transnational civil society networks that will be examined in this study. While social movement groups are seen as more grass-roots oriented and less in-stitutionalized, non-governmental organizations are also called the “tamed” social movement groups (Kaldor 2003) because they are much more profes-sionalized and institutionalized and often focus on lobby activities rather than on public protest (Della Porta and Caiani 2009). Different typologies of social movements were developed based on the assumptions that social movements are historical phenomena, and as such, they cannot be generalized in abstract terms without considering their historical contexts and developments. Fur-thermore, social movements are structured phenomena, which can be situ-
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ated	 between	 an	 “amorphous	 ad-hoc	 collective”	 (Raschke	 1985:	 17)	 and	 a	highly formalized organization. In criticizing the rationalist explanation of social movement mobilization recent studies show that cultural aspects and explanations from social psychology are also relevant for the mobilizing po-tential of “newest social movements” (Day 2005; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 
2001;	Jasper	2007).	Those	characteristics	already	point	to	the	peculiar	prac-tice of civil society, which is very contextualized, dynamic and embedded in diverse cultures and social environments. Transnational civil society organi-zations are often seen as the crucial mediators for transnational mobilization 
(Knappe	and	Lang	2014);	they	connect	different	public	spheres	and	combine	
different	local	interests	(Smith	2001:99).	Transnational	civil	society	networks	are “bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense ex-
changes	of	 information	and	services”	(Keck	and	Sikkink	1998:	2).	Since	the	
1980’s	NGOs	have	been	interacting	with	each	other	in	ever	more	networked	and dense settings. Networks gave a more structured context in transnational relations. These networks are also understood as communicative structures and political spaces, where actors negotiate about the meanings of their “joint 
enterprise”	(Keck	and	Sikkink	1998:	3).	During	the	past	two	decades,	trans-national civil society actors have started to receive much more attention, con-
tacts	and	influence	in	decision-making	processes.	The	traditional	role	of	civil	
society	as	a	third	sector	between	market	and	state,	which	organizes	citizens’	interests and provides a space for public engagement, is no longer the only role of civil society. Members of transnational NGOs or SMOs have partly in-herited the responsibilities of elected representatives in traditional democrat-
ic	settings:	 they	represent	a	certain	constituency,	campaign	 for	 their	norms	and interests, try to formulate and condense interests of their constituency, 
and	finally	sit	at	the	decision-making	table	in	order	to	decide	public	matters	within a certain range. Many democratic theorists reacted to this develop-ment in conceptualizing new forms of democratic governance and political 
representation	(Held	1995;	Archibugi	et al.	1998;	Bohman	2007).While transnational NGOs and SMOs are often seen as per se democratic, there are recent studies which show that civil society organizations do not al-ways represent their constituency adequately (Hahn and Holzscheiter 2013) 
or	do	not	even	claim	to	be	accountable	to	the	beneficiaries	of	their	political	en-
gagement	(Steffek	et al.	2010).	Furthermore,	it	is	criticized	that	transnational	NGO campaigners “have drawn disproportionally from middle-aged adults, professional and propertied classes, men, Northern countries, whites, Chris-
tian	heritages	and	urban	dwellers.”	(Scholte	2002:	296)
Now,	with	 illiteracy	rates	 in	some	parts	of	 the	world	exceeding	80	percent,	with Internet access virtually nonexistent in others, and with language skills, economic knowledge, and political education distributed extremely uneven-ly across the globe, realizing transparency and democracy in a meaningful 
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normative sense is indeed a far-fetched dream. And what is more, hardly any global democracy activists are working to turn this particular dream into re-
ality.	(Dingwerth	and	Hanrieder	2010:	94)
Although	transnational	civil	society	seems	to	have	a	significant	impact	in	the	setting of rules and the promotion of norms, they often lack democratic legit-
imacy,	e.g.	 the	approval	of	beneficiaries.	The	normative	claims	made	 in	 this	literature are that civil society actors from different backgrounds should par-ticipate equally in international institutions and transnational forums (Ben-
dell	2006;	 Scholte	2007).	 Scholte	 argues	 that	 “If	 civil	 society	 is	 to	make	 its	full contribution to enabling public participation in global governance, then 
full	recognition	–	and	effective	negotiation-	of	the	world’s	cultural	diversity	is	
required.”	(Scholte	2002:	297).	Equal	participation	is	especially	crucial	in	re-lation to inclusion of underrepresented groups and the accessibility of forma-tion of opinions and decision-making for the general membership as well, and not only the active elite (Anheier and Themudo 2002). In a study on the par-ticipation patterns of Friends of the Earth (FoE) and Amnesty International in 
Great	Britain,	Jordan	and	Maloney	(1997)	state	that	the	de facto decision-mak-ing in those campaign organizations can be at best termed ‘anticipatory oli-
garchy’2. Few very active members decide on behalf of the rest of the members anticipating their wishes and what is popular enough to gain support. Those democratic shortcomings in civil society networks become particularly ap-parent in the unequal participation of the different members and activists. Social inequalities for example are often rather reproduced than countered 
in	civil	society	networks	(Roth	2001;	Tallberg	et al.	2008;	Beauzamy	2010).	This leads among other things to the fact that global civil society engagement rests on a very narrow cultural base (Scholte 2002). This observed asymmetry in the transnational civil society is particularly virulent in the context of the global North-South divide and most often explained by the lack of capacities, 
such	as	financial	resources,	as	well	as	language	barriers	and	the	campaigning	
focus	on	an	affluent	 (Western)	audience	which	 is	 rather	 inclined	 to	donate	(Roth 2001). Particularly NGOs which are concerned with development and social change in the developing world are criticized for being disproportion-ately based in Western Europe and the US. This affects also the framing of topics and problems which differs between Northern and Southern NGOs, es-pecially in issue areas such as human rights, gender politics or biodiversity issues. If there is no mobilizing potential in the Western world there will be no 
campaign	about	a	certain	topic	(Roth	2001:	43).	Furthermore,	it	is	criticized	that Northern NGOs pick Southern NGOs as coalition partners according to a suitable topic for donors and public attention and often it is not realistic that 
2  This term refers to the “iron law of oligarchization” conceptualized by Robert Michels 
(1989).
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Southern NGOs are able to avail themselves of transnational networks and get prominent according to the urgency or relevance of the issue. Due to its het-erogeneity transnational civil society is easy to get co-opted in particular by 
donors	who	fund	selected	projects	or	organizations	(Fisher	1997).	Thus,	there	is a strong criticism of the observed asymmetry mainly between Northern and Southern groups in transnational civil society networks. This inequality is mostly criticized with regard to the outreach dimensions of transnational civil society, for example public campaigning priorities or lobby activities in 
specific	international	organizations.
Democratic Practices in the Transnational Realm
Departing	 from	this	 state	of	debate,	 the	present	study	 identifies	a	 theoreti-cal and an empirical research gap. First, the theoretical conceptualization of democratic legitimation inside transnational civil society networks has been neglected in the literature on democracy beyond the nation state as well as in the broad NGO-literature. While an overall institutional framework for trans-national democracy seems problematic due to the instable structural contexts of transnational relations, the examination of practices on a meso-level be-tween individual action and overall structure can give better insights on how 
democracy	 can	develop	 in	 temporary,	 fluid	 and	 complex	 transnational	 net-works. Such networks neither function like nation states nor like a multilater-al international system. They are conceptually grasped as self-organized fora of communication, interaction and decision-making between “interdependent 
but	operationally	autonomous	actors”	(Sørensen	and	Torfing	2007:	9).	Thus,	these network structures are best examined in the light of process- and prac-tice oriented approaches to democratic theory, which has not been done so far to a great extent. These approaches can be found in concepts of participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, and more recently even in representative theory. In this context, democracy is	broadly	defined as “empowered inclu-
sion	of	those	affected	in	collective	decisions	and	actions”	(Warren	2006:	386).	The conceptual question of transnational democracy in network contexts is relevant, but under-theorized and will therefore be a major element in this study. The theoretical interest in transnational network democracy is inspired 
by	the	debate	on	how	transnational	democracy,	with	its	specific	characteris-tics, could be envisioned (Held 1995, 2003; Keohane 2003; Dryzek 2006) and how already existing transnational relationships between different types of 
actors	can	be	evaluated	in	terms	of	their	democratic	quality	(Friedrich	2008;	
Tallberg	et al.	2008;	Näsström	2010;	Dingwerth	et al.	2011).	In	order	to	ana-lytically grasp transnational network democracy, the concept of practice is in-troduced and used as an analytical frame to detect democracy that is practiced 
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rather than institutionalized in transnational civil society networks. Practices 
shall	be	defined	as	shared	courses	of	action	that	are	co-constituted	by	actors	
and	structure	and	can	be	modified	by	the	agency	of	the	actors	(Giddens	1984).	Substantive and routinized practices are not only empirically better observ-able in transnational civil society than institutionalized settings, they are at the same time an interesting and innovative conceptual perspective for nor-mative democratic theory and the question of how to think of democracy in transnational relations. Thus, this study attempts to conceptualize democratic practice within the theoretical framework of the three strands of democratic theory (participatory, representative, and deliberative democracy) through the lens of practice theory.
Second,	 this	study	wants	to	 fill	an	empirical	research	gap	and	open	the	black box of the most growing type of actors in global politics, namely transna-tional civil society networks. Although there are single studies of social move-
ments	observing	the	specific	democratic	practices	of	activists	(Polletta	2002,	2006) and a huge strand of literature that refers to the outward dimension 
of	transnational	civil	society	(see	e.g.	Roth	2001,	Scholte	2002,	Tallberg	et al.	
2008;	Beauzamy	2010,	Dingwerth	and	Hanrieder	2010),	the	coalition	build-ing and participation within transnational civil society networks in view of democratic norms is under-researched. The empirical research interest of this 
study	targets	transnational	civil	society	networks’	capabilities	and	potentials	of democratic coordination in order to function as democratically legitimate actors in global politics. If they organized democratically internally, they can serve as an external control layer for international institutions and nation states by representing the underrepresented in the global system. Transna-tional activism and protest has been organized in network-like structures 
since	 it	 came	 into	 being	 (Tarrow	 2006).	 Specifically	 the	 transnational	 civil	society networks examined in this case study are very concerned with demo-cratic procedures and principles. Thus, the practices of democracy that have emerged in these non-state network settings present an interesting and need-
ed	field	of	research	to	be	examined.	Empirical	research	thus	far	has	focused	on	the democratic legitimation of transnational civil society with standards that conceptualize legitimation as external control that runs vertically either be-tween civil society actors and international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) (upwards), or between civil society actors and their constituency, namely the affected groups of indi-
viduals	(downwards)	(Steffek	et al.	2010;	Tallberg	and	Uhlin	2011).	However,	this research perspective neglects the internal and horizontal democratic le-gitimation that is at least equally important for transnational democracy. If transnational civil society networks function as external democratic control layers for international organizations or states, they should be themselves democratically legitimized. Otherwise, opaque and possibly corrupted inter-
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ests could be the basis for a supposedly democratic legitimation of global pol-itics. Starting from these research gaps in a theoretical and empirical context, 
this	 study	 is	 structured	 in	a	 threefold	division:	At	 first,	 the	 theoretical	 con-ceptualization of democracy as practice is done by combining practice theory with democratic concepts of participatory, representative and deliberative 
democracy.	 This	 first	 part	 is	 guided	 by	 the	 question	 of	 how	 democracy	 as	practice can be theoretically conceptualized in transnational civil society net-works. In a second step, the empirical analysis focuses on political practices in transnational civil society networks, thus opening the black box “civil society network” and exploring how participation, representation and deliberation 
practices	 form	 inside	 such	networks.	 In	 a	 last	 step,	 the	 insights	of	 the	 first	two parts of the book are synthesized in a discussion targeting the question, in how far the reconstructed political practices are done in a democratic way. The two cases of transnational civil society networks, namely Friends of the Earth (FoE) and the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), examined in this research study were chosen because they share the most common charac-teristics of transnational civil society networks and their relative power in 
global	politics:	Both	are	organized	as	networks	of	semi-autonomous	member	groups in different countries and have communicative power3 through global 
campaigns	as	well	as	 influence	on	international	 institutions	or	multination-al companies4. The member groups are independent organizations that also campaign in other contexts. Both networks claim to be grass-roots democrat-ic. Despite their shared characteristics of transnational civil society networks, the two cases differ in their goals, internal relationships, targets, strategy and collective identity and thus provide a certain range of transnational civil soci-ety networks. The qualitative semi-structured interviews with activists of the two transnational civil society networks in Europe were analyzed and inter-preted with a reconstructive method of text interpretation. 
3  Following	Habermas’	(1996)	conceptualization	of	communicative	power,	many	construc-tivist IR-scholars claim that NGOs can exert communicative power in convincing more 
powerful	actors	(most	often	states)	to	“change	their	minds”	(Risse	2000:	19).
4	 	FoE	has	consultative	status	in	different	UN	bodies;	CCC	successfully	pressures	many	dif-ferent companies to implement a code of conduct in bilateral negotiations. Besides this, both networks lead public campaigns that are widely taken up by the media. A detailed 
description	of	the	influence	and	action	repertoire	of	both	networks	is	to	be	found	in	the	case chapters (5.1 & 5.2).
Structure of the BookThe following part I of this book delineates the conceptual foundations of this study. After a general overview of the key concepts relevant for studying dem-ocratic practice in transnational civil society, relevant approaches of practice theory are outlined in order to conceptualize democracy as practice (chap.1). Practice theory can bridge the gap between normative democratic theory and empirical reality of transnational civil society networks. The two following chapters (chap. 2 and 3) review the relevant literature on participatory and deliberative democracy and democratic representation respectively. These 
two	chapters	are	organized	in	two	parts:	(1)	a	general	overview	and	discus-sion of relevant concepts and (2) a discussion on the applicability of these approaches to the context of transnational civil society networks. 
Part	II	of	this	book	is	divided	into	four	chapters.	Chapter	4	outlines	the	methodology and research design of the empirical study. Chapter 5 is devoted to the exploration of the political practice in the two cases of Clean Clothes Campaign and Friends of the Earth. After the analytical heuristics for explor-ing the political practice of participation, representation and deliberation are presented, the cases are generally introduced (chapters 5.1 and 5.2). The results of the reconstructive qualitative analysis are then presented in chap-
ter 5.3.	After	this	descriptive	part	of	the	analysis,	the	critical	discussion	of	the	political practices is done in chapter 6. This chapter links back to the theoret-
ical	considerations	of	the	first	part	of	this	book	and	thus	combines	normative	democratic theory and the empirical results in a fruitful discussion about the democratic norms in political practices in transnational civil society networks. This book ends with general conclusions about the usefulness of the practice 
approach	for	transnational	democracy	and	the	implications	of	the	findings	for	research on transnational civil society networks.
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Part I 
Conceptual Foundations of Democratic 
Practice in Transnational Civil Society 
Networks 
For a long time democracy was not a relevant topic for IR. The international system was viewed as mainly consisting of nation states, which acted under conditions of anarchy through power threats (realist perspective) or nego-tiations (rational-institutionalist perspective). This empirical reality has changed in the last 20 years and so has the IR-research expanded scholarly 
interest	into	fields	such	as	the	role	of	norms	during	the	constructivist	turn	in	
IR	 (Jepperson	et al.	1996;	Checkel	1998;	Risse	1999)	and	democracy	 (Held	
1995;	Bienen	et al.	1998;	Archibugi	2004).	
In	the	field	of	global	governance	many	scholars	applied	normative	dem-ocratic theory, which was originally conceptualized for nation state contexts. 
Bexell	et al.	(2010)	speak	in	this	regard	of	the	“trichotomy	of	representative	democracy, participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy” (Bexell 
et al.	2010:	83),	which	defines	the	three	main	strands	of	democratic	theory.	
Taking	these	three	main	models	of	democratic	theory	into	account,	the	first	part of this book is concerned with the examination of concepts and approach-es within these three strands of democratic theory and the development of a concept of democratic practice in transnational civil society networks. Since such transnational civil society networks are more loosely bound together, less 
hierarchically	structured	and	not	limited	by	clearly	defined	boundaries	com-pared to nation states, normative democratic theory that is conceptualized for the context of hierarchically structured, sovereign nation states is not suitable. As a result, normative democratic theory that is concerned with democracy in 
spheres	beside	the	state,	for	example	in	civil	society	associations	(Hirst	1994),	
in	the	work	place	(Pateman	1970;	Bachrach	and	Botwinick	1992)	or	even	in	
private	spheres	such	as	the	family(Phillips	1991)	is	of	specific	value	for	this	
study.	Similarly,	more	recent	theories	in	the	field	of	representation	that	aim	at conceptualizing representation without the formal institution of elections and focus more on horizontal control of representatives (Castiglione and War-ren 2006) or on the performative variants of representation (Saward 2010) are suitable for this study due to their broader horizon of possible forms of 
representation.	 Deliberative	 democracy’s	 procedural	 conceptualization	 of	
20
democracy furthers an understanding of democracy that is not aggregative 
and	is	thus	not	that	tightly	bound	to	clearly	defined	electorates.	Deliberative	
democracy	was	by	some	theorists	specifically	conceptualized	for	the	context	of transnational relations as well as network governance (Dryzek 1999, 2006, 
2007;	Esmark	2007)	 and	 can	 therefore	be	 clearly	 linked	 to	 this	 study’s	 re-
search	 subject	 of	 transnational	 civil	 society	 networks.	 However,	 difficulties	remain in overcoming the boundaries between normative democracy and practical, empirically observable democracy in these networks. Therefore, the practice lens serves as a conceptual bridge between normative democratic theory and empirical observability. Before turning to this practice perspec-
tive,	 I	will	 first	 briefly	 review	 the	debate	 about	democracy	 in	 international	
theory	and	afterwards	discuss	the	specific	relationship	between	civil	society	and democracy in IR.Drawing on different schools of democratic theory, scholars conceptual-
ized	various	approaches	of	a	transnational	democracy.	McGrew	identifies	four	
different	conceptual	strands:	(1)	 liberal	 internationalism,	(2)	radical	plural-
ist	democracy,	(3)	cosmopolitan	democracy	and	(4)	deliberative	democracy	
(McGrew	 2004).	 As	 the	 designation	 of	 liberal	 institutionalism	 and	 radical	pluralist democracy already suggest, the concepts draw from already existing theoretical strands, namely liberal democratic theory and radical democracy. Cosmopolitan democracy is a rather eclectic and ambitious approach, which makes use of different elements of democratic theory, whereas deliberative democracy is a rather recent theoretical strand that is concerned with the discursive forms of democratic legitimation (ibid.). Transnational civil society plays an important role in each of the concepts of transnational democracy. Liberal internationalism, above all conceptualized by Robert Keohane, en-visions transnational democracy as a pluralized and transparent internation-al system with multilateral institutions held accountable by states and NGOs (Keohane 2003). In general, liberal theorists see transnational democracy as a reconstruction of liberal democracy in nation states, without elections. Thus, instead of parties, civil society actors are engaging in democratizing the in-
ternational	system:	“In	place	of	parties	competing	for	votes,	a	vibrant	trans-national civil society channels its demands to the decision makers whilst in turn, also making them accountable for their actions. Accordingly, ‘account-
ability	will	 be	 enhanced	not	 only	 by	 chains	 of	 official	 responsibility	 but	 by	
the	requirement	of	transparency.”	(McGrew	2004:	4).	However,	liberal	inter-nationalism is limited to the Western world and a state-centric perspective insofar as it is concerned mainly with “institutional tinkering” in order to en-hance transparency and accountability of international institutions vis-à-vis national governments (ibid.). To the contrary, radical pluralist democracy as a bottom-up theory of democratization mainly works through the critical social movements, “which challenge the authority of states and international struc-
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tures as well as the hegemony of particular (liberal) conceptions of the ‘polit-
ical’”	(McGrew	2004:	5).	Stemming	from	theories	of	participatory	democracy,	particularly radical democracy, the rejection of concepts such as sovereignty and the rule of law are critical points in this approach (ibid.). Radical pluralist 
democracy	doesn’t	 envision	 real	democracy	 in	nation	 states’	 governance	of	international politics, but rather in the self-governance of communities (ibid.). The ideas of radical democracy are also a relevant part of participatory de-mocracy and will thus be outlined more extensively in the respective chapter. Theorists of deliberative democracy also do not aim at reforming the global polity. They envision a democratization of existing “governance”. Therefore, deliberative democracy goes beyond the liberal vision of institutional reform of global governance and also the cosmopolitan idea of a democratic institu-
tion	(McGrew	2004:	8).	Deliberative	democracy	is	defined	as	“an	association	whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members” (Cohen 
1997:	67).	This	procedural	approach	to	democracy	differs	to	the	more	institu-tional concepts of transnational democracy and will be outlined in further de-tail in the respective chapter. Cosmopolitan democracy attempts to reconcile different approaches to democracy and centers on the “effective democratic 
governance	within,	between	and	across	states”	(McGrew	2004:	6).	David	Held	as one of the main theorists behind this concept argues on the basis of the constitutionalist argument that the political order should be based on a rule of law and constitutional rights guarantee the appropriate participation of af-
fected	individuals	in	decision-making	(Dingwerth	et al.	2011:	51).	Following	this argumentation, the principle of autonomy is a corner stone of cosmopol-itan democracy. Held states that individual autonomy is characterized as “the 
capacity	of	human	beings	to	reason	self-consciously,	to	be	self-reflective	and	to be self-determining. It involves the ability to deliberate, judge, choose and act upon different possible courses of action in private as well as in public life.” 
(Held	2006:	263).	Held’s	concept	of	democracy	 is	 thus	based	on	the	notion	
that	 democracy’s	 function	 is	 to	 further	 the	 aim	of	 individual	 and	 collective	
autonomy	(Dingwerth	and	Blauberger	2011:	51).	The principle of autonomy can also be transferred to the state level, where 
autonomy	erodes	due	to	globalization	processes	(Archibugi	2004:	439).	Held	
distinguishes	state	autonomy	from	state	sovereignty.	Sovereignty	 is	defined	by him as “the political authority within a community which has the right to determine the framework of rules, regulations and policies within a given ter-
ritory	and	to	govern	directly”	(Held	2006:	295).	Autonomy	in	contrast	is	de-
fined	as	“the	actual	power	a	nation	state	possesses	to	articulate	and	achieve	
policy	goals	independently”	(ibid.).	While	sovereignty	defines	the	entitlement	
to	rule	over	a	 territory,	autonomy	defines	 the	 freedom	of	 the	state	 to	dem-ocratic decision-making without international and transnational constraints (ibid.). In this regard, autonomy, thought of as individual, collective and state 
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autonomy	is	the	major	principle	of	justification	for	democracy.	If	governance	modes guarantee or enable the conduct of collective autonomy in the form of collective participation, they can be seen as democratically legitimate 
(Friedrich	 2013: 41).	 As	 Held	 states:	 “In	 a	 world	 intensifying	 regional	 and	
global	relations,	with	marked	overlapping	‘communities	of	fate’,	the	principle	of autonomy requires entrenchment in regional and global networks as well 
as	in	national	and	local	polities”	(Held	2006:	308).	Although	cosmopolitan	de-mocracy  focuses on the international state system, advocates of this approach argue that the system of international democracy among states should be em-
bedded	 in	 transnational	 associations	 and	 communities	 (McGrew	 2004: 6).	This is necessary because the principle of autonomy causes a congruency 
problem	 in	global	politics:	 the	ones	who	 take	decisions	are	not	necessarily	the same that are affected by the decisions. Affected communities can be com-munities that span across state borders, so-called “overlapping communities 
of	fate”	(Held	1995:	136)	or	they	can	be	entirely	global.	Thus,	stakeholder’s	
communities	 do	not	 necessarily	 fit	 in	 state	 borders	 (Archibugi	 2004:	 443).	While many environmental causes affect all individuals globally, communities 
of	fate	can	be	identified	for	example	as	the	workers	of	different	countries	af-fected by human rights abuses in the global garment industry. As a result of this effect of transnational affected communities, advocates of cosmopolitan democracy assume that “[g]lobalization engenders new social movements en-gaged with issues that affect other individuals and communities, even when these are geographically and culturally very distant from their own political 
community.”(Archibugi	2004:	439)	Thus,	autonomy	is	a	central	point	of	refer-ence for the study of transnational civil society networks and their democratic practice.Furthermore, all democratic theorists concerned with transnational af-fairs and global governance must take a stand on the question of the demos 
in	transnational	democracy:	“Who	is	the	people?”.	Who	belongs	to	this	group	
is	difficult	to	define	even	in	nation	states	where	individuals	are	categorized	in	citizens, residents, migrants or refugees. This resonates with the congruen-
cy	problem	(Zürn	2004).	Political	decisions	are	not	always	legitimized	by	the	people who are affected by them. People in nation states are more and more “other-determined”; they are subject to rules made by institutions, govern-
ance	bodies	and	agencies	that	they	cannot	control	anymore	(Näsström	2011).	The concurrence of the people as source and subject of democratic legitimacy is not prevalent in transnational relations. Transnational democracy is not di-vided in geographic terms, but in issue areas. This is mirrored in democracy concepts that emphasize the representation principle of the all-affected. All 
affected	individuals	and	groups	of	a	specific	political	decision	constitute	the	people that should have a say in this particular policy issue. The all-affect-ed principle suggests a solution for the boundary problems in transnational 
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democracy	(Näsström	2011).	It	seems	plausible,	that	not	every	individual	on	this planet needs to be represented in a certain political decision, but only 
those	 that	are	directly	affected	by	a	decision.	However,	how	can	be	defined	
who	will	be	affected	and	who	will	make	this	definition?	If	there	is	a	decision	to	be made about the operating times of nuclear power plants worldwide, who 
knows	who	will	be	to	what	degree	affected	by	the	next	nuclear	catastrophe?	
Besides	the	difficulty	of	drawing	lines	between	affected	and	not	affected	peo-
ple,	there	is	another	problem	with	the	all-affected	principle:	“It	runs	the	risk	of	making future political boundaries into enclaves of sheer self-interest in so far 
as	they	would	be	based	in	separate	stakes	rather	than	equal	rights.“	(Näsström	
2011:	124).	Thus,	the	direct	representation	of	concrete	groups	of	individuals	is hardly practicable in transnational relations. Therefore either a discursive, 
subjectless	mode	of	representation	(Dryzek	and	Niemeyer	2008)	or	the	im-plementation of indirect accountability through proxies (Koenig-Archibugi and Macdonald 2013) is suggested.While autonomy and affectedness as democratic concepts are central for 
transnational	civil	society,	the	definition	of	civil	society	as	such	and	its	relation	to democracy is an important point of departure for this study. Civil society is 
often	defined	according	to	its	boundaries5:	it	is	a	sphere	apart	from	the	state	and, by some theorists also distinguished from the market economy (Arato and Cohen 1999). Civil society is a term that is strongly connected to West-ern liberal democracies and in this context understood as associational life 
that	is	voluntary	and	pluralistic:	“Civil	society	organizations	[…]	are	neither	mandated nor run by state institutions, but spring from the everyday lives 
and	activities	of	communities	of	interest.”	(Young	2000:	158).	While	the	state	(as well as the economy) functions systematically; it follows certain system imperatives and brings together disparate people, places and goals mediated 
through	authorized	power	or	money,	civil	society’s	 focus	rather	 lies	on	free	organization and discursive reasoning (ibid.). The classic role of civil society 
associations	 is	that	of	“schools	of	democracy”	(Tocqueville	and	Mayer	1835	
[1985])	based	on	the	reasoning	that	a	democracy	without	democrats	is	diffi-
cult	to	maintain	(Chambers	and	Kopstein	2006:	369–70).	The	expectation	in	this regard is that civil society associations are places of learning democrat-ic citizenship. Another role of civil society that refers back to the discursive mode of communication in the sphere of civil society (Young 2000) is that of civil society as creator of a public sphere. Through its associational character, civil society can institutionalize societal problems that spring from the private 
lives	of	citizens	and	can	make	them	heard	in	a	public	sphere:
5  Liberals	 emphasize	 the	negative	definition	of	 civil	 society’s	boundaries	 to	 the	 state	as	
rights-based.	The	rule	of	law	should	limit	the	state’s	influence	on	civil	society	and	thus	
guarantee	the	freedom	of	association	(Chambers	&	Kopstein	2006:	364–66).
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Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent as-sociations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal prob-lems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions 
in	 amplified	 form	 to	 the	public	 sphere.	 The	 core	 of	 civil	 society	 comprises	a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres. These “discursive designs” have an egalitarian, open form of organ-ization that mirrors essential features of the kind of communication around 
which	they	crystallize	and	to	which	they	lend	continuity	and	permanence.	[…]All the same, they do form the organizational substratum of the general public of citizens. More or less emerging from the private sphere, this public is made of citizens who seek acceptable interpretations for their social interests and 
experiences	and	who	want	to	have	an	influence	on	institutionalized	opinion-	
and	will-formation.	(Habermas	1996:	367)
This	definition	also	points	 to	a	problematic	aspect	of	 the	 term	civil	 society,	namely its hidden normativity. Civil society is regarded as good. The main argument is that “a robust, strong and vibrant civil society strengthens and 
enhances	liberal	democracy”	(Chambers	and	Kopstein	2001:	837).	This	ideal	of civil society is often criticized as overlooking the “bad” civil society, which 
fulfils	all	criteria	of	voluntary	and	pluralistic	associations	that	further	the	civic	virtues of their members, but promote hate, bigotry or violence (Chambers 
2006:	373).	Tightly	connected	to	this	question	whether	civil	society	associa-tions are always promoting just causes, act in a public interest or at least do not threaten other groups in society, is the question that is raised more often 
in	the	debate	about	transnational	civil	society:	Is	civil	society	contributing	to	
a	strong	democracy,	and	more	specifically:	Can	civil	society	remedy	the	demo-
cratic	deficit	in	global	governance?	
Since	the	late	1990’s	transnational	NGOs	and	SMOs	as	actors	in	a	global	civil society have become an ambivalent research object in political sociology and IR. Main perspectives focus on the development and dynamics of transna-
tional	activism	(McAdam	et al.	2001;	Tarrow	2006),	the	roles	and	structures	of transnational activism (Smith and Wiest 2005), the participation of trans-
national	NGOs	in	international	institutions’	policy	making	and	their	influence	
on	international	institutions	(Friedrich	2008;	Jönsson	and	Tallberg	2010)	and	
the	transnationalization	of	national	and	local	protests	(Della	Porta	et al.	1999;	Rucht 1999; Della Porta and Caiani 2009). Transnational NGOs and SMOs are “governing” their networks independently from the classic arenas of IR-de-mocracy, the international organizations, and at the same time they are ex-tensively interacting with traditional loci of democracy such as state agencies and international organizations. Furthermore, NGOs and SMOs have gotten 
much	more	influence	and	capacity.	They	are	partly	taking	over	state	functions	
and	/or	international	organizations’	services.	Those	developments	make	civil	society networks crucial actors in international relations. Most of the transna-
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tional civil society organizations advocate rights, ideas and norms that often concern minorities and unprivileged groups in society, but the targets of their claims, protests and lobby politics are international organizations and na-
tional	governments	(Risse-Kappen	1994;	Finnemore	and	Sikkink	1998;	Risse	
et al.	2002).	For	this	reason	transnational	civil	society	actors	are	often	seen	
as	mediators	or	the	“transmission	belt”	(Steffek	and	Nanz	2008)	between	cit-izens and international organizations. With this normative conceptualization of civil society actors it can be asked how inclusive, transparent and participa-
tory	international	organizations	are	(Beisheim	2001;	Friedrich	2008;	Tallberg	and Uhlin 2011). While European democratic theory is very much concerned with the de-sign of democratic institutions, some sociologists and ethnographers in the United States have started to investigate democracy as a practice in social movements. These scholars want to show that democracy cannot only be ana-lyzed in terms of institutions and structures, but also in the ways that activists create democracy while participating in some kind of civic action (Polletta 2002; Blee 2012). This empirical perspective on democracy as a practice, which evolves, develops and changes through collective actions of participat-
ing	actors,	is	very	valuable	for	the	context	of	the	barely	institutionalized,	fluid	contexts of transnational civil society networks. Therefore, the practice lens on democracy will be further outlined in the next chapter.
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1  Practice Theory: a New Perspective on 
Transnational Politics and Democracy
A conceptualization of democracy as practice helps to identify democracy through regular and repeated practices within networks. The context (net-work), the study object (civil society) and the theoretical framework (trans-
national	democracy)	of	this	study	are	defined	by	process-orientation	and	the	interplay of agent and structure. The contribution of practice theory to this 
study	is	two-fold:	(1)	Practice	theory	can	broaden	analytical	perspective	and	thus help uncover democratic practice in the transnational realm. (2) Practice theory offers a conceptual account of norms in-practice that can contribute 
to	a	fruitful	rethinking	of	democratic	norms	and	how	to	define,	describe	and	evaluate them. I shall argue in this chapter for the value of practice theory for studying democracy in transnational relations along these two lines. The combination of normative democratic theory and practice theory comes not without tensions. The challenge to normatively grasp practices necessitates 
a	 reflection	 on	 the	 concepts	 of	 normativity	 and	 norms,	 which	will	 also	 be	achieved in this following chapter.
Democratic	practice	will	be	defined	alongside	the	concept	of	social	prac-tice. Practices are shared courses of action that are co-constituted by actors as 
well	as	structures	and	can	be	modified	by	the	agency	of	the	actors	(Giddens	
1984).	On	a	macro-level,	people	produce	and	reproduce	society	through	social	
practice	(Bourdieu	1977).	This	lens	on	democracy	provides	the	opportunity	to see democracy as a procedural category that is not solely bound by dem-ocratic institutions. Neither the institutional structure nor the actors alone create democracy in networks. Both, structures and actions co-constitute each other in the practices of transnational civil society networks. Therefore, the translation of democracy from nation states to networks is done through the conceptualization of democracy as practice. In transnational civil society net-works, democracy is more likely to be practiced in informal routines between actors. Since these practices can further stabilize internal relationships in the networks, practices have the potential to create democracy without a priori established institutions.The “practice turn” recently developed in different disciplines such as philosophy, cultural theory, history, sociology, and anthropology, as well as 
in	 science	 and	 technology	 studies	 (Schatzki	 et al.	 2005:	 1),	 moved	 current	thinking beyond the dualism of structure and action and linked the analysis of micro- and macro phenomena. Given the diversity of disciplinary approach-
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es, it does not come as a surprise that the account and conceptualizations of practice vary and cannot be summarized in one theory of practice. The shift in the understanding of social ontology is one of the main contributions of social theorists to the practice turn. Practice theorists understand the social 
as	“a	field	of	embodied,	materially	interwoven	practices,	centrally	organized	
around	shared	practical	understandings.	[…]	Actions,	for	instance,	are	embed-ded in practices, just as individuals are constituted within them.” (Schatzki 
et al.	2005:	3).	This	understanding	of	the	social	builds	a	contrast	to	concepts	that focus on individuals, actions, language, lifeworld, institutions, roles or 
structures	 as	 the	main	defining	dimensions	of	 the	 social.	 Practice	 theorists	claim that all these phenomena can only be understood through the analysis 
of	practices	(Schatzki	et al.	2005:	3).Studying practice in IR creates a broader spectrum of opportunities to explore and interpret world politics “beyond traditional levels and units of 
analysis”	(Adler	and	Pouliot	2011:	5)	and	hence	practice	theory	is	seen	as	a	promising chance for a dialog between the different schools in IR. IR-scholars see the study of international practices as a way to “spell out the many faces of 
world	politics	[…]	as	part	of	“doing”	in	and	on	the	world.”	(ibid.	2011:	3).	Ac-cording to Adler and Pouliot, practices are competent, patterned performanc-es that rest on background knowledge and weave together “the discursive and 
material worlds”	(ibid.	2011:	7–8).	First, being more concerned with the agency of the actor than structural or systemic analytical approaches; and second, emphasizing the context and the 
collective quality of actions more than action-centered analyses; (internation-al) practice theory perfectly serves the exploration of practices, rules and rou-tines hidden behind formal institutions and well-written mission statements in world politics. This applies also to transnational NGO-networks, whose campaigners, secretariats and international coordinators master the rhetoric and demands of global campaigning but still must navigate through the mud-
dy	waters	of	informal,	opaque	and	fluid	transnational	relations.	This	day-to-day practice behind mission statements and campaign strategies is the space where interactions with members and coalition partners evolve, in campaign meetings and communicative exchanges. These micro-politics of transnation-
al	civil	society	networks	are	on	the	one	hand	configured	by	the	goals	and	tac-tics of campaign strategies and the overall values of mission statements and, 
on	the	other,	dynamically	configured	and	 invented	by	the	 involved	persons.	
Bourdieu	(1977)	called	this	the	“grammar	of	practices”,	implicit	rules	and	reg-ulations that evolve out of formal structures and subjective interpretation. In civil society networks, many such rules refer to democracy as an overarching principle. These rules thus regulate access, transparency and inclusion in the 
network	and	thus	define	the	proceedings	of	democracy.	Due	to	the	character-istics of civil society networks, those rules are much more open for interpre-
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tation	and	modification	through practice, in contrast to a nation state where formal voting rights are relatively clear cut and not subject to constant change and interpretation. It is quite clear that, for example, formal authorization mechanisms of representatives are not in place in transnational civil society networks. However, there are substantive authorization practices that might not be formally legalized, but collectively shared by different network actors. Thus, my argument is that democratic practice can possibly evolve even when democratic institutions are absent. Practice theory thus contributes to a bet-ter understanding of democracy in transnational civil society networks. As in many other national civil society organizations, the transnational civil society organizations of this case study committed themselves to certain democratic standards, such as participatory consensus building6, installing deliberation procedures before major decisions are made, or fairly represent-ing all the different groups and values in the networks7. Unlike in many organ-izations that operate only on a national level, the transnational civil society networks in this study have very autonomous national member organizations with their own campaigns. Although those explicit and implicit democratic norms are a point of reference in such civil society contexts, Blee (2012) speaks of activists making democracy. Polletta grounds this reasoning in the charac-ter of social movement groups. Grass-roots civil society organizations, or social 
movement groups, are often not very formalized or institutionalized. In social movement organizations, decision-making is rather informal, decentralized, 
consensus-oriented,	deliberative	and	experimental	(Polletta	2002:	209).	The	transnational space even reinforces this tendency towards informality and de-centralization. The organization as transnational civil society network is not 
set	up	for	permanent	institutionalization:	networks	as	structural	organizing	
principles	 are	 always	 changing	 rules	 and	 structures	 (Sørensen	 and	Torfing	
2005:	212).	They	are	 fluid	 formations	 that	depend	on	 the	actions	 taken	by	involved actors. Thus, democratic practice in transnational civil society net-works seems to be a case of changing, making and reconfiguring instead of an institutionalization of democratic norms.In the following sections of this chapter, I discuss what practice theory has to say about rules, norms and their relation to the knowledge and agency of actors in practices, in order to arrive at an understanding of democratic prac-tice in transnational civil society networks.
6	 http://www.cleanclothes.org/about/principles	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
7	 http://www.foei.org/about-foei/organisation	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
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1.1 Defining and Changing Rules “as we go along”Practice theory explores many different aspects of the social. In view of demo-cratic practice, the role of rules within practice theory becomes crucial. Rules 
can	follow	different	logics;	one	of	them	is	the	compliance	with	specific	values.	Those are the rules which are relevant in the context of democratic systems. 
Democratic	elections	follow	specific	rules	that	are	deducted	from	democratic	values. In order to speak of democratic practice, we thus have to clarify how democratic rules are part of political practices, i.e. how political practices be-come democratic practices. Thus, the following paragraphs will outline prac-tice theory with an emphasis on the relation between rules and practices.
A Game with Hidden Rules: the Beginnings of Practice Theory
The	 roots	 of	 practice	 theory	 can	 be	 found	 in	Wittgenstein’s	 theory	 of	 lan-guage games in Philosophical Investigations	(1953),	Garfinkel’s	Studies in Eth-
nomethodology	(1967),	Bourdieu’s	Outline of a Theory of Practice	(1977)	and	
Giddens’	Theory of Structuration (1984).	Wittgenstein	 is	seen	as	having	de-veloped the conceptual “backbone” of practice theory. He stated that regular action can never be determined by explicit rules exclusively, because even the most explicit rule can never cover every possible instance. Therefore, actors need background knowledge on how to handle certain situations. Rules need to be interpreted by actors (Wittgenstein 2011 [1953]); (Schulz-Schaeffer 
2010:	321).	Through	this	interactive	process	between	an	actor’s	 interpreta-tion and the systematic rule, practices emerge. Wittgenstein states, in his the-
ory	of	language	games,	how	little	the	act	of	speaking	is	influenced	by	general	rules because the forms of language use are so manifold, and speaking as such 
is	part	of	an	activity:	 “How	many	 forms	of	sentences	do	exist?	For	 instance	
claim,	question	and	order?	–	There	are	countless forms:	 countless	different	sorts of all that what we call “signs”, “words”, “sentences”. And this variety is nothing solid, nothing eternally given; rather new types of language, new lan-guage games, how we could call it, evolve and others become outdated and are 
forgotten.	[…]	The	word	“language game” should emphasize here that speak-
ing the language is part of an activity, or a form of life. “(Wittgenstein 2011 
[1953]:26,	author’s	own	translation,	italics	in	the	original)8.
8	 	Original	quote:	„Wieviele	Arten	der	Sätze	gibt	es	aber?	Etwa	Behauptung,	Frage	und	Be-
fehl?	–	Es	gibt	unzählige	solcher	Arten:	unzählige	verschiedene	Arten	der	Verwendung	
alles	dessen,	was	wir	“Zeichen”,	“Worte”,	“Sätze”,	nennen.	Und	diese	Mannigfaltigkeit	ist	nichts Festes, ein für allemal Gegebenes; sondern neue Typen der Sprache, neue Sprachspiele, wie wir sagen können, entstehen und andre veralten und werden verges-
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According to Wittgenstein, practices are co-produced by systematic rules and actors who interpret situations and rules with their own background 
knowledge	and	experience.	In	this,	rules	are	not	only	sufficiently	vague	and	thus open for interpretation in practice, they do not even need to exist when practice begins. Could it not also be the case that we play and “make up the 
rules	as	we	go	along”	(ibid:	68),	Wittgenstein	asks.	Besides	the	interpreting	rules that already exist, the actors who practice, who play, language games 
can	define	rules	while	practicing.	Rules	can	emerge	and	crystallize	out	of	the	practice itself. Thus, rules are not only interpreted through actors in language games, they can also be invented in the process of doing, of performing a 
‘game’.	Translating	this	to	the	practice	of	politics,	the	possible	spectrum	of	dis-cussing democratic legitimation opens up. Beyond the schematic evaluation of the compliance of a certain democratic rule, it can be explored if and in how 
far	democratic	rules	are	applied,	modified,	invented	“as	we	go	along”.	
Harold	Garfinkel’s	perspective	on	social	rules	that	are	implicit,	“that	are	just in our heads” emphasizes the background expectancies of everyday life 
(Garfinkel	 1967:	 37).	With	 his	 crisis experiments, he showed that a slight change of socially appropriate action can be extremely irritating to others, although those rules are not explicitly agreed on (ibid.). He underlines the stability and persistence of social rules rather than the openness for change. The deep bewilderment that he evoked with his experiments, on the side of 
the	‘victim’	and	the	experimenters	alike,	was	even	stronger	when	the	involved	persons believed the hidden rules to be unchangeable social facts constituting a moral order. Normalizing efforts were a common reaction (ibid.). Familiar scenes of everyday activities, treated by members9 as the ‘natural 
facts	of	life’,	are	massive	facts	of	the	members’	daily	existence	both	as	a	real	
world	and	as	the	product	of	activities	in	a	real	world.	They	furnish	the	 ‘fix’,	
the	 ‘this	 is	 it’	 to	which	 the	waking	 state	 returns	one,	 and	are	 the	points	of	
departure	and	return	for	every	modification	of	the	world	of	daily	life	that	is	
achieved	in	play,	dreaming,	trance,	theater,	scientific	theorizing,	or	high	cere-
mony.	(Garfinkel	1967:	35)
Garfinkel	states	three	things	in	the	above	quote:	(1)	the	hidden	expectations,	
the	 informal	 rules	of	every	day	 interaction	are	 stable	 configurations.	There	
is	a	certain	quality	to	social	rules	that	makes	them	appear	as	‘facts’	to	actors.	(2) Those rules are not merely viewed as given, they are seen as products of 
actors’	actions	in	the	‘real	world’.	In	this,	actors	are	contributing	to	the	emer-
gence	of	those	rules.	(3)	Modifications	of	the	common	grounds	of	social	prac-
tice	take	place	in	unconscious,	habitual	actions.	In	this,	Garfinkel	agrees	on	the	
sen.	[…]	Das	Wort	„Sprachspiel“ soll hier hervorheben, daß das Sprechen der Sprache ein 
Teil	ist	einer	Tätigkeit,	oder	einer	Lebensform.“ (Wittgenstein	2011	[1953]:26)9  Garfinkel	refers	to	‘members’	as	members	of	a	society	(Garfinkel	1967:	35).
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interpretative quality of rules and the necessity of background knowledge to maneuver daily practice. However, he suggests some restrictions to the possi-bilities of changing rules “as we go along”. 
Wittgenstein	and	Garfinkel	both	oppose	the	idea	that	rules	are	external	to	practice and exist a priori. Both emphasize the hidden knowledge that actors 
use	to	 interact	with	each	other.	While	Wittgenstein	and	Garfinkel’s	theories	
rest	on	micro-level	interactions,	Bourdieu	and	Giddens’	accounts	of	practice	
reach	into	the	broader	configuration	of	societies.
Knowledge, Agency and Rules
Pierre	Bourdieu	(1977)	and	Anthony	Giddens	(1984)	built	theories	of	prac-tices that attempt to explain society by reconciling micro-and macro-level explanations. Whereas Bourdieu sees practices as preconscious habits, re-producing rather static groups and distinctions in society, Giddens ascribes 
to	individuals	the	ability	to	reflect	and	change	practices,	and	therefore	change	the structures and rules of society. Practice as social action is, according to Bourdieu, an action by which actors produce and reproduce social, cultural and economic realities10. As a result, practice as an individual behavior be-
comes	 part	 of	 larger	 social	 developments	 (Münch	 2004;	 Bourdieu	 1977).	The practice theory of Bourdieu thus combines subjectivist and objectivist sociological approaches. Bourdieu distinguishes practices from any formal rule-enforced action and thus situates practices in the informal, implicit con-
text	 of	 rituals	 and	 habits	 (Bourdieu	 1977:	 16-18).	 Nevertheless,	 according	to Bourdieu, there is a “grammar of practices” that accompanies every prac-tice and controls the functionality of practices. This grammar can consist of spontaneous “theorizing” by actors about their own actions and the actions of others. However, these secondary explanations of actors “only reinforce the 
structures	by	providing	them	with	a	particular	form	of	‘rationalization’”	(ibid:	29). Furthermore, Bourdieu does not think that the agency of actors, meaning the ability to steer the way and direction of practices, is a main characteristic of 
practices:	“If	agents	are	possessed	by	their	habitus	more	than	they	possess	it,	this is because it acts within them as the organizing principle of their actions, and because this modus operandi, informing all thought and action (including the thought of action) reveals itself only in the modus operatum.”(ibid:	18).	
10  Bourdieu developed his understanding of social practice after observing the Algerian Kabyls and their daily household practices, concluding that diverse practices were partly ambiguous in relationship to greater structures. Those social practices made sense for the individual actor, but not necessarily for the objectivist system. Bourdieu reconstruct-ed the self-concepts of actors instead of looking at general and systematic rules of inter-action.
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Practices make sense to individual actors, but are not intentionally steered by them. 
IR	 scholars	 have	 found	 Bourdieu’s	 concept	 of	 the field very instruc-
tive	 in	explaining	 the	 transnational	 space	 (Bueger	and	Gadinger	2014:	25).	
Bourdieu’s	conception	of	fields	as	“social	configurations	structured	along	re-
lations	of	power,	objects	of	 struggle	and	 taken	 for	granted	rules”	 (ibid:	24)	
focuses	on	the	hierarchies	in	such	fields	through	unequal	resources	(capital),	and the options of actors to improve their stakes in the game through learning background knowledge and other rather non-material skills, which Bourdieu also frames as capital (cultural and social capital), and thus opens up new per-spectives for IR-scholars to explore and understand power struggles and rela-tions in the transnational space (ibid.).The reproduction of society through shared practices and the reconcil-iation of subjectivist and objectivist social theory are two aspects that are 
common	in	Bourdieu’s	and	Gidden’s	practice	theories.	Anthony	Giddens	con-
ceptualized	a	“grand”	theory,	the	theory	of	structuration	(Giddens	1984),	as	a way to reconcile objectivist and subjectivist social theory. Social practices 
in	Giddens’	theory	of	structuration	are	neither	individual	subjective	choices	of action nor structurally steered behavior. Giddens argues that society can neither be explained by investigating isolated individual micro phenomena nor by identifying a detached structure (ibid.). Social practices are not without context and rules, but they are changeable by the agents11 who conduct social practices. According to Giddens, the primacy of either the individual subject or the institutional object needs to be dissolved into a theory of structuration, which argues that the central focus of social research should neither be on the ex-
perience	of	 the	 individual	 agent	nor	on	 the	 coerciveness	of	 society’s	 struc-ture, but on the social practices regulated by time and space. Social practices as shared courses of action are co-constituted by actors and structure, and 
can	be	modified	by	the	agency	of	the	actors	(Giddens	1984:	2–5).	Agents	are	able to change everyday actions, because structural rules are often not explicit and only become present while acting (ibid.).The agent necessarily needs to know the rules of a certain practice in order to take part in it or potentially modify the practice. Rules are, according to Giddens, “techniques or general-izable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices” 
(Giddens	1984:	21).	Thus,	rules	are	aspects	of	practices.	They	can	be	explic-11  In	general,	I	use	the	term	actor	as	a	neutral	term,	defining	individual	and	collective	actors.	Giddens frames the term agent in opposition to actor, which, as he states, is part of sub-jectivist theories of action and thus implies certain attributes. The agent, in contrast to the actor, is not an abstract subject, but somebody who participates in practices and 
changes	the	course	of	practices	(Münch	2004:	477-78).	When	referring	to	Giddens’	theo-ry of structuration, I will adopt the term agent.
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itly	formulated	or	be	implicit	(ibid.).	Rules	are	not	necessarily	codified	in	an	extensive rule book, but they are techniques and procedures that are closely linked to the conduct of the practice. 
The	continuity	of	social	practice	assumes	reflexivity	of	the	agent.	At	the	
same	 time	 such	 reflexivity	 is	 only	 possible	 through	 continuous	 practices,	
which	are	understood	as	a	process.	Thus,	reflexivity	of	the	agent	is	not	only	self-consciousness, but implies a permanent control of action of oneself and 
others.	The	assumption	behind	this	is	that	individuals	act	with	specific	moti-vations, but such motivations might not be consciously known by individuals 
and	cannot	be	understood	isolated	from	time	and	space	(Giddens	1984:	6–7).	
It	 is	 a	practical	 consciousness,	 in	which	we	can	 find	 tacit	 knowledge	about	
routinized	practices	(Giddens	1984:	61).	However,	the	dividing	line	between	practical and discursive consciousness is permeable. Since action is, in con-trast to behavior, understood as intentional, acting is in a direct relationship to the individual, who acts. There might be unintended consequences and circumstances that “let individuals act” in a certain way, but in the end it is the agent who has the transformative capacity to “make a difference (Giddens 
1984:	14–15).	While	not	negating	the	power	of	structures,	Giddens	wants	to	
oppose	the	objectivist	notion	of	structures	as	“forces	in	nature”:	Many interesting cases for social analysis centre upon the margins of what 
can	count	as	action	–	where	the	power	of	the	individual	is	confined	by	a	range	
of	specifiable	circumstances.	But	it	is	of	the	first	importance	to	recognize	that	
circumstances	of	social	constraint	 in	which	 individuals	 ‘have	no	choice’	are	
not	to	be	equated	with	the	dissolution	of	action	as	such.	To	‘have	no	choice’	
does	not	mean	that	action	has	been	replaced	by	reaction	(Giddens	1984:	15). According to Giddens, analyzing the structuration of social systems means analyzing how those systems are produced and reproduced by interactions. Such systems are based on consciously carried out practices of situated agents, 
who	refer	to	different	rules	and	resources	in	different	contexts	(ibid: 25).	The	knowledgeability of actors in practices plays an important role in his theory. “The knowledgeability incorporated in the practical activities which make up the bulk of daily life is a constitutive feature (together with power) of the so-cial world. What is known about the social world by its constituent actors is not separate from their world, as in the case of knowledge of events or objects 
in	nature.”	(Giddens	1984:	90).	Knowledge	of	actors	is	thus	situated	in	social	contexts and should be interpreted in this regard. The aim of reconciling of objectivist and subjectivist approaches let Bourdieu and Giddens turn to practices as a middle phenomenon between broader structure and isolated actions. Collective practices that are closely 
connected	to	the	incorporated	knowledge	of	actors	are	defining	much	of	the	social world. Giddens, however, asserts that the agency of the agent gives them 
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the options to change and invent practice. This brings us to the micro-aspects 
of	practice	theory,	which	are	of	specific	interest	in	recent	debates.Practices are, according to Reckwitz (2003), the smallest unit of the social. Practices are nothing more than body movements12 and are often character-ized by persons dealing with “things”, an interaction between people and ar-tefacts. These interactions are based on practical understanding and implicit knowledge. Knowledge is incorporated and materialized in practices. Thus, 
practices	 are	 always	 knowledge-based	 actions	 (Reckwitz	 2003:	 290–291).	Reckwitz concludes that social practices can be understood as a combination of knowledge-dependent behavioral routines. Practices as such consist of rou-tinized motions and actions of the body. A practice becomes social when it is a collective practice and is intersubjectively understandable, thus becoming 
a	“skillful	performance”	that	can	be	interpreted	by	others	(ibid.).	Reckwitz’s	practice theory emphasizes the implicitness of knowledge. While acting, cri-teria are used to establish meaning for other persons and things in order to take appropriate actions. Thus, this knowledge is practical and not preceding a social practice. One aim of practice theory in this regard is to reconstruct this 
practical	knowledge,	which	is	comprised	of	three	elements:	knowledge	as	in-terpretive understanding, methodical knowledge and motivational-emotional 
knowledge	(ibid:	290–92).	However, the idea of implicit knowledge about generalizable rules is doubted by some theorists (Turner 2005). The “tacit rule book” (ibid.) does not necessarily exist. Turner states that, analogous to Wittgenstein, there are 
so	many	 possible	 situations,	 context-dependent	 specific	 rules	 and	 expecta-tions on how to behave that it becomes impossible to know all those rules. There are rules, but people interpret them either according to their own pur-poses (How are actors pursuing their interests through the interpretation of 
certain rules?) or with the aim of “optimizing harmony” with others (How 
are actors able to share practices and reach a mutual intelligibility?) (Turner 
2005: 124)	Furthermore,	Turner	states	that,	especially	in	the	field	of	politics,	
explicit	rules	are	what	make	practices	“hang	together”:	The explicit rather than the tacit parts of politics, the vocabulary of apprais-al, the body of political and historical discussion, and explicitly formulated beliefs of various kinds, do the work of making practices hang together. A 
practice	such	as	scientific	discovery,	build	around	training	that	is	oriented	to	
12  Much literature on the more recent “Practice Turn” puts an emphasis on the bodily ex-pression of practices (Reckwitz 2003). The practice theories conceptualized by current 
theorists	such	as	Schatzki	et al.	(2005),	Reckwitz	(2003)	and	others	emphasize	the	ob-ject, the non-human artifact as an important part of social practices as a nexus of routines, which sometimes enable certain practices. An example mentioned by Reckwitz (2003) is the invention of letterpress printing and the following newly created practices to use books.
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enabling a person to participate in discussions involving highly specialized terms and employing common apparatus, may in some respects be more like 
arithmetic,	[…]	And	explicit	discussion,	not	the	training	base,	pulls	the	prac-
tice	in	new	directions	and	toward	new	goals	and	experiences.	(ibid:	127)Thus, how practices “hang together”, meaning how they possibly form a mac-ro-structure, is not necessarily dependent upon the implicit knowledge base 
of	actors,	but	rather	on	the	actors’	interpretations	of	implicit	rules	as	well	as	their interactions with others, or on explicit rules themselves. Still, the rela-tionship between macro- and micro level in practice theory remains a complex interplay of interpretations, contexts and occurrences, as Jeff Coulter (2005) 
notes.	 Practices	 can	 reaffirm	 and	 instantiate	 “relevant	 macro-phenomena”	
(Coulter	2005:	34)	as	persons	conducting	practices	can,	 for	example,	act	as	
spokespersons	and	representatives	of	specific	institutions.	However,	this	oc-
curs	only	under	specific	circumstances	according	to	specific	rules.	A	person	is	of course not always the carrier of an institution. For example, the staff person does not always speak on behalf of the bank, but always when she or he is in a 
professional	meeting	with	clients	(Coulter	2005:	34–36).	Thus,	macro-social	phenomena can be observed in daily practices, which are shared by a group 
of	people;	for	example,	officers	or	craftsmen.	They	conduct	practices	in	their	role of belonging to a group and thus have, in this regard, similar intentions. Although practices are individual actions, there are rough patterns that can be translated into macro-categories of practices (Barnes 2005). Practice theory suggests that there is no unidirectional determination of actions, either by structures or by actors. The complex interplay of struc-
tural	 factors	and	agents’	choices	results	 in	an	ongoing	process	of	 inventing,	interpreting, reproducing and modifying rules for practice. In the following, I want to look at the relationship between norms and practices. While rules can be understood as any kind of (functional) regulation, the norms that I am 
concerned	with	are	specific	rules	or	organizing	principles	(Wiener	2014)	that	
refer	to	ideas	and	virtues	that	are	valued	as	‘good’	or	‘right’,	i.e.	human	rights	or democracy.
1.2 Practicing NormsThere is a certain tension between the character of norms and the concepts of practices. Norms are often understood as static, external from identities and 
individuals’	 actions,	 structuring	 action	 or	 giving	 orientation	 for	 action	 and	proclaiming universal validity (human rights). Practices are an expression of the intertwining nature of persons and their social and physical environ-
ments,	the	modification	of	rules	in	process,	and	the	implicitness	of	knowledge.	
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Norms identify desirable states, while practice theory knows no states, but 
rather	fluid	processes	that	can	be	at	best	tracked	for	a	while.	In	short,	norma-tive theory and practice theory might not go well together. However, I claim that practices can also be normatively interpreted – for example, as democratic.	My	 argument	 unfolds	 as	 follows:	 I	will	 first	 clarify	
how	norms	are	conventionally	conceptualized,	and	how	these	definitions	are	recently challenged by approaches that were developed in critical examina-
tion	of	social	constructivist	theory,	namely	Antje	Wiener’s	theory	of	contested	
norms	in	IR,	and	Judith	Butler’s	discussion	of	the	performative	reproduction	
of	norms	in	gender	theory.	After	that,	 I	want	to	discuss	Rahel	Jaeggi’s	argu-mentation for a normative critique of forms of life. Wiener emphasizes more generally the contextual quality of norms and their potential to be contested. This is crucial for understanding democratic norms in the context of trans-national relations and their dynamic nature, contested by actors and devel-
opments.	Butler	 contributes	 to	a	 clarification	on	 the	 role	of	 the	actors.	 She	asserts that norms are part of practices that actors can change over time. But-
ler’s	argument	makes	clear,	in	addition	to	Wiener’s	theory	of	contestation,	that	norms live from repeated practices, but can be steered in different directions 
by	actors.	Jaeggi’s	critique	of	forms	of	life	helps	to	clarify	the	role	of	norma-tive theory for the account of practice, in that she points us to the normative dimension of norms and how a normative account of practice can be possible.Social constructivism brought norms research to international relations. Early constructivists introduced norms as a behavior-structuring phenome-non. Based on sociological institutionalism, the logic of appropriateness con-
ceptualizes	norms	as	standards	for	‘normal’,	appropriate	behavior.	States	and	other actors in international relations not only follow power (realism) or in-
terests	(liberalism),	but	also	norms	that	they	assume	to	define	common	guide-
lines	of	appropriate	behavior	(March	and	Olsen	2008).	This	already	reveals	
the	character	of	such	norms:	they	pre-structure	the	behavior	of	actors	in	order	to normalize it, bring it into a state of what is assumed normal. Although ear-ly social constructivists saw norms as being constructed, they assumed that norms were constituted once and were hardly contested thereafter (Wendt 
1992:	 68);	 (Risse-Kappen	 et al.	 1999:	 826).	 This	 one-directional	 quality	 of	norms was challenged by critical regime theorists and critical constructivists, who claimed that norms have a cognitive quality next to their habitual quali-ty. Actors work with norms instead of just being habitually steered by norms 
they	assume	define	appropriate	behavior.	Actors	 thus	have	 the	potential	 to	contest norms in every stage of norm generation, be it the constituting, refer-ring or implementing phase of norms. This makes norms a much more com-
plex	phenomenon	and	contextualizes	their	validity	(Wiener	2014:	26-30).	In	this way, Wiener claims that norms research should not focus on compliance with norms (as in conventional social constructivism in IR), but on contesting 
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norms. The practice of norms comes into focus. Norms gain a dual quality in that they structure and are constructed through practice. Wiener conceptu-alizes the contestation of norms as a norm-generative practice, which can be 
a	“legitimacy	enhancing	practice	in	the	global	realm”	(Wiener	2014:	45).	Di-verse actors in the transnational arena should be able to contest norms, and thus norms become contestable by practice.The way norms can be worked with in practice was also laid out by Judith 
Butler	(2004).	She	describes,	in	her	essay	on	David	Reimer,	who	was,	after	a	
doctor’s	 fault,	 surgically	 transformed	 into	and	 raised	as	a	girl,	 the	 inherent	normativity of (gender) practice. His story, tragically ending in suicide, ques-tions general assumptions of both (gender) essentialism as well as social con-structivism. David, raised as Brenda, felt very early that she rather wanted to 
play	with	and	like	boys,	while	Brenda’s	psychiatrists	assumed	that	gender	is	
constructed	and	purely	defined	by	how	a	child	is	raised.	Brenda	was	super-vised closely by doctors and psychiatrists and began to understand that there 
was	a	norm	(femininity)	that	she	failed	to	live	up	to	(Butler	2004:	69).	She	ex-perienced that norm to be externally given by the expectation of psychiatrists and her social environment. However, Butler doubts this external character 
of	the	norm,	and	sees	the	norm	being	inherent	in	Brenda’s	practices	of	‘freak-
ishness’	(ibid).	In	this,	Brenda	reproduced	the	norms	that	are	supposed	to	be	
normal	 in	his	daily	practice	of	not	 liking	dolls	or	girls’	 clothes,	 and	playing	
with	 trucks	 instead	 (ibid:	 70).	Brenda	 strongly	defined	herself	 through	 the	
opposition	of	supposedly	female	preferences,	which	might	beg	the	question:	is it unfeminine	to	dislike	dolls?	Would	other	little	girls	be	brought	to	a	psy-
chiatrist	if	they	refused	to	play	with	dolls?	Thus,	Butler	concludes	that	norms	are inscribed in practice and vice versa; practice reproduces or potentially 
modifies	norms:When one performance of gender is considered real and another false, or when one presentation of gender is considered authentic, and another fake, then we can conclude that a certain ontology of gender is conditioning these judgments, an ontology (an account of what gender is) that is also put into crisis by the performance of gender in such a way that these judgments are 
undermined	or	become	impossible	to	make.	(ibid:	214)
Butler’s	concept	of	practice	is	embedded	in	a	critique	against	essentialist	and	prediscursive identities (the “I”). She asserts that there are massive social 
norms	that	affect	a	person’s	gender	identity.	However,	those	norms	do	not	de-
termine	what	it	‘is’	to	be	female	or	male,	i.e.	resulting	in	the	signification	of	a	
certain	identity.	Confirming	gendered	norms	is,	according	to	Butler,	rather	a	
recursive	practice:
[…]	signification	is	not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of rep-
etition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the 
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production	of	substantializing	effects.	In	a	sense,	all	signification	takes	place	within the orbit of the compulsion to repeat; “agency”, then, is to be located 
within	the	possibility	of	a	variation	on	that	repetition.	(Butler	2002:	198).The actor is able to modify repeated practices and therefore change suppos-
edly	‘natural’	norms.	For	exploring	the	relationship	between	norms,	rules	and	
practices,	Butler’s	critical	examination	of	identity	contributes	the	insight	that	norms are not something that determines identity or the practice of identity 
a priori. There is no stable set of attitudes at point in time x.	Butler’s	idea	is	rather that identities form in the constant repetition and reproduction of cer-tain norms. How a man has to sit (legs not crossed) is such a gendered norm, 
which	is	reproduced	constantly,	but	which	can	also	quite	easily	be	modified	in	daily practice. Having focused on norms from an analytical perspective, I now turn to the normative dimension of norms. Beyond the questions of what norms do and how they interact with persons, practices and structures, there are norma-tive questions about which norms are ‘good’	and	should be practiced. We have 
seen	 in	Butler’s	 analysis	 that	normative	questions	already	accompany	such	descriptions of the character of gendered norms, and how actors can circum-vent and eventually change them. Consequently I will point out, with Jaeggi 
(2014),	that	descriptive	analysis	and	normative	evaluation	cannot	be	separat-ed that easily. Similar to gender norms, in each account of democratic norms, there is a certain hidden normativity. These – of course diversely interpreted and contested – democratic norms need to be scrutinized in order to be able to speak about democratic practice. Therefore, the normative dimension of prac-tice is relevant. The conceptualization of democracy as practice can now open up new questions of what democratic norms mean in practice. How are they 
translated	into	actions?	How	good	are	they	for	involved	persons	and	organiza-
tions?	And,	of	course,	when	does	a	practice	qualify	as	democratic	(for	involved	
persons)?	In	this	complex	interplay	of	practice	and	norms,	it	seems	like	the	
normative	standpoint	as	such	needs	to	be	modified,	too.	As	Lisa	Disch	(2015)	argues, theorists could shift their perspective to the “citizen standpoint” as an internal standpoint from which evaluation and critique can be articulated. This might be a solution to the normativity trap, in which liberal theories are stuck, as Jaeggi points out. 
Jaeggi’s	argument	 is	an	argument	against	 the	 liberal	neutrality	 towards	the private sphere, which Rawls coined in his theory of justice as fairness. The state should not judge private forms of life in pluralist societies, in order to do 
justice	to	the	forms	of	life	(Jaeggi	2014:	31).	Jaeggi	refers	to	forms of life as in-
ert	bundles	of	social	practices	(ibid:	94).	It	should	be	possible	to	normatively	
criticize	 forms	of	 life.	Her	argument	 is	also	an	argument	against	Habermas’	division of morals and ethics, in which he put forward the intuitive separation of a universal moral of “the right” (das Richtige) which can be normatively 
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judged, and the plural ethics of different forms and groups in society (ideas of “the good” life), which are not to be judged. While the moral refers to univer-sal and basic norms that every member in a society must respect, according to Habermas, ethics are particular ideas of a good or successful life. Those should not be of public matter. However, Jaeggi asks if this “ethical abstention” 
(Habermas:	1983)	is	not	too	pragmatic	a	solution	for	the	struggles	of	pluralist	
societies.	How	do	we	decide	between	morals	and	ethics?	While	the	cruel	tor-ture of a person must be considered wrong, disconcerting education or mar-
riage	practices	are	ethical	particularities	(Jaeggi	citing	Habermas	2014: 37).If	
parents	beat	their	children,	is	this	an	ethical	particularity	of	specific	milieus	in	
society	or	morally	‘wrong’,	because	the	dignity	of	persons	is	violated?	Refrain-
ing	 from	articulating	such	conflicts	 is	what	 Jaeggi	calls	 the	avoidance	strat-egy of liberal theory. Why should these questions not remain in the private 
sphere?	Jaeggi	argues	that	the	state	already	regulates	many	supposedly	pri-vate forms of life in how it supports technology, infrastructure and education. 
All	 these	public	measures	 influence	social	practices	 in	 the	so-called	private	sphere. Forms of life are always politically instituted and dependent on pub-
lic	institutions.	The	choice	for	specific	values	in	the	institutional	frame	of	the	
liberal	state	is	always	already	made	(ibid:	40).	The	neutrality	of	liberals	is	a	“self-misunderstanding” (ibid.). The division between moral and ethical mat-ters is in itself context dependent and thus naturalizes liberal values. Alterna-tives are invisible. In this way, liberal theory fails in its own norm of autonomy 
and	anti-paternalism	in	the	choice	and	organization	of	forms	of	life –	neutral	abstention does not enable people to build their lives autonomously; rather, 
it	conceals	the	powers	that	determine	it	(ibid:	47).	Furthermore,	liberal	theo-ry does not acknowledge the dynamics of forms of life and thus essentializes them. Because of this, those bundles of social practices are not fully recog-
nized	in	their	meaning	for	individuals	and	their	normative	claims	(ibid:	51).
Furthermore,	 social	 practices	 such	 as	 habits	 already	 normatively	 prefigure	
peoples’	life	choices	and	actions.	There is a deep inscription of norms in the forms of life. The description of a form of life, for example family, already implies certain norms that are part of the practices conducted in and as	 family	 (ibid:	143).	Do	 family	practices	
correspond	with	the	term	family?	The	spontaneous	expression:	“This	is	not	a	
family	anymore!”	already	defines	the	norms	entailed	in	the	practice	of	being	a family, namely as being a loving, mutually supportive community. Similar to practice theorists, Jaeggi argues that besides the explicit norms, there are 
implicit	norms	in	practices.	This	makes	the	sole	identification	of	social	prac-
tices	already	normative.	A	form	of	life,	such	as	the	family,	which	is	identified	as itself, is already normatively coined. The evaluation of the family as being a 
very caring family or just a good-enough family is not necessarily needed in or-
der	to	make	a	normative	statement	about	the	associated	practice	(ibid: 151).
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Ontologically, but also epistemically speaking, practices and norms are not 
separable:	the	analysis	of	social	practices	is	already	intertwined	with	its	cri-
tique.	We	should	be	able	to	‘see’	the	repressive	character	of	a	practice	in	order	
to	normatively	evaluate	it	(ibid:	55).	Jaeggi	argues	for	a	normative	critique	of	
forms	of	life	not	as	something	that	is	externally	done	by	‘judges’	(be	it	philos-ophers or politicians) and then implemented in restrictive laws. Critique is meant as public discussion of debatable forms of life and the possibility of an 
emancipatory	transformation	of	such	practices	(ibid:	53).Concluding from the practice accounts outlined above, practice theory 
first	helps	 to	explore	 transnational	civil	 society	networks	and	 their	specific	
characteristics	–	or,	as	Antje	Wiener	has	put	it:	“‘transnational	arenas’	[…]	are	constructed through practice and can, therefore be reconstructed with refer-ence to practice by empirical research. That is, they emerge through the en-
actment	of	normative	structures	of	meaning-in-use”	(Wiener	2014:	30).	Thus,	
practice	 theory	 can	 enable	 the	 exploration	 of	 the	 dynamic	 and	 often	 fluid	
transnational	civil	society	networks	with	their	specific	forms	of	politics.	Sec-ond, practice theory accounts of norms and normativity can usefully guide the critical discussion of democratic practice, where static criteria for democratic quality fail to address the peculiarities of the transnational realm. 
1.3 Political Practice and Democratic NormsTurning to the political space, we need to specify what political practices 
are	and	what	the	specific	character	of	democratic norms is. Similar to social 
life,	norms	and	practices	are	intertwined	in	political	life,	too.	Nullmeier	et al.	(2003) understands practices in politics as (a) interactions and (b) communi-cations – below the level of institutions – that create and structure the political space. Whereas communication is understood as the basic term for all kinds of social action, interaction is communication between present actors (face-to-face communication). In addition, political practices can be more or less complex in terms of how many actors, communication forms and media are in-volved or how many sub-practices are subsumed13	(Nullmeier	et al.	2003: 18).
Democratic practice necessarily entails a normative understanding of im-plicit and explicit rules. While rules in social and political practices can main-ly have a functional character, rules in democratic practices refer to shared normative ideas of how democratic certain practices should be. Democracy is based on moral ideas of equality and liberty. These broader values are trans-
lated	into	specific	democratic	norms	or	organizing	principles	such	as	balance	13  Nullmeier	et al.	(2003)	cite	political intrigue as one form of a very complex political prac-tice that contains several single political practices.
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of power, voting rights, and so on. In the practices that I study, the organizing principles are these kinds of norms, which are brought to life by practices, 
embed	in	routines	and	at	the	same	time	configure	how	practices	evolve	and	change. These norms are contextual in that they are, for example, interpreted 
differently	 in	 specific	models	of	democracy	or	 in	various	 countries	or	 even	
cities	(Wiener	2014).Democracy in its most abstract version is a set of different norms. The 
broadest	definition	of	an	“empowered	inclusion	of	those	affected	in	collective	
decisions	and	actions“(Warren	2006:	386)	sets	the	parameter	for	any	specific	type of democracy. This means that participatory democrats may apply this 
norm	to	participatory	processes	and	as	a	justification	of	participatory	democ-racy, which could best facilitate the conduct of the democratic norm. Similarly, deliberative democrats and representative democrats argue for their respec-tive types of democracy. While participatory democracy on the hand and representative democracy on the other are sometimes used as oppositional concepts, practices of participation and representation can stand side by side 
and	complement	each	other.	Based	on	the	assumption	that	there	are	specific	participatory, deliberative and representative democratic norms, which fol-
low	the	broadest	definition	of	democracy	named	above,	those	norms	can	be	
divided	into	several	specific	rules14. Actors have learned tacit and explicit rules in order to perform (Turner 
2005:	120).	Furthermore,	the	learning	of	these	rules	can	increase	the	ability	of actors to conduct practices and can enable actors to position themselves towards rules and practices, i.e. go around rules, reinterpret rules (Nullmei-
er	 2008)	 or	 disapprove/approve	 of	 practices	 or	 their	 underlying	 rules.	 In	how far actors can position themselves in a practice highly depends on their knowledge base about the broader structure (the network), the institutions (e.g. general assemblies) and the practices (e.g. decision-making). This knowl-edge is framed very broadly. Giddens calls it “accurate or valid awareness” or 
“practical	consciousness”	(Giddens	1984:	90)	it	has	a	mainly	practical	conno-tation, being incorporated into practices. “Practical consciousness consists of knowing the rules and the tactics whereby daily social life is constituted and reconstituted across space and time” (ibid.). This positioning of actors in practices in turn can modify these practices and consequently their rules. If actors are reluctant to perform a certain prac-tice or to follow the rules of this practice (for example, monthly reporting to their local constituency), the practice will change. Eventually, positionings of actors through practices can lead to a re-interpretation or circumvention of the norms inherent in a practice. The revision and dissolution of the tension 
14  Here, I follow the path of process-oriented democracy. Traditional democratic theorists would argue for the translation of principles into structure and/or resources.
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between an idealist and ambitious norm set (e.g. participatory democracy) and the necessities of functioning daily routines can be successful through re-interpretation and/or circumvention of norms. However, a permanent and consequent re-interpretation or circumvention can also lead to an abolish-
ment	of	the	respective	norm	(Nullmeier	and	Pritzlaff	2010:	21).	Actors	justify	
their	actions	with	reference	to	explicit	norms	or	“practice”	implicit	norms:If one adopts this idea of an implicit, process-oriented dimension of norma-tivity, a typology of explicit sources of normativity has to be complemented by a conception of political practices as performative actualizations of implicit norms. A two-dimensional conception of the normativity of political practices has to address the relation between sources agents explicitly refer to when justifying their actions or proposed decision options and the implicit norma-tive force that becomes apparent in what they actually do, the norms they observe and perpetuate in their actual engagement in political practices, like 
for	example	in	different	types	of	decision-making	practices.	(ibid:	361–62)Actors in transnational civil societies, for example, can refer to explicit norms of democratic coordination and decision-making and at the same time per-petuate the implicit norms they observe in other interactions, or perform in their own daily routines. In transnational civil society organizations as such, individual members, coordinators and campaigners subscribe to and modify (possibly even circumvent) explicit references to and implicit understandings 
of	democratic	norms.	Norms	have	a	dual	quality;	as	Wiener	 (2014)	puts	 it,	they are structuring and constructed.A practice-theoretical approach to democracy stands in stark contrast to the traditional concepts of democracy, which emphasize the institutional character of democracy. The institutional architecture of democratic systems guarantees certain democratic norms, such as checks and balances, minority protection or equal voting rights. This institutional account of democracy has a long tradition. The social contract as an institutionalization of the relation-
ship	between	rulers	and	ruled	is	a	corner	stone	of	the	justification	of	legitima-
cy	of	the	democratic	government,	according	to	Rousseau	(1762).	This	kind	of	institutionalized relationship was further developed in the federalist papers 
by	Madison,	Hamilton	and	Jay	(1787/88),	used	in	the	drafting	of	a	constitu-tion for the United States of America. In contrast to Rousseau, the federalist paper authors conceptualized a democratic theory that is based on pluralism and not on the identity of ruler and ruled. Due to the necessity of drafting a constitution for a large mass society, they emphasized representation as a main element. J.S. Mill later argued for a representative government with an 
institutionalized	system	of	pluralist	voting	(1861).	These	foundations	of	mod-ern democratic theory show the traditional rootedness of democracy in insti-tutions. However, some accounts of democracy that have been drafted since the mid-20th century, try to conceptualize a more process- and practice-ori-
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ented approach to democracy in order to overcome the drawbacks of tradi-tional representative democracy, such as voting fatigue, political ignorance or 
inequality	in	formal	participation:	Process-and	practice-oriented	democratic	
theory	can	be	divided	into	three	main	strands	of	literature:	(1)	literature	on	participatory democracy, dating back to Athenian direct democracy, revived in the 1960s by Pateman, Hirst and others; (2) the more recent literature of representative claims-making (Saward 2010) and discursive and deliberative 
representation	(Dryzek	and	Niemeyer	2008,	Urbinati	2000)	and	(3)	the	large	strand of literature dealing with deliberative democracy (Habermas 1996, 
Cohen	1997,	Goodin	2003).	Practice-and	process-oriented	approaches	to	de-mocracy do not lack institutional features at all. They rather emphasize the practice quality of democracy in its adaptability, interpretative character and contextual nature. In order to identify democracy in transnational civil society networks, the abstract ideas of democracy should be disentangled from the institutionalist idea of the democratic state. Two sets of ideas are the baseline for the nor-
mative	 logic	of	democracy.	At	 first,	 the	moral	 equality	of	 each	 individual	 in	
collective	rule	is	important	“…because	each	individual	life	is	an	end	in	itself,	
collective	decisions	ought	to	recognize,	respect,	and	benefit	individual’s	inter-
ests	and	values	equally,	insofar	as	possible.	“	(Warren	2006:	385).	The	second	
set	of	ideas	relates	to	the	boundaries	of	democratic	rule	and	the	definition	of	“the people”. The normative claim for democracy is the “empowered inclusion 
of	those	affected	in	collective	decisions	and	actions”	(Warren	2006:	386).
As	Saward	stated,	“One	of	the	defining	features	of	democracy	may	well	be	its restlessness, dynamism and comparative openness to new ideas” (Saward 
2000:	3).	The	re-discussion	and	reframing	of	traditional	democratic	theoret-ical concepts in the light of changed contexts is of theoretical interest of this study. While transnational networks are not always seen as a favorable place for democracy because of the lack of institutionalization, the practice lens can help to locate democracy under different conditions than those of the liberal nation state. Consequently, the two subsequent chapters of part I will discuss process-oriented democratic theories that are not that tightly bound to na-tion state institutions. Participatory democracy, the debate on deliberative de-
mocracy	as	well	as	current	approaches	of	representative	democracy	are	first	outlined and then discussed in terms of their use for the empirical context of transnational civil society networks respectively. 
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2  Participatory and Deliberative Democracy: 
From Equality Norms to Argumentative 
Rationalities
Theories of participatory and deliberative democracy are closely related to each other, although not necessarily linked in every strand of theory build-ing. While participatory democracy has its roots in the Greek polis and even 
in	its	modern	interpretation	starts	in	the	1970’s,	deliberative	democracy	is	a	quite recent but very prominent theory in the family of normative democrat-ic theories. Main assumptions of deliberative democracy build on the works of participatory democrats, and since the debate on participatory democracy has stalled in recent decades, deliberative democracy can be seen as the suc-cessor of participatory democracy. However, deliberative democrats have of course shifted the focus from the wider spheres of politics and society to the concrete processes of will-formation and decision-making. In that, they also argued against participatory understandings of democracy and emphasized the epistemic quality of structured (small) group discussions. This chapter 
starts	with	participatory	democracy’s	ground	work	and	main	ideas	and	then	follows the different traces of deliberative democracy that evolved partly out of the critical engagement with participatory democratic theories. 
2.1 Participatory DemocracyParticipatory democracy comprises many very different concepts, ranging from the direct democracy in the Athenian Polis to recent approaches of “de-mocracy in the making” in social movement groups. All these concepts, how-ever, share the strong emphasis on equality and the tight connection between equality and freedom. The tight connection of participation, equality and free-
dom	 is	 of	 specific	 relevance	 here.	 This	 assumed	 interdependency	 between	these three norms is the normative basis of participatory democracy. Building on this normative basis, theorists attempted to relate participatory demo- cracy to existing democracies, either in opposition to it or in an integrative approach. 
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2.1.1 Equality and Popular SovereigntyMany participatory democrats argue for an equal society which should be an end in itself. This should be reached through equalized participation in poli-tics, which gives citizens the freedom to discuss and decide upon their mat-ters freely. This line of argumentation is as old as the city states in ancient Greece. The Athenian Polis in Ancient Greece is seen as the origin of democra-cy, a direct and participatory democracy in a city-republic. The political ideals were “equality among citizens, liberty, respect for the law and justice” (Held 
2006:13);	all	these	ideals	inspired	modern	democratic	theory.	In	the	Athenian	Polis, citizens could engage directly in state affairs; the demos had supreme authority in legislative and judicial functions. Citizens were supposed to sub-ordinate their private lives under public affairs and the common good (Held 
2006:	14).	Private	and	public	life	were	intertwined,	and	every	citizen	should	
live	“in	their	own	way”	(ibid.).	Not	only	the	citizens’	‘duty’	to	participate	in	po-
litical	life	is	expressed	in	the	following	quote	of	Pericles’	Funeral	Oration,	but	also a reference to the increased quality of decisions after thorough debate, 
which	is	a	core	argument	of	deliberation	theory	as	well: Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the af-
fairs	of	the	state	as	well:	even	those	who	are	mostly	occupied	with	their	own	business are extremely well-informed on general politics – this is a peculi-
arity	of	ours:	we	do	not	say	that	a	man	who	takes	no	interest	in	politics	is	a	man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all. We Athenians, in our own persons, take our decisions on policy or submit 
them	to	proper	discussions:	for	we	do	not	think	that	there	is	an	incompati-bility between words and deeds; the worst thing is to rush into action before 
the	consequences	have	been	properly	debated.	(Pericles’	Funeral	Oration,	in	
Thucidides,	The	Peloponnesian	War,	pp.	147,	as	cited	by	Held	2006:	14)Equalizing political participation was a main objective of the selection of rep-
resentatives.	The	selection	of	officials	by	lot	in	order	to	avoid	a	selection	ac-cording to wealth, education or birth was seen as very democratic. It gave the less wealthy, who are strongest in numbers, the main weight in the political system. Elections were seen as a rather unequal instrument since they favor the well-known and usually richer citizens (Cartledge 2006). Thus, freedom and equality were linked because the freedom to rule and being ruled in turn could only be established if there is an equal share in the capacity to rule, 
meaning	that	participation	was	financially	compensated	and	there	were	equal	
chances	to	hold	offices	(ibid.): Thus understood, equality is the practical basis of liberty. It is also the moral basis of liberty, for the belief that people should have an equal share of ruling 
justifies	the	first	criterion	of	liberty	(‘ruling	and	being	ruled	in	turn’).	While	
this	strong	commitment	to	equality	might	conflict	(as	many,	including	Aris-totle, have argued) with liberty as measured in the second criterion (‘living 
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as	one	chooses’),	democrats	hold	that	there	must	be	some	limits	to	choice	if	 
one	 citizen’s	 freedom	 is	 not	 to	 interfere	 unjustly	 with	 another’s.	 (Held	
2006: 16–17).This emphasis on liberty understood as ruling and being ruled in turn marks a core understanding of participatory democracy, while the liberal understand-
ing	of	liberty	as	“living	as	one	chooses”	is	often	said	to	conflict	with	partici-patory democracy and broad participation. Although the ancient Greek city state democracy was very exclusive in terms of formal citizen rights, it is seen as the model of democracy, which lays the foundation for the ideal of an inclu-sive and participatory democracy. However, the Athenian democracy had only 
around	30,000–45,000	citizens	(Held	2006:	12).	Because	of	the	exclusion	of	women, slaves and immigrants, only a small number of inhabitants counted as full citizens. The adaptation of the classical democracy of Athens to modern democracy thus faces problems of scale, complexity and degrees of political heterogeneity (ibid.). 
Besides	 the	 Athenian	 city	 state	 democracy,	 Jean-Jacques	 Rousseau’s	account of popular sovereignty is often cited as the groundwork for partic-ipatory democracy. He conceptualized popular sovereignty as inalienable, in-
divisible,	infallible,	absolute	and	not	to	be	delegated	(Rousseau	1762,	Schmidt	
2008: 83).	In	his	theory	of	republicanism,	Rousseau	argued	against	represent-ative government as an unjust governmental theory that alienates people and 
justifies	constant	and	irrevocable	representation	(ibid.).	On	the	contrary,	he	saw the executive government as a servant to the people who are active cit-
izens	directly	involved	in	the	legislation:	“In	Rousseau’s	account,	the	idea	of	self-rule is posited as an end in itself; a political order offering opportunities for participation in the arrangement of public affairs should not just be a state, but rather the formation of a type of society: a society in which the affairs of the 
state	are	integrated	into	the	affairs	of	ordinary	citizens	(…)”	(Held	2006: 45).	
These	ideas	of	democracy	as	well	as	the	justification	of	democracy	as	an	end in itself were taken up by current participatory democrats as Benjamin Barber, who alleges that representative democracy and participatory democ-
racy	 cannot	go	 together	 (Barber	1984).	Critics	of	 the	 liberal	 representative	
“thin”	democracy	revived	his	line	of	argumentation	again	in	the	1960’s/70’s.	The demand for more citizen participation arose from the insight in the de-
ficiencies	of	modern	democracy	(Dahl	1971),	the	normative	claims	for	more	equality in state democracy as well as in other parts of social life (Pateman 
1970,	Phillips	1993),	and	 the	recognition	of	 civic	virtues,	as	well	as	 the	as-sumption that democratic institutions can foster and broaden the moral and cognitive capacities of reasoning in citizens (Goodin 2003). Ideas of partici-patory democracy were developed in social movement contexts and are often seen as the normative foundation of social movements when taking a critical stance toward the “thin” democracy of representative governments. These in-
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ventions of participatory practice can be observed in the so-called new social 
movements	 in	 the	1960’s	 and	1970’s	 as	well	 as	 for	 example	 in	 the	Occupy	movement, where new practices of equalized discussion and decision-making were invented and tested. Therefore, the consideration of participatory de-mocracy is inevitable in the context of the study of transnational civil society. However, many participatory democrats started with the critical examination 
of	democracy	in	the	state	context.	Carole	Pateman,	as	one	of	the	first	modern	theorists of participatory democracy, argued that citizens can learn from par-ticipating in democratic processes to think and act more democratically and less egoistically. Based on this assumption, all kinds of other societal spheres where people interact with each other should be democratized, for example 
the	work	place	and	the	economy	(Pateman	1970).	The	expansion	of	participa-tory democracy to areas of the workplace, family and schools is demanded by participatory democrats to different degrees. A rather integrative account of 
participatory	democracy	is	that	of	Peter	Bachrach	(1967)	who	sees	increasing	participation as complementary to a representative democracy. This is reject-ed by more radical participatory democrats such as Ernesto Laclau and Chan-
tal	Mouffe	(1985)	or	Benjamin	Barber	(1984).	Thus,	it	can	be	said	that	there	is a continual range of differing views within participatory democracy from a more integrative approach to a radical account of participatory democracy that opposes the representative democratic system. 
2.1.2 The Triad of Participation, Equality and Freedom
Participatory	democracy	is	praised	for	its	developmental	effects:	“Participa-tory deliberation yields citizens who are more knowledgeable, public spirited, better able to see the connections between their own interests and those of 
others,	and	more	willing	to	reevaluate	their	own	interests.”	(Polletta	2002: 11).	The main arguments for the strengthening of participatory democracy are (1) that the authority structures of institutions are interrelated with the psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals, and (2) that the major 
function	of	participatory	democracy	is	to	educate	(Pateman	1970:	27,	citing	
Rousseau	1762).	Participatory	democrats	thus	see	a	potential	in	citizens	who	can develop skills, capacities and virtue under the conditions of a strength-ened participatory inclusion of citizens into decision-making processes. In turn, this means that very authoritative state structures prohibit citizens from making use of their “psychological qualities and attitudes”. Consequently, citi-zens are forced to remain passive in such a minimal democratic polity.
In	her	book	about	participation	and	democracy,	Carole	Pateman	(1970)	investigates the relationships between work place contexts and the sense of a 
political	efficacy.	She	demonstrates	through	many	studies,	above	all	the	one	by	
Almond	and	Verba	(1963)	that	there	is	a	clear	relationship	between	the	sense	
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of	political	efficacy	and	actual	political	participation.	People	who	are	involved	on the local level in non-governmental activities and people who have a high 
socio-economic	status	have	a	sense	of	political	efficacy.	Taking	the	finding	that	people, who are locally engaged feel more interested and capable to partici-pate in national politics seriously lets Pateman, as many other participatory democratic theorists, conclude that a “democratic character” can be learned 
(Pateman	1970:	53).	While	studying	the	impact	of	work	place	situations,	she	
finds	that	workers	who	have	more	room	for	individual	problem-solving	and	exercise their skills have much higher self-esteem and feel more capable to be involved in political matters. In contrast, workers who are treated as sub-ordinates in a strictly hierarchical authority structure do not have this sense 
of	political	efficacy	and	feel	like	powerless	subordinates	in	the	political	sys-
tem	as	well	as	in	their	workplace	(Pateman	1970:	50–52).	Those	two	lines	of	reasoning argue that the political apathy of the majority of people is not an unchangeable fact, but that the “psychological qualities (the sense of political 
efficacy)	required	for	participation	at	the	national	level”	(Pateman	1970:	50)	can be developed and fostered by the participation in non-governmental au-thority structures and the democratization of the work place (ibid.). 
In	critically	examining	elitist	democratic	theory,	Bachrach	(1967)	comes	to a similar diagnosis. The elitist concept of democracy, which Pateman calls contemporary democratic theory, is founded on the assumption that a ma-jority of people in society are not interested in engaging in politics and are furthermore not capable of making reasonable decisions. The potential partic-ipation of those masses poses a threat to democracy. Bachrach describes how democratic theorists shifted their focus from corrupt elites and authoritarian 
despots	in	the	18th	and	19th	century	as	hindering	the	development	of	democ-racy, to the people or the “ordinary man” who in the western industrial socie-
ties	was	suspected	to	threaten	political	freedom	(Bachrach	1967:	46).	Studies	observed that the working class is more authoritarian in its habits and social behavior, because members of the working class are socially isolated and do not participate in public life. Advocates of elitist democratic theory see this evidence as an unchangeable fact and therefore propose to avoid broad par-ticipation. In contrast, participatory democrats see the apathy of wide parts of the population as something that can be changed on an individual basis. Being a democratic citizen can be learned by participation. This self- transformation thesis (Warren 1993) is a central element of participatory democracy. Fur-thermore, Bachrach criticizes that democracy is seen by elitist democrats as a “political method” without any normative claims. This deprives democracy from any goal it could have. According to Bachrach and other participatory 
democrats,	a	democracy’s	goal	should	be	the	self-development	of	its	citizens	
(Bachrach	1967:	118–119).	In	this	context,	advocates	of	a	“thin	democracy”	would pose the question, if a democracy needs all people to participate in po-
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litical decision-making or if it is not enough that a few are active. Pateman 
would	answer	that	this	form	of	contemporary	liberal	democracy	that	we	find	in western liberal states is not a real democracy in the original sense of de-mocracy as a government for and by	the	people	(Pateman	1970:	104).However, the claim for broader citizen participation, understood as a democratization of democracy, is far from being an uncontested issue. A more descriptive and “value free” contemporary democratic theory strongly op-poses the idea of a wide participation of entire populations in nation states. 
Democratic	theorists	such	as	Dahl	(1971)	or	Sartori	(1997)	feared	the	danger	of destabilization and potentially totalitarian rule when all people are active-
ly	participating	 in	a	political	 system.	Other	political	 scientists	 in	 the	1970’s	were concerned about the “involvement of an increasing proportion of the 
population	in	political	activity	[…]	the	development	of	new	groups	and	of	new	consciousness on the part of old groups, including youth, regional and ethnic 
minorities”	and	their	expansion	of	tactics	and	goals	(Crozier	et al.	1975:	163).	This would, as they argued, lead to an overload and consequential weakening of the democratic state. Besides the overloading of state agencies, critics argue 
that	there	are	other	downsides	of	participation:	(1)	an	inclusive	participation	cannot be realized, because different social groups participate to different de-grees; (2) citizens lack skills and competencies to make informed decisions; (3) citizen participation has in general little impact on political decisions; 
(4)	enhancing	citizen	participation	is	not	an	efficient	mode	of	governance;	and	(5) effectiveness of citizen participation is limited by scale, and thus trans-
ferability	 from	smaller	 to	bigger	units	 is	 limited	 (Smith	2009:	14–20).	Fur-thermore, political sociologists claim that wider spheres of the population, especially the lower classes, are not interested in participating in politics 
(Verba	et al.	1995).	Verba	et al.	 call	 that	a	participatory	distortion:	Only	 the	
well-off,	well-educated	and	well	informed	become	active	in	politics:	“(…)	the	voices that speak loudly articulate a different set of messages about the state of the public, its needs and its preferences from those that would be sent by those who are inactive. Were everyone equally active, or were activists drawn at random from across the population, an unbiased set of communications 
would	emerge”	(ibid:	11).	In	sum,	criticism	of	participatory	democracy	raises	
two	main	points:	the	effectiveness	problem	and	the	equality	problem.	First,	broader participation does not only weaken the effectiveness of government (overload of input); it is also in itself not supposed to be politically effective. There is not much political impact when citizens become active, as critics of participatory instruments argue. Secondly, in terms of the equality problem, 
more	participation,	assuming	that	citizens’	attitudes	towards	politics	are	un-changeable, would only lead to more participation from the well-off who are the ones with time and capacities. The latter point will be subsequently elab-orated.
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The relationship between participation and equality is a crucial point of debate between liberal theorists favoring representative democracy and participatory democratic theorists. While liberal democrats argue that more participation reinforces inequalities in society, participatory democrats argue that equality and participation are mutually reinforcing. Participatory demo-crats agree that more participation initially generates inequality among par-ticipants – only the eloquent ones with more spare time etc. will participate. However, at the macro-level and in the long run the democratization of e.g. the work place will contribute to more equality in society as a whole. This will in turn motivate more subordinate members of the participant group (e.g. the 
workers’	movement)	to	demand	their	rights	within	the	group	(Bachrach	and	
Botwinick	1992)	From	a	normative	 standpoint,	Macpherson	 (1977)	 argues	in favor of participatory democracy because it is normatively desirable that societies are more equal. He also admits that a sheer increase of participa-tion does not cure inequality, but that “It is only that low participation and social inequity are so bound up with each other that a more equitable and humane society requires a more participatory political system” (Macpherson 
1977:	94).	However,	he	 identifies	 a	major	dilemma	 in	making	political	 sys-tems more participatory. Two prerequisites have to be met before participa-
tory	democracy	can	work:	(1)	the	image	of	the	citizen	as	a	consumer	must	be	replaced, and (2) social and economic inequality must be reduced in society 
(Macpherson	1977:	100).	Thus,	participatory	democracy	is	obviously	stuck	in	
a	vicious	cycle:	it	could	make	societies	more	equal,	but	before	this	can	happen,	societies must have transformed into more equal societies in order to ena-
ble	all	 citizens	 to	participate.	Macpherson	 identifies	 three	 loopholes	 in	 this	
vicious	cycle.	At	first,	he	notices	that	more	and	more	people	doubt	or	rethink	
the	cost-benefit-ratio	and	the	virtues	of	expansion	and	more	and	more	identi-fy the costs of expansion such as air, water and earth pollution. This could be 
a	first	step	away	from	a	thin	market-embedded	democracy.	Secondly,	there	is	an increasing awareness of the costs of political apathy and in turn the aware-
ness	of	participation’s	political	 efficacy.	Neighborhood	activity	 is	 increasing	as well as movements for more democracy at the workplace. Finally, there is growing doubt about corporate capitalism to meet consumer expectations in 
the	long	run	(Macpherson	1977:	103–04).	These	developments	are,	accord-ing to Macpherson, gateways to more participatory and consequently equal 
societies	 from	the	bottom-up.	Now,	more	than	35	years	 later,	Macpherson’s	normative hopes in participatory democracy have not materialized. Since the loopholes for participatory democracy still exist, and neither the consumption logic of citizens nor the social and economic inequality in society has been sig-
nificantly	reduced,	it	might	need	to	be	rethought	if	participatory	democracy	grows only from a bottom-up initiative or if participatory democracy needs structural change. 
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Such	structural	change	could	have	been	in	Nancy	Fraser’s	(2003)	mind,	when she discussed with Axel Honneth (2003) the relationship between ine-quality and recognition. Referring to the above outlined dilemma of inequal-ity and participation, she argues that recognition and the lack thereof should not be seen as something personal, subjective or even psychological, but as an institutional structure, a norm of participatory equal opportunities (Fraser 
2003:	 46–48).	Whereas	 Nancy	 Fraser	 identifies	 the	 different	 types	 of	 new	
social	movements	as	the	ones	that	 fight	the	battle	 for	recognition	and	sym-
bolize	the	“others”	in	society,	namely	those	who	do	not	fit	in	the	norm	of	the	white, heterosexual, middle class man, Honneth counters that those new so-cial movement groups are already recognized and visible in society. They have already won recognition, left the shadows of the public sphere, and produced exclusion and inequality themselves (Honneth 2003). Although Bachrach and Botwinick as well as Macpherson are conceptualizing the relationship be-tween participation and equality in the framework of broader societies, they argue that equality can also be gained through participatory democracy with-in social movement groups or civil society organizations. Whereas Bachrach 
states	that	participatory	democracy	can	also	maintain	equality	within	specific	social movements, Macpherson alleges that the development within civil soci-ety can lead to more opportunities for practicing participatory democracy and 
therefore	increasing	equality	in	broader	society	(Macpherson	1977,	Bachrach	and Botwinick 1992).Anne Phillips argues for participatory democracy as a solution for inequalities 
in	society	by	using	Rousseau’s	argument	that	no	citizen	can	be	free	if	society	is unequal. In this view, inequality undermines freedom and consent. As long as one man is rich enough to make another one his servant, and as long as another is so poor that he has to submit, they cannot be considered equally 
independent	(Phillips	1991:	15).	Thus,	if	inequality	persists,	democracy	in	its	normative connotation is not possible. The critical perspective on structural inequalities in modern democracies is a very valuable contribution of femi-nist political theory to participatory democracy. Feminist political theorists stress the systematic and historical subordination of groups in democracies. Although feminist democratic theory is quite a new strand of literature, which 
exists	since	the	mid-1990’s,	renowned	feminist	political	theorists	such	as	Car-ole Pateman, Anne Phillips and Iris Marion Young brought concepts of equal representation and groups rights in democracy into the debate on equality 
and	freedom	in	democracies	(Phillips	1993;	Young	2000;	Holland-Cunz	2008).	The reason for inequality in democracies from a feminist perspective is clearly rooted in the male concept of citizenship, which is (falsely) perceived as a uni-versal citizenship concept. Feminist political theorists argue that the concept of the individual citizen in liberal democracy is not gender-neutral. There is 
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a	specific	and	not	gender-neutral	understanding	of	 the	 individual	 in	 liberal	democratic theory based on market relations. Individuals in a democracy are proprietors of their own persons, as Macpherson has argued, and thus the freedom of citizens merely depends on their freedom from any contractual re-lationship with others. The wage workers can freely enter a contract to allow 
others	to	use	their	capacity	as	workers	(Phillips	1991:	31).	However,	women	historically have not formed consented contracts with others. The one con-tract they primarily agreed to was a marriage contract in which they were to 
“hand	over	their	body	to	another”	(Phillips	1991:	35).	This	kind	of	contract	could not be compared to work contracts, which are entered freely. The indi-vidual who is able to consent as such is a male category because the male and female perspectives on freedom and possession differ. Therefore, the concept of citizenship is not universal. The image of a free individual possessing his own person and handing it over to someone else in a contractual relation-ship cannot be compared to marriage contracts15. Therefore, Phillips states that “[t]he notions of consent and freedom that underlie liberal philosophy are grounded in the experience of the male.” (ibid.). Participatory democrats and feminist political theorists share a similar critique of liberal democracy. The strict division of public and private sphere and its implication on political equality are criticized by participatory democrats as well as feminists. Both argue for more participation because it does not make sense to have univer-sal suffrage when main decisions about supposedly private matters such as employment, housing and education are left to an un-elected administration 
(Phillips	1991:	38–39).	Similar	to	feminist	critiques,	the	developmental	argu-ment of participatory democracy also targets the division of private and pub-lic spheres. Democratic practices are learned in the private sphere of family, work or schools and thus it is not a logical step for many women to engage in democracy on the national level where those matters are not negotiated and decided (ibid.). More theoretically, the feminist focus on division between public and private has made the question of where democracy should be practiced a central, in-
escapable	concern.[…]	Diversity,	difference,	differences,	seem	to	be	emerging	as central preoccupations in a feminist perspective on democracy. If this is so, they point to active discussion and participation as the key. (italics in the 
original,	Phillips	1991:	41).	While the representative state democracy is criticized for being exclusive and for marginalizing women e.g. in parliamentary representation, participatory 
15  Phillips also points to rape trials and the negotiation of what counts as consent of women. 
Here,	she	argues,	it	becomes	clear	that	a	woman’s	consent	(and	disagreement	respective-ly) is not valued or even taken seriously under the contract of marriage (Phillips 
1991: 35).
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forms of democracy are much better received in feminist discourse. First, such 
forms	were	 concretely	 practiced	 in	 the	 old	 and	 new	women’s	movements.	Second, they leave room for diverse participation forms, a diversity of voices and the democratization of all spheres of life, including the private sphere16 
(Holland-Cunz	2008:	533):	“Those	who	have	been	previously	subordinated,	marginalized or silenced need the security of a guaranteed voice and in the transitional period to a full and equal citizenship, democracies must act to redress the imbalance that centuries of oppression have wrought.” (Phillips 
1991:	7).	This	normative	claim	of	democracy,	as	formulated	by	Anne	Phillips	in her feminist account of participatory democracy, conceptualizes and iden-
tifies	inequality	as	a	structural,	complex	and	historical	phenomenon	that	can-not just be solved by giving all citizens the same political rights as in liberal democracy. Opening up institutions to citizen participation does not cure the problem of inequality. Difference theorists, such as Anne Phillips, emphasize 
the	 logic	of	presence:	 the	 interests	of	 those	who	are	not	present	 in	specific	meetings will most likely not be considered (Phillips 1996). Consequently, dif-ference theorists argue that it is particularly necessary to test if institutions motivate people from marginalized groups to participate. Thus, the feminist perspective on democracy highlights the necessity of participatory forms and elements of democracy in order to contribute to a more equalized democratic system, not only in terms of gender equality, but also with respect to equality for any groups that are subordinated in society. Feminist authors in particular raise the question where democracy should be practiced and learned. Further-more, feminist democratic theory critically investigates the understanding of allegedly universal norms of democracy. In how far these rules can produce inequalities is outlined by feminist theorists such as Phillips and Young. Men and women must be treated differently in order to be equal. Broadening this thesis to other groups in society, the normative claim of participatory democ-racy for a wider inclusion is a demand for pro-active and group context sensi-tive participation practices. The question that feminist political theorists pose in relation to gender categories, namely what structures and ideas inherent 
in	democratic	 institutions	favor	a	specific	circle	of	people	over	another	(for	example men over women), is relevant in relation to other social categories as well and the intersection of them.
Laclau	and	Mouffe’s	concept	of	radical	democracy	considers	the	plurality	
and	diversity	of	citizens’	concepts	as	relevant	without	trying	to	find	essential-
ist	categories	of	groups	that	merely	reflect	diversity	such	as	in	a	liberal	con-
16	 	The	liberal	dualism	of	public	and	private	sphere	is	a	main	field	of	contestation	in	feminist	theory. Whereas the private sphere as the sphere of difference is mostly attributed to women, the public domain is in those classical accounts a male sphere. This was and is extensively criticized and reformulated by feminists.
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cept of citizens. In this, radical democrats question fundamental assumptions of liberal theory such as the concept of the individual citizen as the central point of reference for any democratic legitimization. Thus, citizen identities are considered diverse and overlapping, which is especially relevant in trans-
national	network	settings:	“Citizenship	is	not	just	one	identity	among	others,	as it is in liberalism, nor is it the dominant identity that overrides all others, as it is in civic republicanism. Instead, it is an articulating principle that affects the different subject positions of the social agent, while allowing for a plurality 
of	specific	allegiances	and	 for	 the	respect	of	 the	 individual	 liberty”	 (Mouffe	
1997:	84).	Thus,	radical	democracy	suggests	a	systematic	change	in	concep-tualizing democracy. Besides the emphasis on pluralism, which is shared by liberal concepts of democracy, radical democracy takes a critical stance towards the belief in the “nature” of politics. Laclau and Mouffe argue that there is always an alternative way to practice politics; there is no determina-tion in “how things are done”. Hegemonies and antagonisms for example are 
created	and	reproduced,	but	they	are	not	necessarily	fixed	(Laclau	and	Mouffe	
[1985]	2001).	What we wish to point out is that politics as a practice of creation, reproduc-tion and transformation of social relations cannot be located at a determinate level of the social, as the problem of the political is the problem of the institu-
tion	of	the	social,	that	is,	of	the	definition	and	articulation	of	social	relations	in	
a	field	criss-crossed	with	antagonisms.	(Laclau	and	Mouffe	[1985]	2001: 153).
Mouffe	refers	to	Wittgenstein’s	“grammar	of	conduct”	as	the	constituting	prin-
ciples	of	democracy	 that	guide	democratic	practice	 (Mouffe	1997:	85).	The	common good coincides with this grammar of conduct, according to Mouffe (ibid.). However, since these principles can be interpreted differently, there must be some sort of exclusion; a radical inclusive democracy is impossible (ibid.). This perspective gives room to think about citizenship and partici-pation outside the common demarcation lines of modern liberal democratic theory. This does not only support the practice or practical aspect of democ-racy, Sørensen	and	Torfing	(2005)	used	the	same	perspective	to	conceptualize	 democratic quality in governance networks, which is conducive to the under-standing of transnational civil society networks, too. Although it seems that participatory democracy often stands in opposi-tion to liberal representative democracy, there are approaches that attempt to integrate participatory elements into existing democratic systems. Associ-ative democracy puts an emphasis on secondary associations in civil society to complement the common participation repertoire in representative demo- cracy. While Cohen and Rogers (1992) rather favor a governance model of associative democracy that implies state regulation of group representation 
(Cohen	 and	 Rogers	 1992:	 425),	 the	 associationalism	 put	 forward	 by	 Hirst	
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(1994)	criticizes	the	“centralized	and	sovereign	state	with	radical	 federalist	
and	pluralist	 ideas	advanced	as	a	substitute”	(Hirst	1994:	15).	While	Cohen	
and	Rogers’	approach	clearly	underlines	the	dangers	of	free	group	representa-
tion	 for	democratic	norms	such	as	egalitarian	participation,	Hirst’s	 empha-sis is on voluntarism and self-governance of secondary associations. Thus, according to Hirst, political organization should be restructured so that vol-untary self-governing associations “gradually and progressively become the primary means of democratic governance of economic and social affairs” 
(Hirst	1994:	20).	The	state	gives	up	some	functions	to	private	agencies,	not	in the liberal understanding of privatization and laissez-faire politics, but as a means to pluralize society. These private agencies are accountable to “those 
for	whom	the	service	or	activity	is	provided”	(Hirst	1994:	22).	Contrary	to	the	conceptualization of the state in liberal democratic theory, the state here is the secondary institution, whereas civil society takes over social and public functions and thus becomes the primary institution17	in	society:	“Self-govern-
ing	civil	society	thus	becomes	the	primary	feature	of	society.”	(Hirst	1994:	26).	A more recent approach to participatory democracy, which is similarly en-visioned as a reform of state and society, is conceptualized by Fung and Wright (2003) who have systematized the observations of participatory projects ranging from participatory budgeting to deliberation forums and mini-publics or citizen juries (Fung and Wright 2003; Smith 2009). These concepts aim at a more concrete application of participatory or deliberative norms. Fung and 
Wright’s	reformist	concept	“Empowered	Participatory	Governance”	seeks	to	broaden the practical orientation of deliberation and wants to do justice to the importance of bottom-up civic engagement and secondary associations for a vivid democracy. Furthermore, they argue for a broader discovering and 
imagining	of	(participatory)	institutions	(Fung	and	Wright	2003:	16–17).	The	
17  Overall, government shifts from being a service provider to a means of protecting citi-
zens’	rights	and	of	ensuring	that	social	services	are	provided	adequately	(ibid.).	Another	principle of political organization according to associationalism is that deliberation and 
reflection	complement	elections	and	majority	decision.	There	should	be	a	constant	infor-
mation	flow	between	governors	and	the	governed.	In	representative	governments,	gover-
nors	 seek	 consent	 and	 cooperation	 of	 the	 governed	 (Hirst	 1994:	 20)	 and	 therefore	
influence	 the	 quality	 and	 scale	 of	 decision-making,	which	Hirst	 identifies	 as	 the	main	problem of representative government (ibid.). His concept of democracy as communica-
tion	is	very	close	to	neo-corporatist	concepts	of	social	governance,	which	define	the	qual-ity of decision-making by the interaction between governing agencies and the agencies 
organizing	the	activities	being	governed	(Hirst	1994:	35).	This	can	also	be	critical	when	the state is creating voluntary organizations that are highly dependent on the state and 
quite	weak	in	their	potential	of	critical	reflection.	According	to	Hirst,	this	problem	can	be	solved by creating more organizations from below and having more regional organiza-
tions	(Hirst	1994:	39).	This	would	pluralize	civil	society	even	more.	In	addition,	regional	organizations further the devolution of state functions.
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design of Empowered Participatory Governance is built on three fundamental 
ideas:	(1)	devolution:	The	power	to	conceptualize	tasks	should	be	delegated	
to	local	units;	(2)	centralized	supervision	and	coordination:	Local	units	should	not be purely autonomous; accountability should be linked to superordinate 
bodies	(Fung	and	Wright	2003:	20–21);	and	(3)	state-centered,	not	volunta-
ristic	participatory	governance:	The	participatory	model	does	not	see	social	
movement	actors	influencing	state	institutions	from	the	outside,	but	remak-
ing	official	institutions	themselves	along	participatory	norms.	Therefore,	Fung	and Wright (2003) argue that this approach is even more radical than other concepts of participatory democracy because it institutionalizes a permanent participation instead of temporary activities of typical social movement mo-
bilization	(ibid:	22).
2.2 Deliberative DemocracyDeliberation theory has grown into a broad strand of literature that is dis-cussed in different research areas of social sciences and linguistics. Delibera-
tion	theory	can	be	divided	into	two	broad	theoretical	strands:	(1)	the	epistemic	conceptualization of deliberation as a more sensible and enlightened form of decision-making and the (2) conceptual theorizing on deliberation as a way to democratize democracy, i.e. democratizing the collective will-formation of citizens (see Olsen and Trenz 2011). This second strand in particular takes up arguments of participatory democracy. The epistemic version of deliberative democracy considers deliberation as a 
cognitive	process	–	bent	on	finding	just	solutions	and	agreements	about	the	
common	good.	Deliberation’s	epistemic	value	rests	on	the	imperative	to	find	the right decision. In contrast, the participatory version of deliberative de-mocracy highlights the active involvement and empowerment of citizens in collective will formation as a necessary condition for the creation of demo-cratic legitimacy. Deliberation has thus primarily a moral value, driven as it is by the imperative to allow for equal participation of all. (Olsen and Trenz 
2011:	2).Democratic deliberation, as Chambers (2009) calls the version of deliberation theory which is more interested in the epistemic perspective on deliberative decision-making, is much more focused on the outcome of deliberation and 
defines	“deliberation	in	terms	of	choosing	a	course	of	action	under	noncoer-
cive	and	discursive	conditions”	(Chambers	2009:	334).	In	contrast,	delibera-tive democracy, as the second more participatory version of deliberation, is concerned with the process instead of the outcome of deliberation, and ad-
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ditionally  focuses more on the society as a whole instead of selected discrete deliberations among few (ibid.). Deliberative democracy developed out of a criticism of contemporary rep-resentative democracy, where voters see elections as consumer choices that only concern them personally and do not take those “others”, the whole soci-ety, into consideration when making voting choices. This produces an instru-mental rationality that guides democratic decisions, which is not conducive 
to	democracy	as	such	(Held	2006:	238).	Deliberationists	argue	that	it	cannot	be just about pooling information and exchanging views; democracy must be about reasoning about views and testing arguments in order to make rational and enlightened decisions. Furthermore, the elected politicians in represent-ative democracies seem disentangled from their voters (Held 2006). This re-moteness of politics was also a diagnosis that participatory democrats made. Citizens should be more engaged in political decision-making and through 
this	be	able	to	make	reasonable	decisions.	Deliberative	democracy’s	premise	is the force of reason-giving in collective decision-making processes (Eriksen and Fossum 2011). Thus, deliberative democracy emphasizes the process that precedes democratic collective decision-making. Deliberation is needed to en-hance the quality of decisions by avoiding the consideration of spontaneous 
preferences	and	rather	by	developing	reflective	preferences.	With	reference	to Habermas, deliberationists argue that rationality cannot be separated from 
justification	 to	others	 (ibid.).	Furthermore,	deliberation	as	 the	 formation	of	
individuals’	will	 is	seen	as	the	primary	source	for	democratic	 legitimacy	in-
stead	of	 the	mere	aggregated	will	of	 individuals	 (Held	2006:	233).	 In	other	
words,	 deliberative	 democracy	makes	 two	 distinct	 claims:	 (1)	 Deliberative	democracy argues that through the process of deliberation, i.e. the process of reason-giving and listening to the arguments of others, a political decision can be more rational and enlightened (Offe and Preuß 1991). (2) Deliberationists argue that deliberation has a developmental participatory effect. Citizens de-velop more sophisticated political views and make more democratic decisions 
considering	 other	perspectives	 (Fishkin	2009:	 54).	 This	 second	part	 of	 the	chapter outlines these two strands of argumentation in deliberation theory, namely the epistemic reasoning of the more enlightened decisions through deliberation and the participatory reasoning of citizen transformation (War-ren 1993) through deliberation. 
2.2.1 The Epistemic Perspective on DeliberationThe distinct epistemic quality of deliberation is mainly based on the system-
atization	of	different	types	of	action	by	Jürgen	Habermas	(1981)	on	the	one	
hand,	and	Jon	Elster’s	(1998)	distinction	between	arguing	and	bargaining	on	
the	other	hand.	Habermas’	distinction	between	strategic	and	communicative	
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action, which he outlined in the Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas 
1981)	 is	 defined	on	 the	basis	 of	 the	 criteria	 of	 action	orientation	 (Saretzki	2009). Whether an action is oriented to success or to understanding de-
fines	if	a	social	action	is	strategic	or	communicative	respectively	(Habermas	
1981: 256–57).Reaching understanding is conceptualized by Habermas as reaching an agreement, which cannot be imposed by one party only, but has a rational basis. In his linguistic conceptualization, Habermas asserts that successful communicative action takes place when the other (person) agrees to a given 
speech	act	(Habermas	1981:	286–87).	Habermas	further	differentiated	com-municative action into weak and strong communicative action by introduc-ing a third action orientation, the orientation to reach consensus. Reaching consensus is conceptualized as strong communicative action, whereas reach-
ing	understanding	is	a	weak	communicative	action	(Saretzki	2009:	156;	cit-
ing	Habermas	1999:	121–134).	Habermas’	distinction	between	strategic	and	
communicative	action	is	complemented	by	a	distinction	of	Jon	Elster	(1998),	
who	defines	his	categories	of	bargaining	and	arguing,	in	contrast	to	Habermas,	on the basis of a rational choice assumption (Saretzki 1996). While bargaining is meant, when persons negotiate with each other having their own preferenc-es in mind, arguing means the communication between two or more parties, which are ready to be convinced and do not consequently follow their own 
interests,	but	aim	at	finding	true	answers	(Elster	1998).	He	further	claims	that	deliberation becomes more probable when it is public because publicness constrains negotiation. Publicness keeps people from negotiating for their 
own	selfish	interests	(imperfection	constraint).	Furthermore,	 in	order	to	be	
convincing,	people’s	arguments	should	be	in	line	with	what	they	said	in	the	
past	(consistency	constraint):	“Once	a	speaker	has	adopted	an	impartial	ar-gument because it corresponds to his interest or prejudice, he will be seen as opportunistic if he deviates from it when it ceases to serve his needs” (El-
ster	1998:	104).	Finally,	public	deliberation	produces	a	plausibility	constraint	to deliberators in that they cannot make hypocritical statements that are not 
convincing	to	others	(Elster	1998:	105).
However,	Elster’s	differentiation	between	bargaining	and	arguing	is	not	one between equal terms, Saretzki argues. Elster rather assumes that bargain-
ing	is	the	‘natural’	way	of	communication,	whereas	one	has	to	be	forced	(by	
external	condition	or	by	oneself)	into	arguing	(Saretzki	1996:	24).	This	nor-
mative	bias	of	rational	choice	can	be	falsified	by	many	examples	of	bargaining	situations, in which starting points of actors are changed and the actors be-come oriented toward a common good (in contrast to individual preferences) 
(ibid:	25–26).	Similarly,	it	can	be	argued	against	the	differentiation	between	
arguing	as	a	public	discussion	and	bargaining	as	a	confidential	communica-
tion;	since	also	arguing	processes	can	be	conducted	secretly	e.g.	dissident’s	
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deliberating	(ibid:	29).	Thus,	it	can	be	concluded	that	the	defining	categories	of	arguing and bargaining such as orientations, themes, contexts and collectives 
are	“contingent	on	the	respective	mode	of	communication”	(Saretzki	1996:	32,	
author’s	own	translation).	Saretzki	suggests	“a	narrow	 ‘modal’	definition	of	
the	two	modes	of	communications”	(Saretzki	2009:	165,	author’s	own	transla-tion) that distinguishes arguing and bargaining on the dimensions of the func-tional reference, the basic structure and the process. Whereas the function of arguing is to solve cognitive problems, bargaining is used to solve distributive problems. From this evolves the basic structure, which is triadic in delibera-tion and dyadic in negotiation. In order to solve cognitive problems, arguing needs the reference to a third party, a criterion for true or right, in front of 
which	arguments	are	exchanged.	This	also	influences	the	process	dimension.	
Arguing	is	reflexive,	whereas	bargaining	is	sequential	(Saretzki	1996:	34-35).Seyla Benhabib (1996) further differentiated the basic principles of dis-course ethics. She argued that deliberation procedures themselves should be guided by general norms, which are outlined in the discourse model of ethics. The participation in deliberation should be governed by equality and symmetry. All should have the same chance to raise issues and arguments. Furthermore everyone should have the right to question the assigned topics 
of	 deliberation,	 i.e.	 the	 agenda.	 And	 finally,	 everyone	 should	 have	 the	 right	
to	raise	reflexive	arguments	about	the	rules	of	procedure	as	such	(Benhabib	
1996:	70).	Following	this	argumentation,	deliberation	theorists	have	argued,	that decisions that are taken after deliberation are better decisions because 
participants	 in	 deliberation	 have	 developed	 more	 reflective	 preferences.	
These	reflective	preferences	are: ● more empathetic with the plight of others; ● more considered, and hence both better informed and more stable; and ●  more far-reaching in both time and space, taking fuller account of dis-
tant	periods,	distant	peoples	and	different	interests.	(Goodin	2003:	7).
Similarly,	 Offe	 and	 Preuss	 define	 the	 aim	 of	 every	 democratic	 decision	 as	
being	 rational	 and	 enlightened:	A	political	will	 is	 rational	 or	 enlightened	 if	
it	meets	 three	criteria:	 (1)	 fact-regarding,	 (2)	 future-regarding	and	(3)	oth-
er-regarding.	(Offe	and	Preuss	1991:	156–57).	This	rational	and	enlightened	decision-making is to be learned in deliberation. This concept assumes also 
that	people	do	not	have	fixed	preferences,	but	that	they	can	“learn”	what	their	
preferences	are	in	discussing	matters	with	others:The major contention of deliberative democrats is to bid farewell to any no-
tion	of	fixed	preferences	and	to	replace	them	with	a	learning	process	in	and	through which people come to terms with the range of issues they need to understand in order to hold a sound and reasonable political judgment. (Held 
2006:	233)
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This normative anticipation that democratic deliberation leads to better deci-sions through a learning process of the involved participants of deliberation is based on the epistemic aim of deliberation to solve cognitive problems, as Saretzki (1996) pointed out. Those better decisions should be grounded in universal and valid norms instead of particularistic interests. This refraining 
from	one’s	own	egoistic	interests	and	the	“inclusion	of	the	other”	(Habermas	
et al.	2002)	is	possible	through	deliberation.	Habermas	stated	that	impartial	judgment can only result from a principle that forces “all affected to adopt the perspectives of all others	in	the	balancing	of	interests”	(Habermas	1992:	65).	Thus, every valid norm must be preceded by a compelled role-taking of all affected. Habermas formulates this universalization principle as a principle of argumentation, which functions as a necessary presupposition for any prac-
tical	discourse	to	be	in	place	(Habermas	1992:	66,	93).	In	defining	the	bridg-ing principle between particular observations and generalizable hypotheses in practical discourse18, Habermas formulates an extended universalization 
principle,	which	goes	beyond	Kant’s	categorical	imperative	and	is	not	solely	based on a formalistic account of the universal validity of norms. Habermas pointed out in his discourse ethics that “[o]nly those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capac-
ity	as	participants	in	a	practical	discourse.”	(Habermas	1992:	66).	Besides the relationship between preferences, learning and valid norms, there are two other epistemological questions that emerge in the discussion 
of	 deliberative	 democracy:	 (1)	 Does	 deliberative	 democracy	 prioritize	 ra-tional reasoning over emotional storytelling or can reasonable decisions also 
be	 found	by	different	 forms	of	 citizen	 input?	 (2)	Which	kind	of	 knowledge	
counts?	Is	there	expert	knowledge	as	the	only	form	of	valuable	knowledge,	or	
can	local	lay	knowledge	be	brought	forward	by	locals	from	bottom-up?	Those	two epistemological questions already point to participatory claims. If the emotional and affective voices are not taken into account, inequalities may be produced, as already outlined, in favor of the well-educated, elaborate discus-sants. Similarly, if local knowledge is not taken into account, the diversity of different forms and qualities of knowledge is missed out. Polletta (2006) argues that storytelling is a very important correction factor in supposedly universal rational deliberation. Although affective and subjective storytelling seems not to contribute to more considered reasoning, and the demand to argue a case in the light of the needs of others, there is a 
function	of	storytelling	 to	deliberation	 that	 influences	 the	rest	of	 the	group	
rather	than	the	storyteller:
18  Habermas names the principle of induction as the bridging principle in empirical scienc-es. In philosophy, he states, the suggested moral principles as the bridging principle al-
ways	refer	to	Kant’s	categorical	imperative	(Habermas	1992:	63).
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When members of disadvantaged groups recount their experiences of par-ticular policies, they expose the disparate impacts of supposedly neutral policies and invite in their fellow deliberators an empathetic understanding of their distinctive needs and priorities. Far from simply asserting personal experience as the basis for policy, such stories serve to reveal the false univer-sality of existing standards – and may open the way to construct more truly 
universal	standards.	(Polletta	2006:	83)Thus, storytelling can give way to an even more considered account of a spe-
cific	matter.	 By	 introducing	 storytelling	 as	 a	 complementary	 concept	 to	 ra-
tional	reasoning,	the	epistemic	process	of	finding	“rational	and	enlightened”	(Offe and Preuss 1991) decisions is not impeded but can be complemented and thus improved.The question of the value of local lay knowledge has a normative as well as a functional dimension. The inclusion of local or lay knowledge into de-liberation processes is desirable under the notion of participatory inclusion. As already indicated, the knowledge and perspectives of local persons and 
groups	is	often	unheard	and	therefore	must	be	given	a	voice	in	order	to	fulfil	the normative standards of an inclusive democratic decision-making (Phillips 1993). Equally important is the functional dimension of local knowledge. As 
Saretzki	(1997)	points	out,	expert	knowledge	comes	up	against	limiting	fac-
tors:	(1)	The	specialized	knowledge	of	‘facts’	that	experts	can	provide	is	not	enough to solve problems in society. In order to do that, a normative evalu-ation against any kind of values or norms must be conducted. Otherwise, it cannot be estimated whether a social or political problematic issue needs to be solved or not. (2) Expert knowledge is in most cases too systematic and abstract in order to diagnose context-dependent problems. Systematic expert knowledge needs to be contextualized in order to be applicable to concrete lo-
cal	political	problems.	(3)	Scientific	expertise	is	disciplinary	expertise,	which	
can	hardly	capture	the	complexities	of	political	problems.	Thus,	scientific	ex-
pertise	is	in	need	of	an	interdisciplinary	integration	of	knowledge.	(4)	There	is	
no	certain	scientific	knowledge.	Scientific	knowledge	is	inherently	hypothet-ical, uncertain and incomplete. Thus, all allegedly certain expert knowledge has epistemic limitations and must be complemented and insured (Saretzki 
1997:	181–83).	Thus,	emotional	storytelling	and	local	lay	knowledge	can	be	very important complements of deliberation processes and must be taken into account when thinking about the epistemic ends of deliberation. They 
fulfil	the	role	to	include	knowledge	and	perspectives	that	are	otherwise	easily	overlooked by expert deliberation. Summarizing the epistemic dimension of deliberation, it can be con-cluded that deliberationists base their reasoning about good decisions for 
cognitive	 problems	 on	 a	 process-oriented	 dimension.	 As	Habermas	 (1981)	pointed out, it is not enough to set a formalistic universal principle that for-
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mally	everyone	could	agree	on	a	norm.	Habermas’	universalization	principle	must be practiced in	discourse	(1981).	Thus,	as	he	further	outlines	there	must	be a practical role-taking of other perspectives by all participants in delibera-tion. Only this kind of practical discourse can result in the decision about valid norms (ibid.). This kind of decision-making underlines very emphatically the practice-dimension in the claim for deliberative decision-making. Thus, when adopting these basic assumptions in deliberation of transnational civil society networks, the focus should be rather on the action orientation of involved par-ticipants in deliberation and the practices of role-taking and “inclusion of the other” than on formal institutional settings of deliberation.
2.2.2 The Participatory Claims of Deliberative DemocracyTranslating discourse theory into the context of mass societies and nation 
state	democracy,	Habermas	(1996)	defined	popular	sovereignty	as	procedur-al and subjectless. While republican democratic theorists claimed that people are the bearers of sovereignty “that in principle cannot be delegated” (Haber-
mas	1996:	301),	 liberals	 stated	 that	political	 authority	 can	be	 exercised	by	“means of elections and voting” (ibid.). Habermas suggested a third version of 
democracy	in	mass	societies:By contrast, the discourse theory of democracy corresponds to the image of a decentered society, albeit a society in which the political public sphere 
has	 been	 differentiated	 as	 an	 arena	 for	 the	 perception,	 identification,	 and	treatment of problems affecting the whole of society. Once one gives up the philosophy of the subject, one needs neither to concentrate sovereignty con-cretely in the people nor to banish it in anonymous constitutional structures 
and	powers.	The	“self ’	of	the	self-organizing	legal	community	disappears	in	
the	subjectless	forms	of	communication	that	regulate	the	flow	of	discursive	opinion- and will-formation in such a way that their fallible results enjoy  the presumption of being reasonable. This is not to denounce the intuition connected with the idea of popular sovereignty but to interpret it intersubjec-
tively.	(Habermas	1996:	301)
Deliberative	democracy	in	its	participatory	connotation	is	defined	as	“polit-ical mechanisms and social practices which facilitate the discovery of good 
arguments,	 sound	 justification	 of	 action	 and,	where	 possible,	 generalizable	
interest”	(Dryzek	1990,	as	cited	by	Held	2006:	246).	The	procedural	notion	
of	deliberative	democracy	and	the	definition	as	“practices	and	mechanisms”	by Dryzek (1990) makes deliberative democracy adaptable to a practice- oriented examination of democracy in transnational civil society networks. 
This	specific	conceptualization	of	deliberative	democracy	is	further	specified	by many theorists. Goodin (2003) argues in this regard to take the input- dimension of democracy more seriously. Input is recognized as having an im-pact, but only in relation to the output. In liberal democratic theory, preferenc-
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es	are	assumed	to	be	fixed.	The	question	how	they	develop	is	neglected.	To	the	contrary, Goodin argues that inputs themselves can be lesser or more demo-
cratic	(Goodin	2003:	10).	This	refers	back	to	the	distinction	between	different	kinds of discussion, whether participants bargain or argue, or whether they act instrumentally or truth-seeking. Furthermore, deliberationists criticize that the mere aggregation of votes in liberal representative democracies does not consider the questions of how and why people come to vote. Empirical studies assess the socio-psychological determinants of voting choices, but do 
not	target	the	“normative	concerns	of	democratic	theory”	(Goodin	2003:	11),	
being	the	reasoning	of	individuals	and	their	“internal	reflective	concomitants	of democratic political discussions” (ibid.). These are important questions 
when	thinking	about	the	inclusion	of	the	“mute”,	 the	ones	that	are	officially	excluded from voting, the homeless and foreigners for example. Also other groups that will be affected by political decisions such as future generations or non-humans (animals, eco-systems) are excluded from the simple vote. Imag-ining oneself in the place of somebody or some group that is not able to vote is better possible in a deliberation process than without any deliberation, Goo-
din	argues	(ibid:	14):	“Premise	matter,	not	just	conclusions.	Democrats	trying	genuinely to respond to one another need to ask not merely what people want, but why. What they are asking, through that further question, is not for some 
psycho-social	 explanation	but	 rather	 for	people’s	 self-conscious	 rationales.”	
(Goodin	2003:	13).	These are main reasons for deliberationists to argue for deliberative de-mocracy as a form of democracy that can overcome the downsides and ex-cluding effects of liberal representative democracy. However, deliberative democracy is distinct from participatory democracy in some regards. Delib-erationists doubt that participatory democracy can be realized in large scale 
complex	societies.	The	“fiction	of	a	general	deliberative	assembly”	is	not	pur-sued by deliberation theorists. Concepts of deliberation for example by Seyla Benhabib (1996) rather envision a “plurality of modes of associations” as the 
spaces	where	deliberation	takes	place	(Benhabib	1996:	74):	It is through the interlocking net of these multiple forms of associations, net-works, and organizations that an anonymous “public conversation” results. It is central to the model of deliberative democracy that it privileges such a public sphere of mutually interlocking and overlapping networks and asso-ciations of deliberation, contestation, and argumentation (original in italics, 
Benhabib	1996:	73–74).Furthermore, deliberation theorists argue in contrast to participatory dem-ocrats that the decision-making in small communities needs not necessari-ly to be very democratic. To the contrary, those homogenous groups can be very susceptible to “conformity, intolerance and the personalization of poli-
tics”	(Held	2006:	236).	The	mere	increase	of	participation	is	no	guarantee	for	
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more equal participation. Direct popular participation per se is not automati-cally democratizing political processes. Thus, deliberationists are cautious in seeing themselves fully as another version of participatory democracy (Held 
2006:	237).	There are many deliberation experiments with citizens that strive to en-
hance	 participation	 in	 political	 decision-making.	 At	 first,	 deliberative	 polls	and deliberation days are practiced as deliberation among citizens that con-stitute a microcosmic sample of the population (Fishkin 2009). In drawing 
them	by	lot,	those	deliberation	models	combine	two	distinct	norms:	equality	and deliberation. Everyone has the same chance to be in and can be replaced equally by anyone else. In those polls and deliberation days, it was observed that people changed their minds after they knew more about certain political 
matters	(Held	2006:	252).	A	critical	point	is	how	those	enlightened	decisions	can be communicated to the wider public, which could have “recommending force” in a way that the public would be confronted with suggestions that might be their own if “they knew and thought more about the issues” (Fishkin 
and	Luskin	2005:	185).	Deliberative Democracy is seen as targeting the micro-aspect of demo-
cratic	 theory,	namely	 the	 citizens’	 competence	 to	deliberate,	 “the	quality	of	
the	 citizens’	 thought	 and	 action”	 (Offe	2003:	297).	Offe	 states	 that	 deliber-ative democracy might be a better solution in more and more pluralist and heterogeneous societies than republican and liberal theories of democracy. However, he states that the practice of deliberative democracy is far from eas-ily implemented. The requirements for citizens are very high and deliberative democracy only works if everybody participates (ibid.). However, he sees the supportive background context “for cultivating democratic citizenship compe-
tence”	(Offe	2003:	319)	in	associations	with	open	membership	criteria	and	a	discursive formation of consensus (in contrast to authoritative decision-mak-ing). Held (2006) sees these associations not unambiguously as favorable for deliberation. Rather, he states that civil society contexts can be both, hinder-
ing	and	nurturing	deliberation:	“There	must	be	a	shift	in	democratic	theory	from an exclusive focus on macro-political institutions to an examination of the various diverse contexts of civil society, some of which hinder and some 
of	which	nurture	deliberation	and	debate.”	(Held	2006:	234).	These	“contexts	of civil society” are investigated in the present study. In adopting a micro-po-
litical	perspective	on	deliberation	 it	can	be	assessed	 in	how	far	 the	specific	civil society contexts of transnational networks hinder or further deliberation processes and the competencies of its participants. This is insofar interest-ing, as deliberationists argued that pluralist network-like contexts seem to be favorable for deliberation, but on the other hand the homogenous character of civil society organizations, that are part of these networks seem to rather hinder equalized deliberation. 
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Deliberative democracy is suggested as an alternative to the aggregation of individual preferences. Deliberation legitimizes decision-making insofar as 
new	information	is	imparted	through	deliberation,	thus	the	individuals’	often	
conflicting	wishes	and	views	are	ordered	through	the	process	of	exchanging	views with a group of people and the provision of new information. This im-
plies	the	assumption	that	people	do	not	have	fixed	preferences	but	rather	an	unordered set of wishes and views. Benhabib calls the assumption that indi-
viduals	have	an	„ordered	set	of	coherent	preferences“	a	methodological	fiction	
of	economic	models	of	political	theory	(Benhabib	1996:	71).	Furthermore	the	act of articulating own opinions in front of others forces individuals to think 
about	how	their	views	could	be	convincing	to	others	as	well:	“Reasoning	from	
the	standpoint	of	all	involved	not	only	forces	a	certain	coherence	upon	one’s	views but also forces one to adopt a standpoint that Hannah Arendt, following 
Kant,	had	called	the	‘enlarged	mentality’	“(Benhabib	1996:	72).	However, the orientation towards consensus poses problems with the liberal assumption of individual autonomy and value pluralism and it is also criticized by difference theorists. Iris M. Young (2000) sees the principle of im-partiality, which says that decisions should be impartial, i.e. that they should be agreeable by literally everyone, as a utopian vision and furthermore a prin-ciple which suppresses diversity. The vision of the one good decision is mis-
leading,	she	argues	(Young	2000:	43–44).	Furthermore,	she	says	that	nobody	can set aside her or his particular preference, which is why impartiality is a false reduction of multiple viewpoints. She suggests a politics of inclusion as an ideal of a heterogeneous public (ibid.). Furthermore, deliberation is crit-icized for privileging particular types of contribution such as dispassionate and disembodied reason-giving over other types such as narratives, and thus perpetuating the dominance of citizens with “higher“ communication skills 
(Young	2000:	38–39).	Carole	Gould’s	definition	of	deliberative	democracy	rel-ativizes the need for consensus in that she states that deliberative democracy means that differences are brought into the public space and are revised un-der discussion, either purely consensual in the end or differences are seen as 
contingent,	 both	assume	a	 generality	of	difference	 (Gould	1996:	143).	This	
definition	reflects	difference	as	an	important	and	general	condition	of	delib-erative democracy.
Pluralism	in	the	political	process	is	 justified,	because	it	“features	multi-ple centers of power, counters authoritarianism, and provides the basic grist 
for	political	debate”	(Dryzek	and	Niemeyer	2012:	635).	An	argument	which	is	shared with participatory democrats is that political disagreement is condu-cive to developing competent individuals, who know the reasoning for their positions (ibid.). If pluralism is a basic value of democracy, that should not be overcome, the question is how consensus can be reached without compromis-
ing	 the	one	or	other	position.	Niemeyer	and	Dryzek	 (2007)	conceptualized	
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the	meta-consensus	as	a	way	to	solve	this	dilemma:	“deliberation	should	pro-duce agreement on the domain of relevant reasons or considerations (involv-ing both beliefs and values) that ought to be taken into account, and on the character of the choices to be made, but it does not require agreement on the veracity of particular beliefs, or ranking of values, still less unanimity on what 
should	be	done.”	(Niemeyer	and	Dryzek	2007:	4).	Furthermore,	on	the	basis	of	
meta-consensus,	a	second	outcome	of	deliberation	can	be	reached:	Intersubjective rationality results from deliberative procedure in which both agreement and disagreement are possible, but are constrained by a condition of consistency regarding the reasons that produce a particular decision. An intersubjectively rational situation emerges when individuals who agree on preferences also concur on the relevant reasons, and vice versa for disagree-ment (ibid.).Similarly, Fung and Wright (2003) imagine a more pragmatic version of de-
cision-making	through	deliberation:	Citizens	do	not	necessarily	need	to	find	neither consensus nor do they need to be altruistic in their positions and argu-
ments.	For	a	reasonable	deliberation	it	is	enough,	if	citizens	can	find	reasons	
that	 they	can	accept	 in	collective	actions	 (Fung	and	Wright	2003:	17).	This	relativization of the consensus-orientation, which questions the Habermasian understanding of citizens who learn to include “the other” in their own pref-erences and arrive at the one valid norm, is taking into account the diverse group constellations that occur also in transnational civil society networks. The participatory notions of deliberative democracy already point to the par-allels between participatory and deliberative democracy and 
2.3  The Prospects of Participatory and Deliberative 
Democracy for Transnational Civil Society NetworksParticipatory and deliberative democracy share many similar traits as out-lined in the previous parts of this chapter. However, they also differ in many 
regards.	 The	main	difference	 can	be	 seen	 in	 the	 level	 of	 conceptualization:	While participatory democrats often focus on society and politics as a whole system and thus suggest concepts that envision a transformation of society as such, deliberative democrats focus on concrete processes of debate and thus often limit their concepts to the levels of will-formation and decision-making on a micro-level. In the following, two aspects of both theories will be outlined that open up the link to transnational civil society networks. Participatory democracy in civil society is a strand of literature that studies the practices of participatory democracy in SMOs and NGOs and thus is a useful bridge between theory and empirical study. Deliberative democracy is prominently 
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applied in International Relations scholarship. Thus, this strand of research will shed light on the connection between normative democratic theory and transnational relations. 
Participatory Democracy inside Civil Society OrganizationsCivil society organizations do not necessarily provide favorable circumstances 
for	participatory	democracy,	as	Warren	(2001)	reflects.	In	general,	two	char-acteristics of civil society organizations and their networks tend to counter-
act	a	participatory	will	formation:	(1)	The	voluntary	character	of	civil	society	organizations “and the ease of exit will mean that they will be relatively ho-
mogenous,	self-selecting	for	values	and	lifestyles.	In	these	cases,	non-reflexive	ideological or religious identities may reinforce one another, and attempts to critique and discourse may be regarded as unwelcome challenges to the soli-
darity	of	the	group”	(Warren	2001:	227).	(2)	Many	civil	society	organizations	are action-oriented, and their communication will thus focus on strategic con-cerns rather than critique and discourse (ibid.). Overall, Warren argues that 
civil	societies’	internal	organization	is	not	conducive	for	participatory	democ-racy. In further differentiating between different types of civil society organi-
zations,	Warren	(2001)	identifies	a	negative	relationship	between	these	inner	and the outer dimensions, namely the two democratic dimensions of civil so-ciety. He states that those organizations that emphasize internal deliberation and thus the furthering of individual autonomy inside the group or organi-zation (internal dimension) can potentially be less successful in articulating a strong public voice, which would further the political autonomy of the or-
ganization	and	their	constituency	(outer	dimension)	(Warren	2001:	79).	Vice	versa, it is plausible that organizations, which are very successful in giving a public voice to subordinate interests, might not be that eager on deliberating inside the organization. Inside deliberation can make claims very intricate, complex or even diffuse, whereas giving a public voice means communicating 
efficiently	and	understandably	to	the	public.	Whereas many grass-roots civil society organizations, especially the ones that are part of the two networks examined in this study, are deeply commit-ted to participatory democracy, their interpretation and rules of those pro-cesses vary depending on the social relationships within the groups as well 
as	with	others	(Polletta	2002:	4).	For	example,	the	circumstance	that	activists	see each other as colleagues, business partners, family members or friends deliberately affects the interactions within groups and creates rules on how 
to	raise	issues	or	find	a	consensus	(ibid.).	Overall,	the	role	of	friendship	and	trust seems to be ambivalent for participatory democracy in social movement 
groups.	Friendship	and	more	specifically	trust	among	participants	is	the	basis	
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for participatory democracy, but friendship can also undermine participatory 
norms	by	its	tendency	towards	exclusivity,	deference,	conflict	avoidance	and	“antipathy to the rules that might have made for more accountability” (Pollet-
ta	2002:	222).	Thus,	 social	movement	 groups	have	 to	 invent	new	practices	of cooperation that include democratic accountability and thus mitigate the undemocratic implications of close friendships (ibid.). In her study of different American social movements, Polletta argues against the conventional thesis that participatory democracy is valuable but 
not	practical	because	it	is	inefficient,	time-consuming	and	not	goal-oriented.	In contrast, she argues that many social movement groups adopt participatory democratic procedures out of strategic reasons and not ideological ones, as it 
is	usually	assumed:It is in some ways a very different version of participatory democracy than 
that	current	in	the	1960’s.	No	one	believes	any	longer	that	decisions	can	al-ways be made by strict consensus. Activists are more comfortable with rules, less hostile to power, and more attuned to the inequalities concealed in in-formal relations. As a mode of deliberation, participatory democracy incor-porates elements of representative democracy; as an organizational form, it 
incorporates	elements	of	bureaucracy.	(Polletta	2002:	202–203)Groups that operate in uncertain conditions and do not have much access to 
power	could	benefit	 from	participatory	decision-making	 (Polletta	2002:	2),	which “gives members a stake in the organization and responsibility for its fate.” Further, she argues, “[i]nformality encourages affectively rich relations, 
and	 the	 organization’s	 egalitarian	 structure	makes	 for	mutual	 respect	 and,	
thence,	solidarity.”	(Polletta	2002:	210).	Decision-makers	learn	to	avoid	pur-
suing	one	true	answer,	but	try	to	explore	several	possibilities	to	find	collective	answers (ibid.). This leads to participants who are more tolerant of differ-ences and “better able to engage in moral discourse and judgment” (Warren 
1993:	209),	described	as	the	self-transformation	thesis	by	Warren	(1993).	In	
addition	to	these	benefits,	there	is	also	a	very	motivational	recruitment	factor	in participatory democracy in movement groups. Open discussions and the equally serious evaluations of all ideas and proposals can make participants sense that the whole process of decision-making is worthwhile because no-body will be left out, leading to decisions with which everyone could agree. 
Still,	 those	kinds	of	 benefits	 are	 “most	 obvious	 in	 conditions	where	people	
have	had	few	prior	opportunities	for	political	leadership”	(Polletta	2002: 212).	
In	stable	groups	with	constant	funding,	the	benefits	of	participatory	democ-racy might not be that evident (ibid.) and the shift toward goal-orientation might be even more popular. The emphasis on participatory democracy also changes over time. As Blee (2012) found out, in her study on micro-dynamics in social movement groups in Pittsburgh, social movement groups gain coherence by forgetting that they 
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disagreed in earlier discussion and subsequently just see their decisions as inevitable (Blee 2012). This goes along with a habitualization of once installed 
mechanisms:	“early	cultural	dynamics	can	undermine	the	democratizing	po-tential of activism as grass-roots groups fall into routines that erode their im-
agination	and	engagement”	 (Blee	2012:	138).	Thus,	 the	 starting	phase	of	 a	group formation is in so far very crucial as it can go two ways. First, it can ei-ther set the standards for participatory democracy, which can be recalled later, Second, cultural dynamics can lead to a tendency toward convention, such as always recruiting similar members, gaining information from familiar sources 
and	 limiting	the	possibilities	of	 talking	to	each	other	(Blee	2012:	138).	The	latter of course diminishes the potential for participatory democracy within 
social	movement	groups.	However,	the	first	possibility	of	setting	standards	is	not self-enforcing. As mentioned earlier, groups can simply forget the initial deliberation about their principles and instead emphasize loyalty and stability in the group instead of sustaining participatory democratic norms. Still, Blee states that some groups in her study “were able to escape paths of diminishing 
possibility	through	self-conscious	efforts”	(Blee	2012:	139).	They	brought	ide-as back on the table, reminded each other of earlier discussions and ideas they had not followed, remained explicit about why which decisions were made, designed strategies to stay open for input of new members, encouraged oth-ers to voice their concerns, and discussed about alternative actions and made ideas explicit (ibid.). Although this seems like an exhausting exercise, it allows groups to remain thriving and democratic. Overall, Blee concludes that “[g]rassroots activism can only strengthen democracy when it nurtures a broad 
sense	of	possibility.”	(Blee	2012:	140).	In	addition,	Polletta	sees	the	causes	for	a decrease in participatory democracy in movement groups not only in the dif-
ficulties	of	staying	with	participatory	norms,	but	also	in	the	differing	demands	of social movements, the features of political discourse and broader cultural 
conceptions	(Polletta	2002:	217).In sum, participatory democracy in civil society organizations is very much dependent on contextual factors and on how activists can sustain norms over time and resist tendencies of habitualization and accommodation to close social relations. Finally, it can be questioned whether participatory democra-cy is effective in internally diverse, complex and resource-dependent groups 
(Polletta	2002:	221)	or	even	networks.	Also,	the	argument	about	the	potential	risks of too much resemblance, proximity and routine inside civil society or-ganizations contributes to the analysis of the empirical case study insofar as it suggests an explanation why actors and organizations in networks choose to practice coordination and organization in a participatory way and why these practices develop over time. 
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Deliberative Democracy in International RelationsSince the end of the cold war, norms played an increasingly important role in IR research. In this regard, deliberative concepts have not only been used to assess democratic innovations such as deliberative polls but also to evaluate the democratic quality of European institutions (see e.g. Smith 2009, Friedrich 2013). The European Union is a distinct place to study deliberation in contrast to international politics. As Neyer points out, the EU is neither anarchically nor hierarchically governed, but is situated gradually in-between. Neyer calls this governance form heterarchy (Neyer 2003). The status of EU governance in-between vertical and horizontal coordination, as well as centralization and decentralization “requires an inclusive and cooperative mode of interaction” 
(Neyer	 2003:	 690).	 This	 can	 be	 also	 proven	 by	 empirical	 evidence:	 “politi-cal interaction in the EU relies very much on deliberation” (ibid.). IR and EU scholars adopted the idea of deliberative democracy in which civil society plays an important part in fostering deliberative democracy. Neyer argues the 
case	specifically	for	the	ability	of	civil	society	to	attract	public	attention	(Neyer	
2003:	695),	where	European	or	transnational	media	hardly	exist.	As	argued	before, this publicity may force actors into a deliberative mode. In his widely received account of communicative action and the persuasive power of norms 
in	the	field	of	international	human	rights	politics,	Thomas	Risse	(2000)	made	the claim that the three modes of action cannot be seen as mutual exclusive but as intermingling and turning over in different phases of international pol-itics. He distinguishes between the classic rational choice account of the logic of consequentialism, a rule-based action following the logic of appropriate-
ness	(March	and	Olsen	1998)	and	the	logic	of	arguing	(Elster	1998).	This	logic	of arguing was equated with the logic of communicative action, as theorized 
by	Habermas	(1981).	In	this	he	and	others	wanted	to	empirically	investigate	
the	existence	of	arguing	in	the	field	of	IR.
Risse-Kappen	et al.	(1999)	translated	the	logic	of	communicative	action	into an empirical model, the spiral model, which builds on the conceptual-
ization	of	the	boomerang	model	by	Keck	and	Sikkink	(1998)	in	the	work	on	transnational advocacy coalitions. In the spiral model, they investigate the communication phases in international human rights politics (Risse-Kappen 
et al.	1999).	The	authors	state	that	NGOs	which	can	successfully	gain	atten-tion in an international public can effectively force states to comply with hu-man rights norms. This is not only because autocratic state leaders are easily convinced of the plausibility of human rights norms, but because at a certain point they get trapped in a rhetoric dead end. Having done “cheap talk” for a while can provoke other states and international organizations to demand consequences. Then, the international reputation, a very costly good, is at stake 
(Risse	et al.	2002).	However,	Müller	(Müller	2007)	stated	that	 this	research	
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program	which	aims	at	making	Habermas’	 theory	of	 communicative	 action	fruitful for the empirical analysis of global politics must fail in that the actual actor orientations that supposedly change after sequences of speech acts can-
not	be	examined	by	social	 scientific	 research.	Since	 these	are	 “intramental”	
processes,	they	cannot	be	studied	by	social	sciences	(Müller	2007: 214).	Thus,	this approach has been criticized in that it fails to reasonably connect theoret-
ical	conceptualization	and	empirical	analysis:
[…]	the	restructuring	of	a	research	design	that	shifts	the	focus	of	attention	to	the structural and institutional context of communication does not provide an answer to the question how we are to conceptualize and describe the deliber-
ations	that	go	on	within	these	contexts	[…]	What	goes	on	in	processes	of	com-munication becomes something like a black box again, if we focus our analysis 
primarily	on	the	topics	and	contexts	of	deliberation.	(Saretzki	2009:	172).Based on this normative turn in IR and the assumption that civil society actors 
can	 play	 an	 influential	 role	 in	 democratizing	 international	 politics	 through	normative argumentation, a second strand of literature evolved. This one has been concerned with questions of “the democratizing potential inherent in civil society participation in the institutions of global and European govern-
ance”	 (Steffek	and	Nanz	2008:	3).	 In	 concretely	operationalizing	 the	demo-cratic quality of existing deliberative arrangements in global politics, the role of civil society actors as a “transmission belt” between international organ-
izations,	the	global	citizenry	and	the	public	sphere	(Steffek	and	Nanz	2008:	
8-9)	was	to	be	examined.	By	operationalizing	the	norms	of	deliberation	into	four indicators of democratic quality, namely access to deliberation, transpar-ency and access to information, responsiveness to stakeholder concerns and inclusion of all voices; this research program investigated qualitatively the 
democratizing	influence	of	civil	society	participation	on	European	and	glob-
al	governance.	As	one	of	 the	 findings	suggests,	 civil	 society	participation	 in	
practice	is	highly	dependent	on	the	policy	field	and	the	willingness	of	political	
decision-makers	to	include	civil	society’s	voice	in	policy-making19 (Friedrich 
2008).	Still,	a	general	trend	of	opening	up	of	international	institutions	can	be	
observed	also	in	quantitative	terms	(Tallberg	et al.	2013).	Although deliberative democracy as a concept of procedural democracy mainly  focuses on the will-formation process prior to decision-making and 
19  In considering the heterogeneous interests at stake at the EU level, compared to the rela-tive homogeneity of the nation state context, Friedrich (2009) suggests a model of delib-erative participation in order to fruitfully operationalize normative democratic theory beyond the nation state. This model combines elements of associative and deliberative democracy in order to combine associative participation of civil society as democratizing 
agents	 and	 discursive	 justification	 under	 the	 conditions	 of	 heterogeneity	 (Friedrich	
2009:	198–99).
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the quality of decisions taken, deliberation is also applied as a discursive control mechanism that secures accountability of representatives in spheres where representatives cannot be held formally accountable by elections. The concept of discursive representation that is suggested as a way out of the prob-lematic question of who is entitled to hold the decision-makers accountable 
in	fluid	spheres	such	as	networks,	shifts	the	point	of	reference	for	democrat-
ic	legitimacy	from	the	individual	to	the	discourse	(Dryzek	1994;	Dryzek	and	
Niemeyer	2008).	A	clearly	defined	demos	is	at	the	core	of	democratic	theory.	
If	such	demos	cannot	be	 identified,	Dryzek	and	Niemeyer	suggests	to	make	
a	shift	towards	a	subjectless	discursive	representation,	following	Habermas’	
concept	of	“subjectless	forms	communication”	(Habermas	1996:	136),	in	en-suring “that a network is not dominated by a single discourse whose terms are accepted uncritically by all involved actors in a way that marginalizes other 
discourses	that	could	claim	relevance”	(Dryzek	and	Niemeyer	2008:	13).
2.4 ConclusionsParticipatory democrats with their very different perspectives and back-grounds have in common that they clearly challenge the liberal notions and assumptions of representative democracy. Participatory democrats began 
with	 challenging	 the	 idea	 of	 fixed	 individual	 interests	 and	 static	 notions	 of	citizen behavior. Instead, they proposed ideas of social learning and self-trans-
formation	 (Pateman	 1970,	Warren	 1993).	 Pointing	 toward	 the	 importance	
of	equality	 in	society,	MacPherson	(1977)	and	others	argued	for	systematic	
change.	Feminists	 in	 the	 field	of	democratic	 theory	 further	emphasized	 the	universality trap of liberal democracy and underlined the importance of di-versity and empowered inclusion (Phillips 1991, Young 2000, Holland-Cunz 
2008).	 On	 a	 more	 general	 note,	 radical	 democrats	 questioned	 the	 idea	 of	group identities as something naturally given and thus opened up a space for considering participation against the background of shifting, overlapping and 
diverse	citizenry	(Laclau	and	Mouffe	[1985]	2001).Those outlooks on democracy are fruitful for the study of transnation-al civil society and their democratic practice out of three reasons. First, de-mocracy in transnational civil society networks spans across state borders. Therefore, the foundations of liberal representative democracy, such as the 
guaranty	 of	 citizens’	 rights	 for	 a	 well-defined	 citizenry,	 are	 challenged.	 It	
becomes	more	and	more	difficult	to	grant	“citizens’	rights”	to	a	diverse	and	
temporary	number	of	“citizens”	who	are	members	of	organizations	in	a	fluid	transnational network. In addition, there is no state-like institution that has the power to control this guarantee. Thus, democracy in transnational civil 
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society	networks	must	be	conceptualized	first	and	foremost	as	a	process-ori-ented rather than as institution-oriented democracy. This process dimension is inherent in the participatory approaches of democratic theory. Second, the main assumption that every citizen is capable of learning and practicing participatory democracy and that participatory democracy leads 
to	better	and	more	long-lasting	decisions	is	reflected	and	adapted	in	the	par-ticipation practices within transnational grass-roots NGO coalition networks. 
These	participation	practices	are	different	from	domestic	state	democracy’s	representative governments and are therefore rather related to normative participatory democratic theory. Civil society as a sphere outside the state is a suggested place to practice democracy by many, if not all participatory democrats. Theorists of associative democracy (Cohen and Rogers 1992; Hirst 
1994)	in	particular	refer	to	the	importance	of	civil	society	for	democratizing	democracy. Third, in the civil society networks included in this study, it can be empir-ically observed how far democracy expands. For example, those networks are not only civil society coalitions; they also serve as work places for the people employed in different NGOs. It is worthwhile to explore in how far democratic procedures diffuse from the network into working routines at the local level or if there is a sharp dividing line between the transnational network collabo-ration and the workplace settings “at home”. The conceptualization of deliberative democracy shares the same as-sumptions about educational prospects as participatory democracy. Deliber-
ationists	see	democratic	norms	fulfilled	if	decisions	are	taken	on	the	grounds	of the reasonable weighing of all possible arguments and preferences (Held 2006). Deliberation over matters of public relevance forces actors to reason generally and argue in favor of a common purpose. In deliberative settings, hidden particularistic interests between certain decisions are exposed, and the perspectives of others need to be included to come to any kind of consen-sus. Although consensus is hard to reach, and moral disagreement will not be 
“solved”	by	deliberation,	involved	actors	can	find	“significant	points	of	conver-
gence	between	one’s	own	understandings	and	those	of	citizens	whose	posi-
tions,	[…],	one	must	reject”	(Held	2006:	243,	citing	Gutmann	and	Thompson	
1996:	85).Deliberative democracy is the one theoretical concept that is most widely applied in IR and transnational democracy. The appeal of deliberative democ-racy can be found in the procedural, subjectless notion (see Habermas 1996), that overcomes aggregative forms of democracy that are so tightly bound to the nation state. Deliberative democracy does not only provide the chance to really conceptualize a democratic form that is translatable to global politics, it is also in its normative claim more ambitious than any aggregative form of democracy. Besides the similarly high claims of deliberative democracy as of 
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participatory democracy in terms of an alleviation of the participatory dem-ocratic quality of decision-making, deliberation is also said to produce better, i.e. more rational and enlightened decisions (see Goodin 2003). This epistemic dimension of deliberation counters also the critics of participatory democra-cy, who state that too broad participation of allegedly uninformed citizens is 
not	conducive	for	a	stable	political	system	(see	Crozier	et al.	1975).	
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3  Representation and Democracy:  
Performing Control and Accountability
During the long history of democracy, representation as a main principle of 
democracy	emerged	because	of	two	reasons:	to	cope	with	the	ever	growing	number of individuals belonging to the demos and, partly as a consequence of the former, the growing mistrust of political philosophers towards the capac-ity and motivation of the majority of individuals to govern directly (Dahl and 
Tufte	1973:	10–11).Representation is thought of as making someone or something present 
that	 is	not	 literally	present	(Pitkin	1967:	8).	Traditionally,	 representation	 is	conceptualized as a dyadic relationship between the representative and the represented or constituency. This chapter will discuss the formal establish-ment of, as well as the actions taken within that relationship from different theoretical perspectives. The chapter begins with the roots of representation 
theory:	Thomas	Hobbes	first	described	representation	as	a	rational,	not	reli-gious legitimation for authority, followed by John Stuart Mill, who can be seen as the founding father of democratic representative governments. While there 
were	other	democratic	theorists	beside	Mill,	he	specifically	saw	representa-tion as a central anchor of democracy. The second part of this chapter will out-line the varieties of representation and their different normative implications. Some approaches of representation entail very high normative claims in re-spect to democratic equality, whereas other approaches are rather concerned 
with	the	functioning	of	a	representative	system	as	such.	Hanna	Pitkin	(1967)	provided a classic and comprehensive theoretical foundation of the concept of 
representation.	Her	definition	and	review	of	political	representation	theory	is cited in many, if not most of the studies of political representation. Thus, 
Pitkin’s	work	will	be	outlined	during	the	course	of	the	following	chapter.	The	third part of the chapter is focused on the peculiarities of representation in 
civil	society	contexts	 that	are	not	controlled	by	elections.	Here,	we	find	dif-ferent forms of representation and different conditions and necessities for representation practices. These theoretical approaches will function as the baseline for an analytical heuristic of representation practices in transnation-
al	civil	society	networks.	However,	first,	it	is	necessary	to	understand	the	ori-gin of representation and its different forms and normative claims in order to analytically grasp representation practices in new contexts. 
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3.1 Authors, Personations and OrgansThomas Hobbes thought democracy was a weak form of government; only a strong authority could establish peace and protect society from a “war of all against all” (Hobbes 1996 [1651]). While Hobbes clearly dismissed the idea of democratic	government,	he	is	one	of	the	first	theorists,	who	thought	about	
representative	authority	as	an	alternative	to	the	theological	justification	of	au-thority. In his secular conception of political authority, his idea was constitu-
tive	for	modern	theorists	of	representative	government	(Runciman	2009: 15).	In very abstract terms, Hobbes spoke about the constituency, making itself 
the	“author”	of	representative’s	actions	and	thus	“owning”	the	actions	of	the	
representative	(Pitkin	1967:	15).	The	authorization	of	the	representative’s	ac-
tions,	in	Hobbes’	case	the	sovereign,	is	not	limited	by	specific	requirements.	Once authorized, the sovereign has unlimited and binding authority. Thus, the people, who authorize the sovereign, must “own” whatever the sovereign is doing. That means that they take full responsibility for any action of the sov-ereign and must obey every decision taken by the sovereign. The sovereign neither has to respond to any demands by their constituency, nor is there any 
control	over	the	sovereign	(Pitkin	1967).	Representation	as	personation,	as	wearing a mask of the represented, is hardly conceivable as a representation of the “multitude” of individuals who live in a state. Therefore Hobbes con-ceptualizes the state or the commonwealth as something distinct from the individual persons that live in the state. Although Hobbes based his rational account of political authority on individuals, he saw problems in conceptual-izing the representative relationship as an individual relationship. In order to prevent the Hobbesian state from being fragmented and destabilized by the diversity of people who are represented, he conceptualized representation as representing the people as if they were one person. Although the individual persons authorized the sovereign and “own” their actions, the commonwealth becomes a unitary actor. Nevertheless, the obligations of this representative 
relationship	 rested	upon	 the	 individuals	 (Runciman	2009:	15–22).	This	 re-
fers	 to	 a	 crucial	 point	 in	democratic	 representation	 theory:	 the	problem	of	representing diversity. While Hobbes is not concerned about the democratic quality of representation, classic and contemporary democratic theorists are. The question of how to be responsive to the multitude of individuals whom a representative represents becomes even more relevant in an ever more glo-
balizing	world.	Thus,	 the	transnational	sphere	 is	specifically	affected	by	the	problem of representing diversity. What Hobbes thought of as authorship, is a central point in classic and contemporary democratic representation theory, namely the authorization of representatives. Authorization describes a formalistic aspect of representa-
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tion. It means that “a representative is someone who has been authorized to 
act.”	 (Pitkin	1967:	38).	This	view	 largely	 favors	 the	 representative.	Her/his	rights have been enlarged and s/he has only a few responsibilities. In contrast, the represented have acquired new responsibilities and given up some rights 
(Pitkin	1967:	399).	The	contrary	concept	is	accountability,	which	will	be	out-lined later in this chapter. Authorization theories can be split into the theory of Organschaft20 and the theory of democratic representative government. Both theories oppose each other in the way they conceptualize authorization. 
Organschaft theorists argue that the way representatives are selected is irrel-evant21; rather, they see representatives as organs or parts of the state appara-tus. Organschaft theorists conceptualized an organic political theory, namely “the idea that (some) groups of people are (like) living organisms“ (Pitkin 
1967:	40).	Organschaft theorists are interested in questions of sovereignty and 
legal	status	of	government	agents.	They	think	that	“all	government	officials,	all	organs of the state, are representatives, and representation is necessary in any 
complex	society.”	(Pitkin	1967:	40).	Thus,	Organschaft representation can be 
seen	as	the	first	conceptualization	of	unelected	representatives.	Since	actors	in civil society networks are also often unelected representatives, this is an interesting proposal in order to understand authorization of representatives 
as	an	ongoing	process	of	fitting	in	like	an	organ	in	an	organism.	In	contrast	to Organschaft theorists, theorists of democratic representative government are very much interested in the way representatives are authorized through elections. In representative democracy, elections are the main mechanisms of authorization. Authorized representation in representative democracy is 
commonly	defined	as	 the	“acting	with	the	consent	of	someone	else”	(Pitkin	
1967:	43).	This	means	that	the	right	to	act	in	a	certain	way	is	conditional	upon	another who has “expressed the wish that he should act” in a certain way and that the “represented must at least share in responsibility for the actions 
taken”	(ibid.).	The	problem	that	arises	from	this	definition	is	that	it	does	not	include a timely limitation of representation. In other word, authority is not given for a limited period of time. Nothing in the meaning of representation in representative democracy could justify this, although no one would really ac-cept a lifetime dictatorship as representative democracy. Authorization means to authorize a representative beforehand, but not to hold the representative accountable after the legislation period. As noted already above, representa-tion through the authorization perspective derives from the need for action. 
20  One of the better known Organschaft theorists is Max Weber (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft) (see Weber (2005) 21  “The manner of their selection is irrelevant so long as they become organs of the group. Elected representatives are no different in status here than those chosen in some other 
way.”	(Pitkin	1967:	41)
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Representatives must and should take actions for their constituency, and thus, they need to be authorized so that their actions are legitimized. This is differ-ent from other concepts of descriptive representation, which argue that rep-resentation is linked to government control and not government action. Those concepts will be explored later in this chapter.John Stuart Mill, one of the main advocates of democratic representative government, preferred a government that consists of the “instructed few”. He saw expert guidance as complementary to the “popular government” of the 
representative	assembly.	Mill	(1972	[1861])	wanted	to	constrain	the	danger	of the “tyranny of the majority” by delegating government functions to skillful and wise experts. The executive government should not be alone in possess-ing a certain degree of expertise; the electorate should also be knowledgeable 
in	order	to	vote	competently.	Mill	suggested	“plural	voting”:	citizens	with	spe-
cific	competences	or	intellect	(“mental	superiority”)	should	have	more	than	one vote. This should improve the quality of political will formation as well as the political government. Although this is a very elitist argument, it uncovers a 
critical	aspect	of	the	functioning	of	democracy:	Democracy	needs	competent,	
informed	citizens	(Mill	1971	[1861];	Pateman	1989).	Mill	saw	this	as	a	main	
function	of	democracy	that	needs	to	be	improved:	the	education	of	the	citizens	in order to become politically mature individuals who can competently en-gage and participate in the process of will-formation and elections (Pateman 
1989:	31–35).	Mill’s	“true	democracy”	is	a	political	system	with	proportional	
representation	and	adequate	minority	protection	(Mill	1971	[1861];	Schmidt	
2008).	 In	 this	way,	Mill	 is	a	 liberal	proportionalist	with	 the	 idea	of	an	 ideal	democracy as direct democracy. In this sense proportionalists see democracy 
only	as	a	substitute	for	the	ideal	of	direct	democracy:	“the	modern	form	of	de-
mocracy	(…)	[is]	a	machinery	necessitated	by	modern	civilization	and	require-
ments	of	life	to	make	democratic	government	possible”	(Pitkin	1967: 86).In sum, the basic idea of representation as a mechanism of authorization rests on the assumption that either democratic control of the representative 
would	weaken	the	government’s	ability	to	rule	effectively,	as	Hobbes	saw	it,	or that authorization of expert representatives is a way to avoid a “tyranny of 
the	majority”	and	to	reflect	the	“ideal”	form	of	democracy,	direct	democracy,	in a way that proportional representation of citizens can be guaranteed. These 
initial	 ideas	of	representation	are	 influenced	by	the	 image	of	very	powerful	representatives who only need to be legitimized through an initial election. Procedural democratic control is neither a necessary condition for legitima-tion nor is it of any help to a good government. This kind of representation was further developed by modern representation theorists who saw more need for a more far-reaching democratic control of representatives. 
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3.2 Democratic Norms and Forms of RepresentationThe variants of representation that were developed out of the normative claim of legitimacy of representatives constitute a further development in the think-ing about representation and democracy. This legitimacy is either derived from a high equality of representation through the resemblance between representatives and represented (descriptive representation) or through “tal-ented” and experienced representatives who further the discourse with their constituency and bring in new ideas. Besides this controversy over the tasks 
of	a	representative,	 there	 is	a	parallel	controversy	over	the	representative’s	liberty. Democratic legitimation of the representative can be either reached by controlling the representative through a delegate model, i.e. the constituency gives the representative a mandate to act in a certain way, or the representa-tive is democratically legitimized on the basis of trust. This trusteeship model involves less control and more knowledge on the part of representatives about their constituency. It is very common in civil society contexts where control mechanisms are often hardly feasible. These different forms of representation and their normative implications are indicative for the forms of representa-tion that are possible in contexts of transnational civil society networks. 
Representation as DescriptionDescriptive representation means standing for the represented by resem-
blance	(Pitkin	1967:	61).	Pitkin	distinguishes	descriptive	“standing	for”	from	substantive “acting for”, which overall means speaking for, acting for and look-
ing	after	 the	 interests	of	 the	groups	one	represents	 (Pitkin	1967:	116).	Ac-cording to descriptive representation as “standing for”, a democratic assembly of representatives should be a microcosm of society. It is therefore more im-portant how a parliament is composed than what it actually does. According to descriptive representation theory, representative bodies have a different role than in substantive representation. Descriptive representatives do not act; they control the government that acts and takes decisions. Therefore, an accurate resemblance of the people is more important than the actions taken 
by	the	representatives.	Representation	thus	means	sharing	one	group’s	attrib-utes22. The general reasoning behind descriptive representation is that there should be an equal representation of all groups in society and, from a critical 
22  When we think of political candidates who campaign for their own election, they often try to resemble their voters. However, this is an ideal typical presentation of a group (for ex-ample in displaying ideal family values) and not a representation understood as the 
“identity	of	characteristics”	(Pitkin	1967:	78).
82
perspective on liberal democratic theory, a distinct representation of under-
privileged	groups	(Phillips	1996;	Young	2000).	According	to	Young’s	critical	approach of a politics of difference, underprivileged groups must be present in decision-making institutions for three main reasons. First, , there might be a history of exclusion that affects members of those groups in that they refuse to participate actively; consequently, descriptive representation could be mo-tivating for them. Second, some groups have dominated the discourse for a long time; this might affect how issues are prioritized, discussed and decided, and this “way of doing things” can be seen as something neutral or universal. Lastly, the special representation of marginalized groups brings in the “situ-ated knowledge” of those groups, which is often unheard or not known. All those arguments for descriptive representation or a variation of it, group rep-resentation, aim at the drawback of political inequality and injustice (Young 
2000:	144–45).	In trying to reach a common identity between representative and rep-
resented,	 representative	 institutions	 first	 and	 foremost	 should	 function	 as	suppliers of information about their constituencies. The more accurate the information about the constituency is, the better representatives can de-scriptively represent their constituencies. This is necessary in order to be representative in a descriptive sense. Pitkin distinguishes between descrip-tive representatives as (1) a map, meaning an inanimate object that perfectly mirrors the interests of the people; (2) painter, describing this representa-tion as providing accurate information; or (3) an accurate copy, meaning that elected representatives do “what the whole nation would have done” (Pitkin 
1967: 84).	This	third	definition	of	descriptive	representatives	is	at	the	core	of	understanding democratic representative government. The logic behind this is radically democratic. It frames direct democracy as the ideal type of democ-racy or the desirable norm. Thus, representative democracy must strive to re-semble direct democracy as much as possible in copying society as perfectly 
as	possible	(Pitkin	1967:	86).
Two	main	arguments	against	descriptive	representation	can	be	identified	
as	follows:	(1)	There	is	no	room	for	descriptive	representatives	to	take	initi-atives, promote new ideas and discuss matters. Thus, descriptive represent-atives merely mirror the interests of their constituencies, but remain passive 
entities	without	agency	(Pitkin	1967:	60–92).	(2)	Descriptive	representatives	may be less talented to take political action than representatives who were elected and already have experience in politics. It is also assumed that elected representatives are more willing and skilled to take over the position because they have already won the competition about votes. Taking these arguments 
into	account,	Mansbridge	suggests	a	modified	form	of	descriptive	representa-tion. The criticized descriptive representation, which she calls microcosmic representation, is the pure form of descriptive representation, where the par-
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liament is supposed to be a microcosm of society. As a solution, Mansbridge suggests a selective form of descriptive representation. Here, representatives are selected by group characteristics and are not randomly selected (Mans-
bridge	1999:	629).	Thus,	there	is	a	selection	process	that	creates	a	group	of	descriptive representatives who are willing and skilled to take over the re-
sponsibility	of	a	representative.	Still,	the	general	question	remains:	Is	it	nec-essary that groups must be represented by members of their groups in order 
to	reach	democratic	representation?	And	how	could	we	define	which	groups	
are	relevant	enough	to	be	represented?	The	number	of	possible	groups	is	in-
finite.	Mansbridge	concludes	that	only	those	groups	should	be	included	that	are concerned with the decision to be taken, meaning all groups that contrib-
ute	(new)	relevant	aspects	to	the	decision	(Mansbridge	1999:	635).	However,	
who	decides	about	the	affectedness	of	a	group?	When	thinking	about	group	representation, there are further issues about the ambiguity of group belong-ings and group identities, which complicate descriptive representation in the sense that every individual naturally belongs to many groups and that groups themselves are not that unitary as they are assumed to be in, as some reason-ing about descriptive representation might suggest (Phillips 1996).Suzanne Dovi (2009) introduced a new argument about descriptive rep-resentation and states that it is not enough to always include as many groups as possible. In order to equally balance representation, one has to track who is replaced by whom. It is necessary to exclude privileged groups in order to allow for a better representation of all affected groups. She states that if dem-ocrats are strategic about inclusion, they also have to be strategic about exclu-
sion	in	order	to	represent	historically	disadvantaged	groups	equally:	“After	all,	in a context where you have a white majority, a simple increase in the number of Latino representatives will not necessarily change the policy representa-tion of Latinos since the number of Latinos could be increasing at the expense 
of	black	representatives.”	(Dovi	2009:	17).The discussion about descriptive representation is concentrated very much on formalistic access of underprivileged groups into decision-making forums. In this way, descriptive representation is a very normative debate, which  focuses on the ideal composition of representatives and their formal group membership rather than on the action of representation or the repre-sentative relationship as such. This formal “right to presence”, which is articu-lated in descriptive representation, can hardly be guaranteed in transnational civil society networks. It should be a worthwhile concern, given the diversity of network members, but the implementation of this right can only be thought of in an informal and mitigated way. It would also be important to guarantee this diversity in such networks because if new ideas and campaigns would not be picked up by representatives and represented alike, the networks would stand still. Thus, the criticism of descriptive representation must equally be 
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taken into account when adapting representation to the context of transna-tional civil society networks. 
The Representative’s FreedomHow free should representatives be in the practice of representing constitu-
encies?	This	is	a	controversy	between	mandate	and	independency	theorists,	which is a discussion about the degree of independence of representatives. Whereas mandate theorists claim that the wishes of the represented should be the yardstick for any action of representatives, the independency theorists 
argue	that	a	representative’s	judgment	is	the	only	relevant	criterion	for	tak-
ing	decisions	 (Pitkin	1967:	165).	The	metaphor	 that	mandate	 theorists	use	to describe mandated representatives is the megaphone as a device to make the voice of the constituency a little louder and bring it into parliament. Dele-gate representatives only act on explicit instruction of their constituency. The reasoning behind this is that there is not one national interest that can be an-ticipated by the representative, but there are many local interests that overall build the national interest. In contrast, independency theorists see the repre-sentative rather as a free agent or trustee. Once representatives are elected, 
they	are	completely	independent	in	their	actions	(Pitkin	1967:	146–47).	This	trusteeship model is a relationship that involves trust and obligations on both 
sides	(ibid:	128).	Here,	the	powers	of	government	are	seen	as	a	property	that	
representatives	must	administer	for	the	benefit	of	others	like	fiduciaries	do.	In general, representatives are quite remote from the represented, and there is no consultancy at all. Because representatives are seen as the experts, they 
“know[…]	better”	and	do	not	need	advice	in	finding	the	best	solution	of	the	
represented.	(ibid:	136).	Independency	theorists	say	that	a	constituency	is	not	a single unit with ready-made opinions and wills. The representative cannot just mirror already existing opinions. Even if that was possible, there would not be room for activities of the legislature such as “the formulating of issues, the deliberation, the compromise on which decisions should be based” (Pitkin 
1967:	147).	The	representative	would	be	merely	a	technical	device	of	the	con-stituency without the opportunity to bring in new ideas and discuss matters. The question of the freedom of representatives is, as already indicated, 
also	a	matter	of	the	definition	of	the	represented.	Whom	or	what	is	the	rep-
resentative	supposed	to	represent?	According	to	 liberal	 theorists,	 the	act	of	representation means representing people and their own individual interests, in contrast to representation of a national interest or the common good. Inter-
ests	are	defined	as	pluralistic,	as	opposed	to	the	idea	of	the	one	national	in-
terest,	connected	or	attached	to	people,	subjective	and	“likely	to	conflict	with	
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the welfare of the nation”23	(Pitkin	1967:	191–92).	This	notion	of	representa-
tion	is	in	line	with	the	delegate	or	mandate	model	of	representation.	Burke’s	
trusteeship	model,	which	he	calls	“virtual	representation”	(Burke	1774),	jus-
tifies	representation	on	different	grounds.	He	sees	interests,	unlike	Liberals,	as unconnected to people. Those unconnected interests are seen as having 
an	„objective,	 impersonal,	unattached	reality”	(Pitkin	1967:	168).	From	this	
definition,	Burke	concludes	that	there	are	morally	“right”	answers	for	the	gov-ernment. There is the one national interest, which is why representatives do 
not	need	to	be	responsive	to	a	constituency	(Burke	1774).	They	do	not	even	need to be elected because they know what is right in the end. Thus, he sees representation as an elite caring for others and the parliament as a deliber-ative assembly of the one nation and not an assembly of ambassadors of dif-
ferent	and	diverging	 interests:	 “[…]	government	and	 legislation	are	matters	
of	reason	and	judgment	and	not	of	inclination”	(Burke	1774)	Burke	suggests	virtual representation as an alternative to actual representation i.e. elective representation. 
	 Virtual	 representation	 is	 that	 in	which	 there	 is	 a	 communion	of	 interests,	and a sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in the name of any description of people, and the people in whose name they act, though the trustees are not actually chosen by them. This is virtual representation.
[…]	The	people	may	err	 in	 their	choice;	but	common	 interest	and	common	
sentiment	are	rarely	mistaken.	(Burke	1792)Neither the trusteeship concept nor the mandate or delegate concepts are au-tomatically and directly linked to democratic representation. Trusteeship, as conceptualized by Burke as “virtual” representation, depends on represent-atives who act with wisdom at best, but without the consent of their constit-uency (ibid.). In contrast, delegates as pure mirrors of the represented can lack the ability to actively deliberate and moderate political processes and decisions. Thus, neither concept in its pure form is useful for thinking about democratic representation. Therefore, theorists started to combine elements of both approaches and thought about accountability as one mechanism to ensure democracy in representation. The assumption is here that representa-tion is socially constructed and can develop very differently into diverse and rather lose forms of representational practices. The concept of representation is ambiguous insofar as that there are different understandings about the re-lational aspects of representation or the objects of representation (Castiglione 
and	Warren	2006:	8).	Therefore,	many	current	concepts	of	representation	ar-
23  Utilitarians argued even further, namely that it is impossible to represent someone else, because people are only able to follow their own interests. The task of representative government is to preserve the status quo, assure stability and wait until time gives way to 
reason	over	selfish	interests	among	the	people	(Pitkin	1967:	196).
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gue that the distinction between the trusteeship and the delegate model does not capture the complexities of political representation (Mansbridge 2003; Rehfeld 2011). There is also a shift away from conceptualizing representation in terms a principal-agent relationship to conceptualizing representation in 
regard	to	questions	of	decision-making	(Rehfeld	2011:	2).Jane Mansbridge solves the problem of complexity in stating that there is not one good form of representation, but that there is a system of different representations. Mansbridge introduces different normative criteria in order to evaluate those forms of representation. She suggests that representation is systemic and not dyadic, that it is plural and not singular, and that representa-tion should be based on deliberative rather than aggregative criteria. The forms of representation are categorized as anticipatory, gyroscopic and surro-
gate	representation	(Mansbridge	2003:	515–16).	Anticipatory representation is understood as a relationship that is based on the anticipation, among rep-resentatives, of a future election outcome. Representatives assume that voters will vote retrospectively and thus will take their decision in line with what representatives have done during the past legislation period. Since a later event (the election after the legislation period) cannot cause an earlier event 
(a	representative’s	action	during	the	legislation	period),	the	representation	is	
“just”	built	on	the	representative’s	beliefs	about	voter	preferences	during	the	
next	election:	“In	anticipatory	representation,	what	appears	to	the	represent-ative to be a “power relation” thus works not forward, but “backward,” through 
anticipated	reactions,	from	the	voter	at	Time	3	to	the	representative	at	Time 2:	
RT2	--	VT3.”(Mansbridge	2003:	517).	Representatives	have	also	an	informa-
tion	problem.	They	need	information	about	their	constituency’s	preferences	
and	will	tend	to	address	the	general	needs	rather	than	the	specific	interests	of	certain people, thereby reacting to their lack of information. However, repre-sentatives can at the same time use the time of their legislation period in order to educate the constituency and deliberate about certain preferences of their constituency that can develop into interests (also referred as enlightened preferences). Thus, in anticipatory representation, the quality of delibera-
tion	is	much	more	relevant	for	representatives’	relationships	with	their	con-
stituencies	 than	 the	mere	aggregation	of	votes	 (Mansbridge	2003:	516 17).	In gyroscope representation, representatives refer to themselves and their own “gyroscopic compass” when acting as representatives. It seems similar 
to	Burke’s	concept	of	virtual	representation.	The	crucial	point	in	gyroscopic	representation is the successful deliberation at the point of recruitment of the representative. The voter does not have power over the action of the repre-sentative as such, but over the system and the decision to put this or that rep-
resentative	in	the	system.	(Mansbridge	2003:	522).	Gyroscopic	representation	
in	itself	may	also	create	a	more	definite	space	of	public	deliberation	because	representation may “provide cognitive distancing between persons and ar-
87
guments,	 between	 the	 “who”	 and	 the	 “what”	 […]”	 (Castiglione	 and	Warren	2006). Self-interested arguments may decrease, because the judge and the 
cause	are	separated	(Madison	et al.	1993	[1787/88])	and	representatives	can	
bring	this	reflexivity	even	to	the	individuals	they	represent	by	raising	other	arguments and thus involving interest holders in a discussion about their 
interests	within	a	broader	public	space	(Castiglione	and	Warren	2006:	11).	
Surrogate representation means the representation of constituents who live outside the district of the representative. Although surrogate representation comes from the Burkean idea of a representative without an electoral basis, in 
Mansbridge’s	concept,	it	is	thought	of	in	much	more	territorial	terms.	It	is	not	about the national interest that is represented by a representative; it is rather about representatives in one district also speaking and acting for constituen-
cies	who	are	outside	 their	own	district	 (Mansbridge	2003:	523).	 Surrogate	responsibility often arises out of a form of group belonging and descriptive 
representation.	 If	 representatives	 share	 group	membership	with	 a	 specific	social group, they might feel responsible to represent group members in gen-eral and not only within the electorate. If this is judged in deliberative terms, 
the	best	argument	should	decide	about	specific	issue-related	questions.	Thus,	
surrogate	representation	reflects	both	deliberative	and	aggregative	logics	of	
representation.	This	 is	different	 from	Burke’s	 virtual	 representation,	which	just  focuses on (elite) deliberation. In sum, the controversy between delegate and trusteeship representation 
contains	 three	 levels	 of	 divergence:	 (1)	 the	 normative	 justification	 of	 rep-resentation; (2) the relational aspects of representation; and (3) the substan-tive arrangement of representation. (1) The legitimacy of the representative is either derived from representa-tion of the common good (trusteeship) or the representation of people with 
interests	(delegate).	Thus,	 in	the	trusteeship	model,	the	normative	justifica-tion of the democratic legitimacy of a representative is reached by the repre-
sentative’s	representation	of	the	common	good,	which	means	to	be	identified	
by	wisdom	and	expertise	rather	than	by	counting	people’s	votes.	Contrary	to	the trusteeship model, the delegate model assumes that interests are attached to people and thus should be represented as accurately as possible by repre-
sentatives.	If	the	representatives	fulfill	this	task,	they	are	legitimate.(2) Relational aspects of representation are different between the dele-gate and trusteeship models insofar as a delegate is seen as a tool of the con-stituency, whereas a trustee is conceptualized as a free agent. This implies 
different	 responsibilities:	 the	 delegate’s	 task	 is	 to	make	 the	 constituency’s	
interest	visible	and	politically	effective.	The	constituency’s	task	is	to	instruct	
the	representative	accurately.	In	contrast	to	this	process,	the	trustees’	respon-sibility is to oversee the constituency as a whole and estimate a common good, 
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which they would then represent as well as discuss with their constituency. This leads to the substantive aspect of representation. (3) The substantive aspects of representation are divided into delibera-tion among representatives and between representatives and constituency in the trusteeship model and the aggregation of votes in the delegate model. 
Whereas	the	trusteeship	model	follows	the	logic	of	finding	a	consensus	about	the common good through deliberation, the delegate model follows the logic 
of	a	numerical	equality	of	the	constituency’s	interests.	It	is	difficult	to	divide	those two dimensions of relational and substantive aspects, as Rehfeld crit-
ically	 notes	 with	 respect	 to	Mansbridge’s	 categorization	 of	 representation.	
Mansbridge’s	approach	combines	the	conceptualization	of	relational	aspects	with the substantive aspects (deliberative and/or aggregative). This is not conducive to a clear cut categorization of representation (Rehfeld 2011).
3.3  The Prospects of Non-electoral Representation for 
Transnational Civil Society Networks
[…]	anyone	who	performs	a	function	for	the	group	may	seem	to	be	its	repre-sentative, for his actions may be attributed to it and are binding on it. (Pitkin 
1967:	40–41)Representation is an omnipresent social and political phenomenon. Rep-resentatives of certain groups and interests can be found everywhere. The crucial question that will be further investigated in this chapter is how this representation, which is not bound to election, can become democratic. Many political and social spheres that give input to political decision-making and generate representation without electoral authorization have evolved over 
the	last	20	years.	This	development	is	specifically	prevalent	in	spheres	of	civ-il society activities and in spheres of transnational governance. This form of non-electoral representation outside of state contexts is conceptualized either as a claims-making of proactive representatives that need not necessarily be democratic, or by considering accountability, i.e. account-giving as a substi-tute for electoral authorization. The second conceptualization based on ac-countability is thus more normatively constructed as a way to democratize 
representation	in	non-electoral	settings,	whereas	the	first	conceptualization	of claims-making (Saward 2010) is more of an empirical conceptualization. Both attempts to capture the practices of non-electoral representation will be presented and discussed in the following section. The contextual nature of representation is very relevant when examining concepts about representation beyond elections and states. Representative re-lationships can be seen as something socially constructed, which cannot to be 
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captured by a single one-dimensional concept. In the context of transnational networks, representative relationships are rather contingent and ambiguous (Castiglione and Warren 2006). Whereas electoral politics rely on clear tem-poral sequences of authorization via elections and holding representatives accountable for their actions (mainly in retrospect) through the whole term of 
office,	in	non-electoral	politics,	the	mechanisms	of	authorization	and	account-ability can be diffuse and diverse. This is even more the case in informal repre-sentative relationships such as social movements where represented groups do not pre-exist the representative relationship. They are shaped and some-times even constructed in the process of representation. In other words, by labeling the constituency as one unit or one group, the act of representation creates the groups that are represented. In an ongoing process, representa-
tion	can	also	stabilize	groups	(Castiglione	and	Warren	2006:	13).	
Holding Representatives Accountable by a Blurred ConstituencyAccountability is a concept currently debated in political representation the-ory. Accountability is an alternative form of formality in representative rela-tionships, which is according to Pitkin the opposite concept to authorization. While in authorizational representation, the represented (i.e. the constit-uents) are bound to and accountable for the actions taken and representa-tives are free in their mandate, in the concept of accountability these roles are changed. Here, the represented (i.e. the constituents) are rather free and 
representatives	are	bound	by	obligations	and	control	(Pitkin	1967:	55).	Rep-resentatives must be eventually (after the period of representation) held ac-countable for their actions. This is missing in the concepts of authorization 
theorists	(Pitkin	1967:	57–58). Authorization just marks the beginning of rep-
resentation,	but	not	 its	 final	ending.	 In	transnational	civil	society	networks,	there is often neither a clear start nor a clear ending of representation because these network relations evolve through the practices of involved actors. Thus, 
representation	in	transnational	civil	society	networks	is	fluid,	similar	to	oth-er relationships between actors in networks. There is hardly any formalized attribution of representatives and constituency. Thus, formalized accountabil-ity mechanisms do not work. “In general the principal problem with network governance in this respect is that the network structure itself tends to blur 
the	clearly	defined	roles	of	accountability	holders	and	holdees	in	favour	of	a	situation in which each actor is equally and accountability holder and holdee” 
(Esmark	2007:	282).The	suggested	solution	for	this	problem	is	a	widening	of	
the	definition	of	democratic	representation	in	terms	of	the	involved	actors	as	well as the forms and directions of representation (ibid.). To further substan-tiate this form of holding representative accountable under the conditions 
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of blurring roles in non-electoral representation in civil society, Castiglione and Warren (2006) suggest functional equivalents for the formal mechanisms of authorization and accountability that can be found in electoral politics. They categorize these equivalents according to different types of civil soci-ety groups. A functional equivalent of authorization in non-electoral politics 
may	be:	the	ability	of	groups	to	attract	follows,	mission	statements	of	groups	that converge or claim to converge with a constituency, descriptive character-istics such as gender or race, experiences, public visibility (Castiglione and 
Warren	2006:	15).	In	the	case	of	voluntary	organizations	and	NGOs,	it	is	also	suggested that accountability can be established by the “horizontal” mutual 
policing	of	groups	 in	a	network.	This	specific	 form	of	accountability	 is	bor-rowed from the concept of organizational learning and peer-to-peer control. This is similar to Sørensen’s	(2010)	argument	 that	“accountability	runs	not	
only	vertically,	making	elected	officials	answerable	to	the	ballot	box,	but	also	
horizontally,	across	a	network	of	relatively	autonomous	powers’”	(Sørensen	
2010:	17).	Those	mechanisms	stress	the	horizontal	relationship	between	rep-
resentatives	and	thus	circumvent	or	mitigate	the	difficult	definition	of	the	con-stituency in transnational civil society networks.
Accountability	is	specified	as	controlling	and	sanctioning	of	the	“account-
ability	holdee”	i.e.	the	representative	(Esmark	2007:	290).	Esmark	also	states	that representatives become automatically accountable as soon as they be-
come	representatives:	Insofar as actors take the position of representatives, they do in fact by impli-cation become accountability holdees, not just to their readers, their organ-izational members or their peers, but also to the moral constituency. In fact, 
widening	the	field	of	eligible	accountability	holdees	may	be	an	equally	impor-
tant	democratic	challenge	as	widening	the	field	of	accountability	holders.	As	stated earlier, however, it is more fun being an accountability holder than an 
accountability	holdee.	(Esmark	2007:	282)In applying the stakeholder concept to transnational relations, Terry Mac-
Donald	(2008)	suggested	a	concept	that	is	built	on	public	power	as	the	main	instrument of democratic control. “Multiple agents of public power” should 
be	“held	to	account	by	their	multiple	overlapping	‘stakeholder’	communities”	
(Macdonald	 2008:	 13).	 The	 stakeholder	 concept	 was	 originally	 introduced	in business studies in order to identify stakeholders, next to shareholders, 
as	a	group	that	should	be	included	in	decision-making	on	companies’	devel-
opments	(Walk	2008).	Within	the	literature	on	participatory	democracy,	the	
stakeholder	concepts	define	a	way	to	 identify	relevant	affected	groups,	 that	should participate in political planning and decision-making processes (Walk 
2008:	 52-53).	 The	 stakeholder	 approach	 assumes	 that	 interest	 groups	 are	
sufficiently	institutionalized	in	order	to	be	identified	by	political	authorities	and that they contribute effectively to the problem solution. Thus, the output 
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criterion is in some of these approaches higher valued than the educational aspects that where highlighted by Pateman and others (ibid.). Moreover, in contrast to other participatory democratic approaches, the inclusion of stake-holders is limited to a manageable size of possible stakeholders. Stakeholder concepts are applied in public-private partnerships or in multi-stakeholder initiatives (ibid.). Beisheim and Kaan (Beisheim and Kaan 2010) for exam-
ple	 find	 in	 their	 evaluation	 of	 transnational	 standard-setting	public-private	partnerships that the broad inclusion of stakeholders has a direct effect on 
the	output	of	standard-setting	in	that	a	“customized	institution”	(2010:	138)	
could	be	developed.	While	Walk	(2008)	and	Beisheim	and	Kaan	(2010)	iden-tify the stakeholder concept as a rather pragmatic and empirical model of par-
ticipatory	governance,	Bäckstrand	(2006)	and	MacDonald	(2008)	envision	a	normative potential to broaden the range of participating actors in non-elec-
toral	 contexts	of	 global	 governance	 (Bäckstrand	2006)	 and	 to	 install	 direct	democratic control in a “pluralist global order” (Macdonald and Macdonald 2010). MacDonald and MacDonald argue that the global order differs to the nation state order in that it is characterized by pluralist structures of power instead of sovereign structures of power. Sovereign structures of power are characterized by centralized and constitutionalized public power24, whereas the public power across national borders is characterized by an “organiza-tionally complex network of public political agencies” and a “radically decen-tralized” structure of state and nonstate actors (MacDonald and MacDonald 
2010:	24).	According	to	the	authors,	this	poses	two	key	challenges	of	demo-
cratic	control	in	the	global	order:	First,	the	multiple	actors	that	exert	public	power need to be held directly accountable to their own stakeholder com-munity. Indirect accountability, as in national governments to the delegato-ry chain of control is not possible. This makes any form of electoral control seem very improbable. Second, the so-called “nonsovereign forms of public 
power	 (such	 as	 corporate	 power)”	 (MacDonald	 and	MacDonald	 2010:	 26)	are less institutionally stable and transparent than sovereign forms of public 
power,	which	makes	 it	more	difficult	 to	democratically	control	 them	(ibid.).	The normative agenda of the global stakeholder democracy would thus be to connect the pluralist forms of public power with their multiple stakeholder 
groups	(MacDonald	and	MacDonald	2010:	32).	The	more	institutionally	sta-ble and transparent these forms of power are, the better responsibilities can 
be	identified.	This	approach	is	insofar	interesting	as	it	neither	tries	to	adopt	democratic institutions from nation state contexts to the transnational level, 
nor	does	this	approach	claim	to	define	a	completely	new	democratic	architec-
24		Public	power	is	defined	as	the	power	that	“prospectively	affects	in	some	problematic	way	the equal autonomous entitlements of individuals such that there is a normative impera-
tive	for	its	democratic	control”	(MacDonald	and	MacDonald	2010:	21).
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ture for the global order. However, there is a major practicability concern that needs to be raised. It remains vague how these highly complex and decentral-ized coalitions of actors should be institutionally stabilized and bound back to their stakeholder communities in practice. The diagnosis of a pluralist global order with multiple overlapping stakeholder communities vis-à-vis pluralist forms of public power is a good starting point for the study of the substan-tive practices that actually take place in transnational civil society contexts. MacDonald and MacDonald (2010) come to a very negative assertion of the democratic control mechanisms which they ascribe to the absence of a constitutional structure and a generally weak institutionalization of control mechanisms. However, this evaluation is based on the criteria of the control of sovereign power within nation states. It should be considered to take the notion of different institutional preconditions in transnational relations more seriously and adopt, as argued before, a practice lens that can better identify democracy in such pluralist and decentralized transnational networks.
In	 widening	 the	 field	 of	 accountability	 holders,	 Koenig-Archibugi	 and	MacDonald argue that accountability relationships in “non-state governance 
arrangements”	 (NGAs)	 (2013:	 499)	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 direct	 beneficiary	
accountability	“to	the	most	affected	by	their	decisions”	(2013:	500)	and	ac-countability-by-proxy, which means that an actor “exercises accountability on behalf of other actors and is not itself accountable to them” (ibid.). In the non-state governance arrangements on labor rights, which were studied for their paper, Koenig-Archibugi and MacDonald identify (Western) consumers and activists as the ones who hold companies accountable on behalf of the work-ers and their families. They make the argument that the choice for policy in-struments in these NGAs depends on whether the accountability mechanisms 
are	pure	beneficiary	accountability	mechanisms	or	hybrid	forms	of	proxy	and	
beneficiary	accountability.	While	 they	differentiate	between	distant	proxies	
(consumers),	 solidaristic	proxies	 (activists)	 and	beneficiaries	 (workers	 and	
their	families),	they	find	difference	in	policy	choice	between	distant	proxies	
on	the	one	hand	and	solidaristic	proxies	and	beneficiaries	on	the	other	hand	
(ibid:	504–05).	Thus,	it	could	be	argued	that	accountability-by-proxy	of	soli-daristic activists could be democratically legitimate from an output perspec-tive since the results of decisions made by solidaristic proxies resemble the 
choices	that	the	“real”	constituency,	the	beneficiaries	would	make.	This	can	be	explained by the much higher engagement, concrete knowledge and sense of solidarity that activists have in contrast to consumers (ibid.).While it can be empirically observed that the boundaries of the constit-uency blur in transnational civil society networks, there are also normative arguments why constituencies and their interests are not always that clear-
cut	and	well-defined	as	supposed	to	be	in	liberal	nation	states.	The	argument	put forward by Iris Marion Young (2000) against the liberal concept of cit-
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izens	 having	 a	 universal	 and	 fixed	 citizenship	 describes	 citizens	 as	 mem-bers of different and changing groups, as holders of a plurality of interests. This argument was picked up by several democratic theorists, for example 
by	Dryzek	and	Niemeyer	(2008)	who	transformed	it	into	a	model	of	discur-sive representation. He argues that every citizen subscribes to different dis-courses, and it is a matter of equally representing those discourses instead of 
equally	 representing	certain	 individuals	 (Dryzek	and	Niemeyer	2008).	This	is analogous to Young who argued that citizens need to be represented ac-
cording	to	their	multiple	group	affiliations	and	not	only	as	individual	citizens	
(Young 2000).In networks, it makes even more sense to think past the liberal notion of 
universal	citizenship	because	it	is	even	harder	to	define	who	is	in	and	who	is	out, i.e. where are the borders of “citizenship” in networks. The complexity and openness of networks make it much harder to identify the spaces of af-fectedness. Much of democratic representation is linked to the external and internal boundaries of networks. People who are directly working in member organizations of the network are internally affected, and people who are the 
targets	of	the	network’s	policy	outputs	are	externally	affected.	It	is	not	easy	to	clearly identify the boundaries of internal and external affectedness. In oth-er words, the lines between the external environment of networks and the internal members are blurry. It is neither possible to give every individual in this network context a voting right (apart from that would it be impossible 
to	“find”	all	 individuals	of	one	constituency	and	for	or	against	whom	would	
they	vote?)	nor	is	it	possible	to	weight	voting	rights.	This	would	conflict	with	the basic idea of democracy and it would dissolve the network character by introducing a hierarchy. Thus, there is no real possibility to represent individ-uals in networks. Representation axes can rather go along group identities or discourses. 
Trust as a Basis for Unelected RepresentativesIn the condition of complexity and opacity of network structures, the constitu-ency, represented either by vertical representation (membership base to NGO elite) or horizontal representation (between NGOs in the network), might not know everything about the decisions taken because of a lack of time, capacity, interest etc. (Mansbridge 1999). In descriptive representation, the represent-ative represents a group as a part of the group. This relationship is tightened 
by	resemblance	or	 reflection	 (Pitkin	1967;	Kröger	and	Friedrich	2012:	20–21). Disadvantaged groups can be empowered by descriptive representa-tion (Phillips 1996), and descriptive representation could enable models of representation that are built on trust rather than on control. Castiglione and 
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Warren	(2006:	8)	argue	to	emphasize	trusteeship	over	delegation	in	general	and in the sphere of civil society in particular because trust has the advantage that it is not as costly as control. Trusteeship as a form of representation is omnipresent in political life and beyond. Thus, Castiglione and Warren (2006) 
argue	that	this	existence	of	trusteeship	could	be	used	to	filter	out	democratic	
features	of	trusteeship	in	political	representative	relationships:We might say that trusteeship is democratic when a citizen makes a decision to trust, based on knowledge of convergent (or encapsulated) interests or val-ues. Clearly, this kind of representative relationship is common in civil society 
through	voluntary	 association	membership:	we	 trust	Greenpeace	 to	 repre-sent our interests in their political activities, even though we are not active in 
the	organization	(Castiglione	and	Warren	2006:	9)Here, trust is based on common interests that are shared by representatives and represented. This is a major difference to representative relationships between elected representatives and the constituency. The daily business of 
politics	 is	 usually	 characterized	 by	 the	 negotiation	 between	 conflicting	 in-
terests	 (Castiglione	and	Warren	2006:	9).	Trust	as	 the	basis	 for	democratic	representation could thus form one kind of representative relationship in-be-
tween	other	kinds	of	democratic	representation,	 reflecting	a	representative	relationship mainly found in civil society contexts. As Young pointed out, civ-il society follows different logic than the systematic logic of the state, which 
follows	 a	 specific	 system	 imperative	 and	must	 handle	 conflicting	 interests	
(Young	2000:	169).	Public	communication	in	civil	society	is	often	not	unified	and orderly, but messy, playful and emotional (ibid.). Thus, representation cannot be thought of as a linear and highly formalized process.Rather than striving for the identity of representative and represented as a controllable measure, one could imagine representation as a process that includes communication between representatives and the represented as well 
as	among	the	represented,	namely	on	a	horizontal	 level	(Young	2000: 127).	This process could also be mediated in order to ensure equal access and op-portunities, but it seems not possible to control or hold it accountable in terms of an output-orientation of representation. In general, deliberation with its open-ended quality gives better communicative chances to representatives 
who	 are	 close(r)	 to	 the	 issues	 (Mansbridge	 1999:	 635–36).	 They	 are	 even	more important and better equipped in deliberation processes under the circumstances of communicative mistrust or uncrystallized interests. Here, Mansbridge states that in the context of uncrystallized interests, the horizon-tal deliberation between representatives is much more important than the vertical deliberation between constituency and representative. If interests are not really clear, descriptive representation is necessary because representa-tives of certain groups can better judge and feel like their constituency and get into an opinion building process parallel to their constituency (Mansbridge 
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1999:	644–645).	According	to	concepts	beyond	the	liberal	democracy	model,	the individual person that is to be represented is not only a “bundle of inter-
ests,	identities	and	values”	(Castiglione	and	Warren	2006:	13).	Representation	is always a two-way process. Persons that are represented, are represented as 
citizen-agents	with	their	capacities	to	argue,	reflect,	demonstrate,	write	and	vote. Also, the interests, identities and values do not always pre-exist the rep-resentative relationship, they are sometimes articulated explicitly prior the representation, but for many individuals, they are framed and formed in the 
process	of	representation	(Castiglione	and	Warren	2006):When representatives – groups, public individuals, the media – carry inter-est positions into public decision making, they engage in more than “individ-
ual”	 judgment.	They	 function	as	key	 figures	 in	 representing	and	mediating	
public	debates,	in	this	way	reflecting	interest	and	identity	positions	back	to	
their	constituents.	This	reflexive	representation	of	positions	and	arguments	
should,	ideally,	enable	constituents	to	follow	debates	and	to	reflect	upon	and	defend their own positions, such that representatives can, ultimately claim to 
represent	the	“public	will”	as	reflected	in	a	developed	“public	opinion”.	(Cas-
tiglione	and	Warren	2006:	13–14)This points to the deliberative or discursive mode of democracy, which is also brought into being in the process of representation. Castiglione and Warren argue that representation can only be democratic in the sense of a representa-
tion	of	 the	public	will,	 if	 there	 is	a	 reflexive	element	 in	 this	 representation.	When people debate about opinions, they form and change opinions while exchanging ideas and values from different sides (ibid.). 
The Substantive Practice of RepresentationCastiglione and Warren argue, following Mansbridge (2003), that accounta-bility or the account-giving of representatives is discursive in form and can be 
on-going	through	the	term	of	office	of	a	representative.	Still,	accountability	in	this sense needs regular elections as a formal mechanism to temporally frame the discursive account-giving. Non-electoral accountability, on the contrary, relies on the pro-active development of accountability by self-appointed rep-resentatives and the horizontal, “informal but effective” mutual control of dif-
ferent	kinds	of	groups	(Castiglione	and	Warren	2006:	17):
[…]	the	emerging	political	landscape	provides	more	and	more	opportunities	for individuals and groups to propose themselves as representatives, and to 
function in representative capacities. But once representation no longer has an electoral basis, who	counts	as	a	democratic	representative	is	difficult	to	as-sess (Alcoff 1995). Democratic theorists should not, we believe, rule out any such claims at the outset, but we do need ways of judging their democratic 
creditials	[sic]	of	representative	claims.	(Castiglione	and	Warren	2006:	15)
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The proposition or self-appointment of representation is a conceptualiza-tion that frames representation as a performative action, following Judith But-
ler’s	work	on	the	performative	construction	of	gender	identities	(Butler	2006	
[1990]).	Representation	is	performatively	produced	(Saward	2010:	42)	in	an	“ongoing process of making and receiving, accepting and rejecting claims –in, 
between,	and	outside	electoral	cycles”	(Saward	2010:	36).	In	this	framework,	representation is a series of practices and events and, unlike the presence approach of representation (Phillips 1996), an institutionalized relationship between representatives and represented. In other words, representation is understood as making claims that give the impression of representation. Thus, it is less about a substantial relationship that can be explored than about the question of how the practice of representation is acted out, leading to the 
following	 question:	 How	 is	 presence	 constructed,	 defended	 or	 contested?	
(Saward	2010:	39).	Saward distinguishes different elements in representational practic-
es:	the	maker,	the	subject,	the	object,	the	audience	and	the	constituency.	He	provides an example about global civil society to exemplify the relation be-
tween	 the	 different	 elements:	 “Antiglobalization	 demonstrators	 (maker)	set up themselves and their movements (subject) as representatives of the oppressed and marginalized (object) to Western governments (audience).” 
(Saward	2010:	37).	There	is	a	maker	of	representation,	who	“puts	forward”	a subject that stands for an object. Saward distinguishes maker and subject, although they can be the same. Also, the differentiation between constituency 
and	audience	 is	not	automatically	mutually	exclusive.	As	he	defines	constit-uency as the people for or about whom claims are made, the audience is a group of people that are spoken to. Both groups can be overlapping or even 
be	identical	(Saward	2010: 50).	Saward	makes	one	important	argument	based	on the assumption that representation is socially constructed; he concludes 
that	subject	and	object	are	refined	and	clarified	through	the	process	of	rep-resentation. What Castiglione and Warren said of civil society groups, namely 
that	they	are	defined	by	representation,	 is,	 in	Saward’s	framework,	relevant	for all sorts of representation. Representation as a social construction through a performative practice creates and strengthens representational identities of the involved actors. This argument can be traced back to concepts such as symbolic inter-
actionism	 (Blumer	 1986,	 [1969])	 and	 generally	 the	 so-called	 interpretive	
paradigm	(Garfinkel	1967;	Mead	1980),	which	see,	on	a	more	general	 level,	interaction and its interpretation by individuals as the basis for individual identity development. Moreover, Saward describes this event of making rep-
resentative	claims	as	the	core	of	the	representative	relationship:	Claims-mak-ing is a constantly changing dialogue in which different actors make claims to audiences that discuss, reject or amend them (Saward 2010). Unelected 
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representatives are even more under pressure to make their claims very ex-plicit because they cannot rely on the structure of representative institutions 
(Saward	2010:	65).	However,	since	those	representatives	lack	an	electoral	ba-
sis,	 it	becomes	difficult	 to	assess	who	 is	a	 representative	of	whom	or	what	(Castiglione and Warren 2006). In networks, many different representative claims, often by different actors, can be made, for example hypothetical con-
sent,	mirroring,	and	word	from	the	street	(Saward	2000:	95–103).	Represent-
ative	relationships	are	also	influenced	by	this	dynamic	structure	that	creates	informality as well as more direct links between representatives and repre-
sented	 (Sørensen	and	Torfing	2007:	13).	Here,	 representative	 relationships	
are	“like	a	game	whose	rules	change	with	use”	(Lord	and	Pollak	2010:	119).	Since these conceptualizations of representation do not take into account the problem of democratic control and accountability, one could ask wheth-er this kind of network representation just leads straight to arbitrariness. Thus, the democratic quality of claims-making can be doubted. Representa-tion as claims-making suggests that only those claims are voiced for which a 
“maker”	 is	present	(Kröger	and	Friedrich	2012:	270).	Therefore,	represent-ative claims seem to be “decoupled” from the institutional environment of democratic representative government and the general democratic value of 
political	 equality	 (ibid:	 271).	Kröger	 and	Friedrich	 attest	 to	 this	 “wealth	 of	
multi-faceted	practices	of	representation	in	the	EU”,	which	confirms	theoreti-cal thinking about representation in non-state or semi-state contexts outlined 
above.	Their	findings	show	that	although	constituencies	are	addressed	most	frequently along national lines, the organizations of representation can have many different faces and can change dynamically back and forth between mandate, delegate or “solidarity” models of representation (Kröger and Frie-
drich	2012:	259–64).	With	 regard	 to	 the	democratic	quality	of	 those	 forms	of representation, Kröger and Friedrich do not see a strong potential of the new forms of representation to replace institutionalized forms of democratic representation, as of now. At the same time, they admit that it is much more 
difficult	 to	democratize	non-electoral	 representation	 (Kröger	 and	Friedrich	
2012:	274 75).	From	these	two	observations,	they	conclude	that	democratic	representation “requires a strong linkage to the institutional center of deci-
sion-making”	(Kröger	and	Friedrich	2012:	276).
3.4 ConclusionsDifferent assumptions lay the ground for diverse perspectives on representa-
tion.	 The	 crucial	 questions	 can	 be	 summarized	 as	 follows:	Which	 roles	 do	
representatives	 take	 on	 (trustees/delegates)?	How	 are	 representative	 rela-
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tionships	 structured	 over	 time	 (authorization/accountability)?	What	 is	 the	
nature	 of	 interaction	 in	 representation	 (descriptive/	 active/	 interactive)?	What is the general function of representation (description/ action for or 
deliberation	 with	 the	 constituency)?	 What	 is	 the	 object	 of	 representation	
(unattached,	 attached	 interests/groups/discourses)?	 Many	 of	 the	 authors	discussed in this chapter share the argument that representative democra-cy is a form of democracy with its own quality. Democratic representation is not a mere substitute for direct democracy. Furthermore, many recent works on representation assume that representation is socially constructed. Thus, 
norms	of	representation	mostly	depend	on	the	definition	of	representative	re-lationships; the objects of representation and the ascribed roles of represent-atives, the represented and possibly the audience. Democratic representation may be differently practiced if individuals, groups, interests or the common good are represented. This rests upon the construction of representation as such and is highly contextual and ambiguous. However, it can be concluded that representation without formal elections could be democratically legiti-mized through different forms of accountability, for example being held ac-countable to a moral constituency or being held accountable by horizontal 
mutual	 peer-monitoring.	 These	 two	 forms	of	 accountability	 are	 specifically	
suitable	to	a	context	of	blurred	constituencies.	If	a	clearly	defined	constituen-cy does not exist, it makes sense to either think of a moral constituency, which could be people affected by human rights violations, nature or future genera-tions, or to install accountability mechanisms that are based on a mutual peer-to-peer accountability among NGOs in civil society. However, these norms of accountability can only work smoothly when there is trust between repre-sentatives and represented. In civil society networks, there are no capacities for extensive control measures, but there is a high potential of trust due to similar interests, common goals and homogeneity in and between the groups. Thus trust may play an important role in making democratic representation feasible in transnational civil society networks.The performative aspect of representation is an additional dimension that needs further empirical scrutiny. Conceptualizing representation as a performative practice decouples representation from the common assump-tion of a dyadic relationship between representatives and represented. It in-volves more actors and is driven by the proactive proposals of self-proclaimed representatives rather than by elections. How this empirical concept can be normatively undergirded in order to speak of democratic representational performances is a question that remains open and can be further elaborated through the empirical study of such instances in transnational civil society networks. 
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Part II  
Exploring Political Practice in  
Two Transnational Civil Society Networks
After having established the theoretical ground of this study, the second part of this book will now turn to the empirical study of transnational civil socie-
ty	networks.	Chapter	4	will	 justify	the	choice	for	a	reconstructive	interview	analysis with the twenty-six activists from two transnational civil society net-works, Friends of the Earth (FoE) and Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC); it will explain the case selection as well as the methods used for the qualitative in-terviews and the text analysis. The main section of this second part of the book comprises the presentation of the results from the reconstructive interview analysis (chapter 5).These results cover the political practices explored in the two transnational civil society networks. The political practices that were re-constructed in the interview material are described in this chapter systemat-ically according to the broad general categories of participation, deliberation and representation practices. 
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4 Researching Practices
The exploration of political practices of transnational civil society networks 
requires	 a	 specific	 research	 design.	 A	 research	 methodology	 for	 studying	practices should follow similar principles as practice theoretical accounts suggest. Bueger and Gadinger formulate the principles of practice research 
as	recursivity,	abduction,	mobility,	proximity	and	co-production	(2014:	80).	Research is thus a practice, too. Those principles mirror interpretive and eth-nographic research methodologies, which do justice to the phenomenon of practices as “moving, shifting and changing entities” (Bueger and Gadinger 
2014:	78).	Furthermore,	practice	theory	research	“does	not	want	to	fill	gaps,	
but	 to	problematize,	 to	add	and	to	enrich”	(ibid:	80).	Following	those	more	general assumptions and principles, the following chapter suggests a concrete research design for studying political practices and democratic norms. This research design is built to explore political practices and democratic norms that are co-produced and contextual. A central element, the reconstructive in-terview analysis is a productive tool to widely explore the universe of political practices in transnational civil society networks and gain empirical material that really enriches the picture of democracy in transnational relations, adds reconstructed practices to the already known and problematizes the already established notions and understandings of how democracy should work. 
The	specific	aim	of	the	present	explorative	qualitative	case	study25 is to analyze political practices in transnational civil society networks and interpret and discuss these practices from the perspective of democratic theory as well as from the standpoint of interviewed participants. Twenty-six semi-struc-tured qualitative interviews with activists from two transnational civil soci-ety networks, Friends of the Earth (FoE) and Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) 
were	analyzed	in	a	two-step	analysis.	First,	political	practices	were	identified	through a reconstructive analysis. In a second step, the democratic character of these political practices was critically discussed in the light of the inter-
viewees’	assessment	and	normative	theories	of	participatory,	representative	and deliberative democracy. The interview analysis focused on a retrospec-tive examination of political practices, perspectives of participating actors on 25  Generally, a case study is used in order to study one case or a small set of cases intensive-ly, aiming at a generalization across a larger number of cases of the same general type 
(Gerring	2007:	65).	Case	studies	as	such	are	not	bound	to	a	certain	methodological	para-digm; they can for example follow the paradigm of cross-case methodology or can be in-terpretive. However, case studies are more useful for generating new hypotheses than for 
testing	hypotheses	(Gerring	2007:	67).
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the practices, the positioning of actors to practices, rules and knowledge of practices, and their understanding and evaluation of practices in the two civil society networks. All those parts were meant to capture the phenomenon of political practice as a whole set of empirical phenomena. Transnational civil 
society	networks	are	as	the	unit	of	analysis	a	new	phenomenon	in	the	field	of IR. They are outside the three traditional analytical categories of the indi-vidual, the state and international system (Waltz 2001). The two civil society networks, FoE and CCC, which are investigated in this case study, address envi-ronmental issues as well as global justice and human rights issues. Since civil society actors, i.e. social movement organizations (SMOs) as well as non-gov-ernmental organizations (NGOs), are mostly concerned with human rights as 
well	as	with	environmental,	women’s,	religious	or	global	justice	causes	(Flam	
2001;	Khagram	et al.	2002;	Kern	2008),	the	two	chosen	networks	and	their	respective issue focus are typical for transnational civil society organizations. The choice for qualitative interviews as the main instrument for data collec-
tion	is	appropriate	in	the	light	of	this	study’s	overall	research	interest	and	its	methodological assumptions. The question of democratic practice in transna-tional civil society networks can only be answered by investigating individual actors and their experiences and knowledge within these networks and the practices developed there. In the interpretive paradigm, methods that support and further the understanding of certain complex interactions, structures and motivations are useful. Consequently, qualitative interviews and text interpre-tations are one of the most common methods in interpretive social sciences. 
4.1  Methodological Assumptions of a  
Reconstructive AnalysisWhen exploring new phenomena, it seems reasonable to design an open and explorative analysis. While realist or positivist social scientists assume that there is a reality that exists independent of what and how we think about this 
world,	where	the	researcher’s	task	is	to	describe	and	explain	this	reality	ob-jectively, interpretive social scientists share a constructivist assumption about 
reality:	there	is	not	the one reality, but reality is socially constructed by the people living in it26. Interpretive social sciences thus assume that the subjects of the study are also interpreting their realities while acting and even while 
talking	about	it	in	interviews	(Przyborski	2004:	42).	Thus,	we	can	assume	that	
26  Moderate social constructivists of course assume that there is a basis of reality that does not change. Constructivists in international relations are for example interested in the 
social	construction	of	power	through	arguments	(Risse-Kappen	1994).
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interview texts cannot be taken as an image of the objective reality; they are narrations of interpretations and can thus only be analyzed by reconstructing the underlying interpretations of the interviewee. When implementing these two opposing ontological assumptions in a methodological framework, real-ist or positivist social scientists often use standardized methods in order to detect the regularities of social life. On the contrary, interpretative social sci-entists argue that those regularities must be known before they can be investi-gated in a standardized way. Such regularities and standards are incorporated in practices and a form of a-theoretical knowledge. Therefore, they need to be empirically reconstructed. Thus, reconstructive methods of analysis, which reconstruct those regularities, are a prerequisite for the validity of theory building (ibid.). While standardized methods give insight into questions of distribution and causalities of pre-determined natural standards, reconstruc-
tive	methods	want	to	ask	what	those	natural	standards	are	in	the	first	place.	
The	shift	from	‘what’-	to	‘how’-	questions	is	crucial	for	reconstructive	methods	in order to avoid remaining in description (Bohnsack 2001). The central aspects of interpretive social science methodology struc-
ture	 and	 frame	 the	methodical	process	of	 this	qualitative	 case	 study’s	data	
collection	and	analysis.	A	first	methodological	aspect	has	to	do	with	the	aim	
of	analysis:	 the	aim	is	access	to	social	structures	of	meaning,	as	extensively	and directly as possible, through interpretive understanding. Secondly, a sys-tematically open access to the empirical reality with the aim of discovering something new is important in interpretive methodology. Interpretive social 
sciences	are	above	all	based	on	the	theories	of	Herbert	Blumer’s	Symbolic	In-
teractionism	(Blumer	1986	[1969])	and	Harold	Garfinkel’s	Ethnomethodolo-
gy	(Garfinkel	1967).	Blumer	sets	out	three	basic	methodological	assumptions	of symbolic interactionism that are also taken as basic principles of this study. First, individuals act with “things” according to the meaning those things have for them. “Things” can be objects, but also other persons, institutions or con-cepts such as friendship and honesty. Second, the meaning of things results from the interaction with other persons. Third, this interactively constructed meaning can be changed in an interpretative process in which individuals deal 
with	those	meanings	and	possibly	modify	them	(Blumer	2004:	322).	The	sec-
ond	and	third	principles	are	specific	to	the	theory	of	symbolic	interactionism	and particularly relevant for this empirical study. The second principle con-trasts the realist assumption that meanings are inherently attached to objects and subjects. Symbolic interactionism declares that persons create meaning through interaction. In other words, meaning is a product of social interaction. 
This	assumption	about	 reality	also	 influences	 the	choice	of	methods	 in	interpretive social sciences. As it is assumed that the application of norms into action is not that unambiguous and unproblematic, it is necessary to gain rich 
and	detailed	information	about	the	social	context	and	interpret	actors’	choices	
104
of	their	actions	(Joas	and	Knöbl	2004:	183–84).	Thus,	when	studying	the	dem-ocratic practice in networks, meanings of democracy verbalized in the inter-views, websites and meeting minutes are always seen as something that was created in a process of negotiation of many actors. Even so, the interviews can 
be	seen	as	reflections	of	one	single	person	who	is	nonetheless	embedded	in	a	wider environment of social interactions. Based on the third principle, it can be assumed in this study that actors in the networks do not only adopt those meanings that were constructed through interaction, but also change them in a process of interpretation in the face of the concrete situation and the goals 
they	follow.	Based	on	those	conditions,	meanings	are	selected	and	modified.	This means that actors in the networks are in a constant process of construc-
tion	and	modification	of	meaning	through	the	interaction	with	their	peers	in	the networks and others outside the networks as well as through their own interpretations of situations and adequacies. Thus, the norms of democracy can also change over time and are constructed and changed through interac-tion. Although the actors present their own interpretations of democracy in the interviews, their interpretations are still grounded in the social interac-tions they are involved with in the networks. This gives the interpretation of the interviews a broader and more general horizon.The analysis of interview texts meant working with the medium “lan-
guage.”	Through	language,	we	can	access	actors’	patterns	of	orientation	and	relevancy, which can be reconstructed with methods of interpretive text anal-ysis. The qualitative semi-structured interviews with activists and coordina-tors of the two transnational civil society networks in Europe were analyzed and interpreted with a reconstructive hermeneutic method of text interpre-tation27. A reconstructive hermeneutic method was chosen because the re-construction allows a close analysis of the interview texts. Although there are 
clear	definitions	of	democratic	norms	and	procedures,	 the	political	practic-
27		Wilhelm	Dilthey,	one	of	the	founding	fathers	of	hermeneutics,	defined	the	process	of	un-derstanding as an act of recognizing an inner meaning in signs, which are externally giv-en. He saw two different degrees of understanding, the daily understanding of others and oneself in social situations and the sophisticated understanding, which he calls interpre-tation. Interpretation that arrives at some controllable objectivity can only be exerted in 
written	or	otherwise	documented	expressions	(Dilthey	2004:	23).	In	contrast,	the	volatil-
ity	of	social	 interaction	makes	 it	difficult	 to	arrive	at	a	deeper	understanding	of	social	practice as such in a concrete situation. Actors intuitively understand situations, in which they act, react and interact, but there is no possibility for a systemic ex-post understand-ing. Soeffner even speaks of the absent-mindedness of actors (Handelnde) who do not have any interest to speak with their actions to an (imagined) audience. Thus, an inter-pretation of practice is only possible through the documentation of action (Soeffner 
1979),	 according	 to	 the	 conceptualization	 of	 hermeneutics	 as	 the	methodological	 ap-proach for humanities (as it is the explanatory approach for the natural science) (Dilthey 
2004).
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es	in	transnational	networks	are	more	flexible	and	contextual	insofar	as	the	network actors deal with those democratic norms and can create political practices that might not be concurrent with the given norms and procedures. With a clear cut set of criteria the patterns of political practices would only be predictable to the extent that they could or could not comply with demo-cratic norms. However, with reconstructive text analysis, it is possible to ex-plore how political practices are conducted and which roles network actors play in these practices. The descriptive interpretation of both cases takes into 
consideration	the	specific	contexts	of	both	cases	and	thus	makes	for	a	more	
valuable	and	in-depth	study	(Guba	and	Lincoln	1989:	37).	Guba	and	Lincoln	state that the positivist paradigm of inquiry and the context-stripping/control of determining categories also leads to evaluations which are “often found to be irrelevant at the local level, leading to the much lamented nonuse of eval-
uation	findings”	(Guba	and	Lincoln	1989:	37),	because	the	evaluation	results	are too abstract and general.Soeffner, a German sociologist and founder of the hermeneutic sociology of knowledge, argues that social sciences are linguistics because social sci-ence data as well as social science “products” are language, texts. The object of social sciences is symbolic, meaningfully represented and therefore inter-pretable social action28.	Social	scientific	data	are	the	descriptions,	recordings	and presentations of social life, which are texts in almost all cases (Soeffner 
1979).	Turner	(2005)	and	Schatzki	(2005)	make	the	same	argument	for	ver-bal practices which they also see included as practices; thus, it can be said that 
the	analysis	of	practices	should	be,	to	some	extent,	based	on	linguistics:	“Any	account of practice that fails to account for language will be defective, because linguistic practices are part and parcel of many other practices and because 
linguistic	practices	are	in	principle	not	sufficiently	different	from	other	prac-tices to regard them as likely to have a radically different character.” (Turner 
2005:	121).Written texts represent different verbal and non-verbal realities and are not situated in a concrete situation; they can include many different possible 
realities	and	interpretations	(Soeffner	2004:	95).	This	is	especially	crucial	in	
28  While interpreting texts, the interpreter uses contextual information and goes back and forth between understanding the whole through its parts and the parts through the whole (hermeneutic circle). The interpreter interacts with the text and the author of the 
text.	The	text	itself	is	a	product	of	an	interaction	(Soeffner	1979:	329).	Hermeneutics	aims	at making implicit knowledge explicit, and therefore, hermeneutics is not concerned with the interpretation of knowledge, but with rules and conditions that enable knowledge as such. The potential for generalizable evidence lies only in the reconstruction of the origin, effect and alternatives of knowledge inherent in documents and interpretations. This can 
only	be	verified	in	the	analysis	of	concrete	texts.	Hermeneutics	is	the	work	on	single	cases	
(Soeffner	2004:	108–12).
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interviews, where actors can talk about many different situations that they have experienced, many different persons whom they have met or concepts they have in mind. Thus, text or interview analysis opens a broader horizon of reality than observation alone. The permanent availability of interpreted texts 
and	the	interpretations	themselves	are	the	formal	prerequisites	of	scientific	
hermeneutics	(Soeffner	2004:	118).
4.2 Qualitative Semi-structured InterviewsThe qualitative interview is the most common method in qualitative research. Many different forms of qualitative interviews that are conceptualized for dif-ferent kinds of research interests exist. Qualitative interviews are not stand-ardized methods; they are communicative situations, which means that the quality of the data depends on the successful conduct of a highly complex in-
teractive	situation	(Helfferich	2009:	9).	The	interest	in	investigating	very	spe-
cific	issues	is	different	from	the	interest	in	exploring	new	and	unknown	issues,	typically done via qualitative interviews. The technique of asking questions 
must	 therefore	 vary	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 interview	 (Bryman	 2008: 469).	Qualitative interviews are “second-order observations” (Foerster 2000), where the interviewee, in addition to asking questions, observes what inter-viewees disclose. This kind of observation is fruitful for research interests that focus more on the how of issues rather than the what. The exploration of subjective structures of relevancy is the aim of qualitative semi-structured in-
terviews.	Therefore,	they	are	more	flexible	and	open	than	quantitative,	struc-tured interviews. Throughout the interview, the interviewer can change the 
order	and	wording	of	the	questions	and	will	try	to	adjust	to	the	interviewees’	
narrations	and	emphases	(Bryman	2008:	437).	The qualitative interviews29 for this study were done with persons in-volved in international campaigns of the two selected networks. Twenty-six interviewees from both civil society networks were interviewed from seven-teen European countries and from four non-European countries. Interviewees 
can	be	categorized	in	three	groups:	international	campaigners	in	charge	of	one	
specific	 campaign;	 international	 coordinators	 in	 charge	 of	 all	 international	communication in their organization; and international network coordinators 
in	charge	of	coordinating	the	whole	network.	The	organizations’	positions	dif-
fer	with	regard	to	their	network	centrality	and	affiliation	status.	Some	of	the	organizations are central players with many responsibilities, whereas other 
29 Interviews were conducted between April 2012 and February 2013. 
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organizations are rather marginal and/ or new network members or they are only associated with the network.Beside the qualitative interviews, which form the central part of the empirical data, other sources and data are used in order to complement the interview data. The websites of network member organizations are a very in-structive source for background information about the organization as well as the statutes and general self-images of the organization and campaigning activ-ities. Besides this publicly available information, internal documents of meet-ing proceedings and decision-making procedures are important; for example, they support the evidence from the interviews. However, all the complemen-tary material is of secondary importance compared to the interview data. The interview data were systematically analyzed, whereas the other empirical data was used as additional evidence supporting the interview analysis.The exploration of practices through interview data can cause a trans-lation gap because practices cannot be observed directly in interviews. In qualitative interviews, interviewees just tell their stories about practices and thus discursively construct meaning of what they think of how such practices 
are	taking	place	and	how	they	are	to	be	classified	and	judged.	Thus,	the	prac-tices “as such” are not to be observed by conducting qualitative interviews30. Still, practices can be studied with the help of qualitative interviews. The as-sumption that people cannot talk about their practices (Hitchings 2012) is 
even	 less	 true	 in	this	specific	context,	where	not	 the	subconscious	 forms	of	practices are investigated, but the consciously formed and framed practices of democracy. Furthermore, these qualitative interviews are valuable to ex-amine the reasons for certain decision-making or deliberation strategies that actually cannot be observed. Interviews are well suited when processes need to be reconstructed because the development of certain strategies and prac-tices are best investigated by interviewing people with a certain history in the networks. Furthermore, interviews allow for a greater breadth of topics and at the same time specify issues much more. For example, interviewees can talk about many more persons in their daily lives than for example a par-
ticipant	observer	can	observe.	(Bryman	2008:	465-69).	Political	practices	are	
very	specific	phenomena	that	require	a	focused	investigation	with	the	help	of	structured interviews. Furthermore, some of the political practices cannot be directly observed but must be recalled by interviewees, such as the writing of e-mails. Thus, qualitative interviews carry more weight under the perspective 
of	reconstructing	political	practices.	Also,	this	study’s	research	interest	is	not	
30  The question can be posed in general, if it is possible at all to observe a social interaction “as such”. When we assume that social sciences are mostly doing second-order observa-
tions;	 they	observe	what	people	 in	their	social	context	observe	(Luhmann	1997),	 then	
there	is	no	“pure”	observation	of	facts	(first-order	observation)	in	social	sciences.
108
solely on the practices as such, but also includes the knowledge, positioning and patters of practices. The knowledge of the actors and the development of certain practices play a major part in reconstructing why certain political practices occur and are used in transnational civil society networks.The qualitative interviews with activists and coordinators of two civil so-ciety networks in Europe were semi-structured. Semi-structured interviews are not completely open such as narrative, biographical interviews and not completely structured the way highly structured interviews as well as quanti-
tative	surveys	are	(Helfferich	2009:	36).	Interview	questions	varied	between	open and focused questions in order to balance between the research interest 
in	discovering	new	phenomena	and	the	focus	on	specific	(theory-guided)	cat-egories of interest. The analytical categories, which structured the interview guidelines in main parts, were open and continuous categories. Those prelim-inary categories could be opened up to new phenomena found in the text ma-terial during the process of analysis. The conceptualization of the interview guidelines was a multistage process developed by qualitative interview meth-odologists (Helfferich 2009; Kruse 2011). This method of interview guideline 
construction	is	divided	into	four	phases:	(1)	collection	of	interview	questions	in an open group brainstorming; (2) check and elimination of inapplicable questions; (3) arranging and reformulating of the chosen questions; and 
(4)	subsumption	under	the	guiding	lines	of	the	interview	(Kruse	2011:	79).	This research project aims at exploring an empirically under-researched 
field:	the	democratic	practices	in	transnational	civil	society	networks.	There	is	
no	clearly	defined	empirical	expectation	about	what	to	find	in	the	field.	There-fore, a certain openness needed to be kept. At the same time, different norma-tive and theoretical arguments exist and need to be taken into consideration. Many concepts that are proposed from different scholars are not translated into clear-cut categories. Those concepts are rather thoughts, questions and visions about different variants of democracy in networks (Enroth 2011). For this reason, the operationalization process is marked by a series of translation problems. Normative theory cannot be translated into analytical categories without losing (necessary) complexity. This means that openness is necessary and that there cannot be clear-cut categories. The interview guidelines provid-ed a categorical structure, but the questions within the categories remained relatively open. The different items of the interview guidelines are grouped 
along	 the	 following	 clusters:	 (1)	 network	 architecture,	 (2)	 deliberation	 
(3)	representation	(4)	participation,	(5)	deliberation	and	(6)	evaluative	items.
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4.3 The Method of Reconstructive AnalysisThe integrative method, developed by Jan Kruse (Kruse 2011), which is chosen in this study, has many advantages. It integrates parts of different approach-
es,	but	mainly	follows	the	logic	of	the	documentary	method	(Garfinkel	1967;	
Mannheim	1980;	Bohnsack	et al.	2001).	Bohnsack	developed	a	method	of	text	interpretation based on this documentary method of Mannheim. Mannheim and Bohnsack argue that there is a division between an action and the draft of such an action, the motive. Motives cannot be observed. They can only be spec-
ulated	about.	If	actors	are	asked	about	their	actions,	we	find	only	their	subjec-tive theories about practices, but not practices as such. The radical change of this analytical approach has led to the questioning of common sense. It should not be relevant to ask what the motives are, but how they are constructed, produced and ascribed. Second-order observations are more important than 
the	search	for	an	objective	meaning	of	first-order	observations31. In this sense, the question of the meaning of an action is a question about the structure, the 
generative	pattern	of	the	construction	of	that	action.	The	identification	of	this	generative pattern requires the observation of practices. Those practices can be observed directly or through stories and descriptions of actors.The integrative method is focused on very close readings of the actual texts32.	It	is	based	on	different	assumptions	and	principles:	(1)	It	is	assumed	that there is meaning in every word, transcending the actual or literal mean-ing of the word. Within the documentary method, those two meanings are labelled as immanent meaning and documentary meaning. Every word is a document for further meaning. (2) Rules and relevancies determine choices of articulation. In other words, how individuals verbalize their thoughts is not arbitrary, but follows rules of grammar as well as symbolic structures; subjec-tive relevancies and interpretation patterns determine how things are said. (3) Those rules and relevancies can be reconstructed with the methodical 
process	of	analysis.	(4)	Analysis	and	interpretation	are	two	distinct	processes;	
analysis	 includes	 the	reconstruction	of	 the	 text’s	meanings,	 followed	by	the	interpretation of these meanings. (5) The analysis must be strictly data-cen-tered, while interpretations must be consistent with the text material. (6) A reconstructive attitude must be adopted. The interpreter needs to reconstruct 
31  Luhmann marked this as a turning point in social science methodology. In second-order 
observations,	social	scientific	typification	can	be	distinguished	from	common-sense	typi-
fication	(Luhmann	1997).32  Objective hermeneutics as an alternative interpretation method is a radically open meth-od with less rules and regulations than the documentary method and the applied integra-
tive	approach.	The	results	of	interpretations	can	vary	significantly	and	can	be	of	limited	value if the interpretations are not done by a very experienced scholar. 
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the	subjective	meaning	within	the	text	material	rather	than	putting	one’s	own	
subjective	meaning	 into	 the	 text.	 (7)	 It	 is	 assumed	 that	 the	articulations	of	the interviewees make sense to them and are “objectively” valid for them. 
There	should	be	no	claims	about	truth	in	those	statements.	(8)	The	interpre-
tation	must	be	transparent	and	intersubjectively	verified	and	comprehensible	
(Kruse	2011:	156;	Lucius-Hoene	and	Deppermann	2004:	95–100).According to these basic premises, the texts of interview data are recon-
structed.	Reconstructive	interview	analysis	means	first	of	all	an	open	herme-
neutic	method	of	description	and	interpretation	of	texts.	The	first	step	of	the	interview analysis is purely descriptive. Description without interpretation can be reached with several methods that deepen “Fremdverstehen” (the un-
derstanding	of	other),	i.e.	stepping	back	from	one’s	own	personal	subjective	systems of meanings. The general idea is to slow down the process of analysis. The description of the text, which includes a sequential analysis according to the principle of emergence (line-by-line analysis) of the introductory parts of each interview, is an instrument that helps to get to as many different ideas ex-
pressed	of	the	text	as	possible.	The	different	levels	are	examined	after	that:	the	pragmatic level of interaction positioning, the syntax level of grammar usage, timing and rhythm of language, and the semantic level of word choices as well 
as	the	creation	of	“semantic	fields”(Kruse	2011:	161–62).	The	level	of	prag-
matics,	in	which	interviewees	position	themselves	vis-à-vis	narrative	figures	
(persons	they	are	talking	about),	is	specifically	relevant	when	reconstructing	
practices. This level of text analysis captures the positioning and agency of network actors and can give valuable insights into the conduct of political practices from different perspectives. As already mentioned, the positioning of interviewees can help to explain relationships between actors in networks and the practices that constitute and form those relationships. Positioning analysis, which is the analysis of discursive practices, “the stories through which we make sense of our own 
and	others’	lives.”,	was	developed	by	discursive	psychologists	in	order	to	study	identities or the self of individuals by investigating how they verbally interact 
within	a	specific	context	(Davies	1990).	Three	reconstructive	levels	 in	posi-
tioning	can	be	 identified:	(1)	“How	the	conversational	units	(i.e.	characters,	events, topics, verb structure, etc.) or general conversational structure are 
positioned	in	relation	to	one	another	within	the	reported	events“;	(2)	„How	the speaker both is positioned by and positions him/herself to the actual 
or	 imagined	audience”;	 and	 (3)	 „How	do	 the	narrators	position	 themselves	
in	answering	the	specific	and	general	question	of	 ‚who	am	I?‘	and	‚how	do	I	
want	to	be	understood?‘	“(Korobov	2001:	15–16).	The	third	level	focuses	on	the identity construction, which is a main aim of positioning analysis. How-
ever,	the	first	and	second	levels	are	more	relevant	for	the	present	empirical	
study.	The	first	level	emphasizes	the	characterization	of	individuals	and	their	 
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agency	in	specific	contexts.	The	second	level	contains	interaction	and	speech	acts such as giving excuses, blaming other persons, or giving advice. This con-versational structure and content “is analyzed as a means to an end—one that is concerned with situating conversational structure within certain distinctive 
audience-driven	interpretive	modalities.”	(Korobov	2001:	16).	Those	specific	interpretive modalities that interviewees are using in order to position them-selves within the context of the network are always positionings that are re-
lational	and	can	only	be	successful	if	the	actors	share	specific	knowledge	and	
context.	Actors	are	influenced	by	the	context	of	norms,	values	and	structure,	
but	at	the	same	time,	they	are	“capable	of	exercising	choice”	(Davies	1990:	3).	Since actors are actively positioning themselves and others, they are con-structing dynamic network relations. Those positionings of many actors in the network can be condensed into different types of practices in the networks. 
The	interviewed	activists	in	the	two	networks	reflected	upon	their	own	roles	and tasks in the network, evaluated processes of decision-making and delib-
eration	and	thus	positioned	themselves	as	specific	actors	in	the	network,	for	
example	as	the	rather	marginalized	group	with	only	a	 few	chances	of	 influ-
ence	or	 the	powerful	 coordinator	who	 firmly	 controls	developments	 in	 the	network. Through those narrations of roles and positionings, certain practices 
of	“how	things	are	done”	can	be	identified	and	extracted.	Agency analysis is a second analytical tool that is used to investigate po-
litical	practices	with	the	help	of	the	 interview	material.	Agency	is	a	specific	form of positioning. The agency concept  focuses on the cognitive representa-
tion	of	one’s	own	initiative	power	to	action	and	the	possible	courses	of	action.	
Agency	 analysis	 categorizes	 different	 forms	 of	 subjective	 ideas	 about	 one’s	own involvement in certain events or results. In the present case, it would be 
the	interviewees’	involvement	in	democratic	decision-making	practices.	This	agency can be anonymous, collective, structural, indirect, consensual or indi-
vidual	(Kruse	2011:	203–04).
After	this	first	period	of	descriptive	analysis,	the	findings	were	structured	and grouped into several interpretative pathways. In this phase, heuristics 
helped	to	structure	 the	different	 findings.	 In	 this	way,	 it	 is	possible	 to	cate-gorize observations based on different interpretations of positioning, agen-cy and practice. In a next step, the different interpretations were condensed into one consistent interpretation. In a last step, the empirical interpreta-tions were put into the theoretical context and normatively discussed (Kruse 
2011:	224–228).	This	step-by-step	analysis	was	also	done	in	an	interpretation	group. This is very important in order to avoid one interpretation that might 
be	full	of	very	specific	assumptions	and	classifications.	Interpretation	groups	provide an opportunity to collectively develop analyses and interpretations, which are validated through the triangulation of many subjective positions. 
Group	interpretation	also	leads	to	theoretical	sensitization	(Kruse	2011:	183).	
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Particularities in analysis and interpretation arose when the interviews were held in a language that was foreign to both the interviewer as well as the interviewee. Interviews that are conducted in a foreign language seem to be problematic in the sense that we never know if the interview partners are really saying what they want to say with the same accuracy as if it were their 
mother	tongue.	At	first,	it	must	be	assumed	that	individuals	are	able	to	articu-late what they “really” want to say. Without this assumption, the analysis and interpretation would not be possible or lead to arbitrariness (Kruse 2012). The limited semantic repertoire of interviewees in a foreign language context 
is	a	phenomenon	 that	needs	specific	and	sensitive	analysis	of	 the	choice	of	
words	and	a	specific	concentration	on	the	reconstructive	and	distancing	atti-
tude	(Verfremdungshaltung).	The	 interpretation	of,	 for	example,	metaphors	must be even more careful. Nevertheless, the foreignness of language makes it easier to adopt this distancing attitude in the interview situation and in the interview analysis. The understanding of language of the other person is not 
taken	for	granted,	and	thus	a	“Verfremdungshaltung”	comes	more	naturally.	During the interview, meanings and choices of words are more often ques-tioned and asked for. Thus, the foreignness of language can help the recon-structive analysis in a positive way. Since the understanding of language is never trivial, be it the mother tongue or not, the commitment to basic princi-ples of reconstructive analysis is even more necessary, but also even easier to conduct because the implicitness of meaning is not the same as in native-lan-
guage	communication	(Kruse	2012:	20).
4.4 The CasesThe selected cases are two politically relevant transnational civil society net-
works	that	claim	to	be	democratic:	the	environmental	network	Friends of the 
Earth (FoE) and the social rights network Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC). Both networks are typical examples of the broader universe of civil society net-works. In this study, the network as the unit of analysis is chosen rather than other possible units of analysis such as activists, organizations or campaigns 
because	of	its	specific	structural	character	that	poses	challenges	to	traditional	democratic institutions. These two cases were selected because they are di-verse in regard to some important dimensions of transnational civil society 
networks	and	 thus	reflect	 to	a	certain	degree	 the	diversity	of	 transnational	civil society networks. Diverse cases are useful for exploratory studies be-cause they “illuminate” the full range of possible cases in one population (Sea-
wright	and	Gerring	2008:	297).	
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Besides the rough distinction between social movements and NGOs, many scholars have categorized social movements and also non-governmen-
tal	 organizations	 in	 different,	 more	 well-defined	 ways.	 Whereas	 NGOs	 are	typologized according to their organizational status, founding context or ori-entation33, social movements are often typologized according to social struc-ture, goals or group structure. Typologies based on the goals of movements 
prevail	 in	much	of	 the	 research	 (Raschke	1985:	106).	A	general	 characteri-
zation	of	social	movements	is	provided	by	Raschke	(1985)	based	on	the	di-mensions of (1) goals, (2) mobilization, (3) action repertoires and changes, 
(4)	negotiation,	(5)	control,	(6)	situative	factors,	(7)	strategy	and	(8)	internal	dynamics. The three dimensions of negotiation, control and situative factors somewhat correspond with the concept of political opportunity structure34. Those external factors of social movement typology are clearly dependent on the nation state. In transnational social movements, these factors lose some of their explanatory power because organizations are not that much (still enough, but to a lesser extent) dependent upon domestic political institutions in their home countries. It can be observed for example that organizations that do not get access to media or decision-makers or cannot expect an ex-tensive list of allies in countries such as Bangladesh, they will seek support 
elsewhere	and	find	funding	and	support	opportunities	for	example	in	Western	European organizations35. While the concepts of political opportunity struc-tures, negotiation, control and situative factors are only marginally relevant in transnational networks, the concepts of goals, mobilization, action reper-toires, strategy and internal dynamics are highly relevant in the context of this study. For the changed context of transnational activism, sociologists studying transnational social movements conceptualized a more dynamic approach of 
transnational	 social	movements	 (Tarrow	2006:	24).	Mechanisms,	processes	
and	episodes	 form	 the	 triad	with	which	Tarrow	et al.	want	 to	describe	and	explain complex series of developments inside and outside movements which lead to contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001)36. Keck and Sikkink 
33  There is a myriad of acronyms out there in order to categorize every kind of NGO, for ex-ample GONGO (government-operated NGO), QUANGO (quasi-autonomous NGO) or BIN-GO (business-friendly NGO), which try to do justice to the different contexts worldwide, in which NGOs are founded and operate.
34  Situative factors are slightly different from political opportunity structures according to 
(Raschke	1985:	363).	Situative	factors	are	narrow	and	temporary,	but	also	provide	exter-nal input to social movement development.35  This particularity of transnational activism is conceptualized in the model of the “boo-
merang	pattern”	(Keck	and	Sikkink	1998:	12-13).36  The concepts by Tarrow and others try to do justice to the increased range of actors and constellations in transnational relations such as NGOs, international organizations, advo-
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(1998)	 systematize	 transnational	 advocacy	 networks	with	 similar	 dynamic	categories. While examining transnational campaigns, they differentiate be-tween the categories of internal relationships among network actors and how they are maintained, different types of resources that enable campaigning, institutional structures, both international and domestic, that frame the ac-tivists campaigning, and different ways that tactics evolve (Keck and Sikkink 
1998:	7):Campaigns are processes of issue production constrained by the action con-
text	in	which	they	are	to	be	carried	out:	activists	identify	a	problem,	specify	a cause, and propose a solution, all with an eye toward producing procedur-al, substantive, and normative change in their area of concern. In networked campaigns this process of “strategic portrayal” must work for the different ac-
tors	in	the	network	and	also	for	target	audiences.	(Keck	and	Sikkink	1998:	8).	Furthermore, according to these authors, it is important to identify the major actors in such networks. Such actors are very diverse and range from local social movement groups to media outlets, research institutions or even par-liamentary branches of governments (ibid. P. 9). A differentiation between dif-ferent issue areas and the channels and forums of communication, as well as the way of the functioning of different networks and the construction of cog-nitive frames (information, symbolic, leverage or advocacy politics) seems to 
be	crucial	(ibid.	p.	11–16).	Bennett	(2005)	summarized	Keck’s	and	Sikkink’s	
different	dimensions	in	order	to	differentiate	between	the	first	generation	of	transnational activism portrayed by Keck and Sikkink and the second gen-
eration	 transnational	 activism,	whose	 rise	he	 identifies	 in,	 for	example,	 the	
social	justice	activism	(Bennett	2005:	212).	While	the	transnational	advoca-
cy	approach	is	more	NGO-centered	and	defines	NGOs	as	the	central	actors	in	
transnational	advocacy	networks	(Keck	and	Sikkink	1998),	the	transnational	
activist	networks	approach	reflects	a	more	current	form	of	transnational	civil	society networks, which are constituted of many different actors and articu-late broader claims (Bennett 2005). Both of the chosen networks in this study feature different characteristics of both types to different degrees. The sug-gested catalogue of categories from Bennett (2005) is comprised of the fol-
lowing	categories:	(1)	scope,	(2)	organization,	(3)	scale,	(4)	targets,	(5)	tactics,	
(6)	goals	and	(7)	capacity.	He	extends	this	list	to	further	categories	that	mark	
the	 difference	 between	 national	 and	 transnational	 activism:	 (8)	 structure,	 
cacy networks or transnational labor activism. Also, they expanded the analytical focus beyond the Western liberal system and transferred the static categories of political op-portunity structures into more dynamic kinds of mechanisms and processes (Tarrow 
2006:	24).	This	further	development	of	the	concepts	of	social	movements,	as	Raschke	and	
others	conceptualized	them,	leads	to	a	modification	of	explanatory	factors	and	descrip-tive categories.
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(9) formation, (10) stability, (11) membership, (12) mobilization, (13) bridg-
ing,	 and	 (14)	diffusion.	 They	partly	 overlap	with	 standard	 analyses	 of	 new	
social	movements,	 such	 as	 the	 typology	 by	Raschke	 (1985).	 Some	 of	 these	categories do justice in capturing the dynamic network character of organiza-tions or the transnational level of activism. In combining these different approaches, a rather comprehensive catalog of categories can be established that can describe the two cases in this study 
and	identify	differences	between	these	two	networks:(1)  Goals	result	 from	the	specific	 interpretation	of	reality	and	the	perceived	necessary changes or perceived structural inconsistencies. Goals are the basic principles of a movement group or civil society network and project the future as an orientation for present action. Those goals can be targeted 
towards	norms,	values	or	institutions	(Raschke	1985:	165–66).The goals of both networks differ slightly. The CCC’s	goals	are	very	clear-cut criteria for living wages, working conditions and human rights imple-mentation. The goals of FoE are more diverse and depend much on the local work of network members. The European branch of FoE, FoE Europe, focuses on lobbying activities in Brussels, whereas other groups in Europe have direct action and information exchange between local activists as 
their	main	goals.	Both	networks	find	themselves	in	the	typical	issue	are-as of civil society engagement. However, the breadth of the issues differs. The CCC	defines	a	quite	narrow	issue	area,	namely	the	working	conditions	
in	a	specific	industrial	sector.	Moreover,	the	global	garment	industry	has	production facilities mainly in Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India, Cambodia and China. Thus, the issue focus also includes a regional focus. On the contrary, FoE has a very broad issue area that includes all kinds of environmental and ecological topics as well as social justice and participa-tory democracy.(2)  Collective identity or collective action frames are schemata of interpreta-tion that organize experience and guide action. Furthermore, they attract 
support,	gain	media	attention	and	signal	intentions	(Tarrow	2006:	61,	cit-
ing	 Snow	et al.1986/Snow	and	Benford	1988,	 1992).	 Collective	 identity	
can	be	defined	as	“an	individual’s	cognitive,	moral,	and	emotional	connec-tion with a broader community, category, practice or institution.” (Polletta 2001).Both transnational civil society networks identify as global grass-roots movements. While FoE frames this collective identity very prominently on its website, CCC states its network identity within a catalog of many ideas 
that	they	believe	in.	For	example,	“we	are	the	world’s	largest	grass-roots	
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environmental network.”37	 can	be	 read	on	FoE’s	 homepage.	This	 idea	 is	also featured in CCC’s	self-portrait,	stating	that	the	cooperation	in	the	net-work should be “based on mutual respect for each others (sic) different roles and methods, open and active communication, participatory consen-sus building and constructive criticism.”38(3)  The organization or formation of networks  focuses on the composition of actors in the network and the form of organization between the actors (Bennett 2005). The main categories of organization in social movement research are social movements, campaign coalitions and advocacy net-works39.	While	 social	movement	 is	 a	 general	 term	 that	 classifies	 a	 very	broad social protest phenomenon, coalitions and networks refer to organ-izational and structural traits of transnational civil societies. Furthermore, 
organization	defines	the	range	of	members	that	are	in	the	network	and,	which roles they play in the network.The two chosen civil society networks are purposive in their action (the same as coalitions) and are not just networks of different “nodes” that are casually combined in the same area of activism. Furthermore, they 
are	not	just	temporary	coalitions	that	take	action	for	a	specific	cause,	but	they are relatively stable and permanently networked cooperation struc-
tures	(Tarrow	2006:	161–65).	Both	transnational	networks	are	organized	as networks of semi-autonomous member groups in different countries. These member groups are independent organizations that also campaign in other contexts. They pool resources, share information through their networks and agree on basic values and principles as admission criteria, but are permanent networks and not temporary, event-based coalitions. Members in the CCC network are quite diverse. Obviously, there are trade 
unions,	 but	 also	 social	NGOs,	women’s	 rights	 groups	and	 church	organ-
37	http://www.foei.org/en	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
38 https://cleanclothes.org/about/principles	(accessed:	01.10.2016)39	 	Coalitions	are	defined	as	different	groups	of	actors	that	combine	efforts	and	pool	resourc-
es	in	order	to	gain	joint	political	influence	and	to	create	solidarity	against	common	threats	
(Tarrow	2006:164).	Coalitions	are	temporary;	they	“frequently	form	around	short-term	threats and opportunities, but when the occasion for collaboration passes, many disperse 
or	subside	into	“paper	coalitions”	“(Tarrow	2006:	165).	While	coalitions	are	mainly	de-
fined	by	their	strategic	cause,	the	standard	account	of	transnational	advocacy	coalitions	focuses on principled ideas and values as the driving force behind the so-called transna-tional advocacy networks. Besides this, the “ability to generate information quickly and accurately, and deploy it effectively” is also an important structural feature of transna-tional networks and the basis of a collective identity within a network (Keck and Sikkink 
1998:	1,	11).	NGOs	are	the	central	actors	in	those	transnational	advocacy	networks,	but	also other actors such as foundations, churches, trade unions, intellectuals or media par-
ticipate	in	those	networks	(Keck	and	Sikkink	1998:	9).
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izations. Every network member is part of a national platform, in which different kinds of organizations gather. The FoE network is in this regard rather homogeneous and consists mainly of environmental groups. 
(4)	 Mobilization and action repertoires describe the activation of resourc-es with the aim of implementing the goals of the organization (Raschke 
1985:	187),	whereas	 actions	describe	 the	different	 forms	of	 action	 that	an organization or network realizes in order to reach its goals (Raschke 
1985:	274).	Both	terms	are	empirically	not	always	clearly	distinguishable	
(ibid:	275)	and	thus	will	be	used	here	as	one	category.	The	civil	society	networks in this case study are both permanent campaign networks with 
a	history	of	20	to	40	years,	evolving	over	the	years	into	global	networks	of	local organizations. Both civil society networks mobilize through a com-bination of symbolic and information politics40. Protest events are often 
choreographed	in	public,	either	on	important	dates	or	during	significant	events with highly symbolized theatrical performances. Those public pro-tests are accompanied by mobilization through information and petition campaigns and the reporting of grievances to the public and political de-cision-makers.(5)  Internal relationships41 are the connections established and maintained between network actors and their allies and opponents (Keck and Sikkink 
1998:	7).	In	FoE, all network members formally have the same status as a member group. In the CCC, there is a division between coalitions in Eu-rope and partner organizations in garment producing countries, which also results in different roles and obligations of different types of network members.(6)  Targets are understood as the targets or addressees of action and social change (Bennett 2005). The CCC targets mainly international brands in the clothing industry such as Nike, H&M, and Zara in order to push them to take responsibility for their production sites in Asia. FoE also conducts 
campaigns	that	target	specific	industrial	actors,	but	the	targets	of	the	net-work are in general broader and the campaigns last longer. FoE has been, for example, campaigning against Shell in the Niger Delta since the ear-
40		Symbolic	politics	are	defined	as	“identifying	and	providing	convincing	explanations	for	powerful symbolic events, which in turn become catalysts for the growth of networks.” 
(Keck	and	Sikkink	1998:22).	Information	politics’	purpose	is	explained	as	follows:	“They	
provide	information	that	would	not	otherwise	be	available	[…]	and	they	must	make	this	
information	comprehensible	and	useful	to	activists	and	publics”	(ibid.	:	18).
41	 	Raschke’s	term	of	internal	dynamics	resonates	with	the	term	of	relationships,	but	goes	far	beyond it in modelling the evolution of social movements in different scenarios (Raschke 
1985:	377–383),	which	seems	too	complex	for	the	purposes	of	these	categories.
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ly	1990’s.	Although	FoE	has	a	specific	target,	the	issues	raised	are	much	broader.
(7)  Strategy   is the unit of basic rules of action for a multitude of situations. Tactics 
is	understood	as	the	behavior	in	a	concrete	situation	(Raschke	1985:	368). The claims of CCC are made through strategic campaigns, which are often 
initiated	by	specific	findings	of	drawbacks	in	clothing	factories.	One	main	instrument of campaigning is the CCC urgent appeals, which are published as reactions to particular human rights abuses or catastrophes in cloth-ing factories. The CCC network uses consumer communication as a main tool for public protest. They are publicly addressing consumers and their choices of action. The FoE network does not focus on a specialized public; it changes from campaign to campaign or is assumed to affect all citizens globally.
(8)  Capacity or social differentiation	of	a	network	defines	the	range	of	issues	
and	 the	 fields	of	 action	 in	a	network	 (Bennett	2005).	The	CCC’s explicit 
issue	 focus	 is	very	narrow.	 Its	capacities	 focus	on	the	workers’	rights	 in	the global garment industry. At a second glance, it seems that there are 
different	fields	of	action	where	the	CCC is also involved; this concerns hu-man rights advocacy (for workers whose rights were violated) and gender 
equality	issues	(advocacy	for	women’s	workers).	FoE naturally has a very broad capacity of issues that they are addressing. Environmental issues such as climate change, biodiversity, or pollution are at the center of their agenda, but social topics such as land grabbing are also emphasized.In sum, the two cases, FoE and CCC, differ in many main dimensions and thus mirror the diversity of transnational civil society networks. Still, they share the basic relevant preconditions for being considered in this study, namely the organization as a network, the collective identity as part of a grass-roots movement and the style of mobilization.
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5  Political Practices in Transnational Civil 
Society Networks – An Exploration
“How	 does	 politics	 function	 in	 its	 everyday	 occurrence?”	 asked	 Nullmeier	
et al.	in	their	book	about	political	practices	in	higher	education	policies	(Null-
meier	et al.	2003).	This	will	be	the	first	question	that	guides	the	exploration	
of	political	practice.	Political	practice,	analytically	defined	as	an	action	taking	place in a relational structure of more than one actor, a “community perfor-
mance”	(Nullmeier	2008:	22),	is	conceptually	and	empirically	related	to	the	analytical dimensions knowledge of actors and the positioning of actors, which are equally important for the interview text analysis (Korobov 2001). The 
political	practices	and	the	knowledge	about	them	influence	the	actor’s	posi-tioning towards the political practices. Positioning can be self-positioning as well as intentional or unintentional positioning of others in the practices. The positioning of an actor is in turn based on a complex practice. When conduct-
ing	political	practices,	actors	use	their	specific	knowledge.	The	modification	of	
this	specific	actor’s	knowledge	can	evoke	certain	political	practices	and	ena-
ble	or	disable	a	certain	positioning	of	the	actor	(Nullmeier	et al.	2003:	16).	The	two analytical dimensions of positioning and knowledge structure the analy-sis and interpretation of the empirical material and help to identify political 
practices	by	recognizing	the	actors’	ways	of	positioning	as	well	as	forms	and	scale of knowledge. Through the ascribed meaning, namely the positioning and agency of interview partners within the two transnational civil society networks, the practices in the networks were reconstructed. That means in 
concrete	terms,	that	practices	such	as	those	of	a	specific	form	of	decision-mak-
ing	script	specific	roles	such	as	moderators,	working	group	leaders,	present-ers or discussants and at the same time network actors position themselves through the practice of decision-making in the context of the broader network for example as outsiders, opinion leaders, listeners or information brokers. The exploration of political practices is roughly guided by the open cat-egories which were developed in preparation of the interview analysis, as described in the previous chapter. This exploration comprises a thorough re-construction of the different political practices that range in the spectrum of participation, representation and deliberation. Analytical categories broadly 
define	 participation,	 representation	 and	 deliberation	 practices	 in	 empirical	terms and build a heuristic in order to identify them as political practices as such. The different categories of political practices can appear in different set-tings and phases and can develop different shapes. Consequently, they need 
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not be democratic. Representation and deliberation as empirical terms can comprise any kinds of deliberation and representation that include for exam-ple exclusive negotiation rounds or authoritarian representation strategies. Thus, the empirical conceptualization of the participation, deliberation and representation practices is very broad and includes all kinds of practices cir-cling around these three terms. At the same time, such political practices are of course informed by normative claims and understandings of how partici-pation or deliberation should be done. There is no clear dividing line between practices and norms, as I outlined in the chapter on practice theory (chap. 1). I will come back to this point when discussing the democratic character of the political practices. Before that, the following chapter 5 will outline the results of the empirical reconstruction of interviews. This will be structured along the open categories that were developed in order to have a very rough heuristics 
as	a	starting	point	for	the	reconstructive	analysis:Participation practice encompasses learning and empowerment practice, cooperation and joint decision-making as well as decentralized governance. First, learning and empowerment are practices of participation that involve the learning of skills to participate effectively and the learning processes that take part during participation. Empirically, this comes mainly into effect in em-powerment practices of marginal or weaker groups. Second, cooperation and joint decision-making is the main part of participation practice in the two net-works. It is a broader category that involves many kinds of different practices of campaigning, coordination, information distribution and decision-making. Lastly, the decentralization and establishing of autonomy is an important set of participation practices that aim at providing members with the freedom they need to decide on their own campaigns and let member participate in 
tasks	that	are	devolved	from	the	central	offices	to	the	local	organizations.	
Deliberation	 practice	 is	 subdivided	 into	 the	 identification	 of	 problems	
and	defining	of	agendas,	the	structuration	of	deliberation	processes	and	the	decision-making during and after deliberation. All categories mark rather concrete practices that take place during deliberation or encompass deliber-
ation	processes.	While	the	problem	identification	is	not	directly	connected	to	deliberation, these practices prepare deliberation processes in that they set the points that will be discussed during deliberation practice. Structuring the deliberation is a practice that involves all actors in the network, namely coordinators, campaigners and facilitators. During deliberation we can again differentiate deliberation as such and decision-making practices. These prac-
tices	are	specifically	interesting	because	they	define	how	output	is	generated	in deliberation.Representation practice comprises practices of selection and instruction of representatives, communicating between representatives and represented and the making of representative claims. All those practices of representation 
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are related to the performance of the relationship between representatives and represented. The different ways of instructing or communicating thus form the representative relationships. The making of representative claims rather marks the outreach-dimension of representation.
Analytical Categories of Political Practice
(1) Learning and empowering
(2) Cooperating and making joint decisions
(3) Governing in a decentralized network
(4) Identifying problems and setting agendas
(5) Structuring deliberation processes
(6) Selecting and instructing representatives
(7) Communicating between representatives and represented
(8) Making representative claims about individuals and discourses 
Table 1: Analytical Heuristics of Political PracticeAfter a general introduction of the two cases in chapters 5.1 and 5.2, the re-sults of the reconstructive analysis are presented in chapter 5.3. This section does not follow the process of the interview analysis, but presents the results of this process divided into the analytical categories and complemented by further categories that were generated inductively throughout the process of the interview analysis. As empirical reality is chaotic and fragmentary, the de-
scription	of	the	individual	political	practices	cannot	fulfil	any	demand	of	com-
pleteness.	The	observed	political	practices	in	the	two	networks	that	fit	in	the	
categories	are	described	without	completely	filling	out	the	analytical	scope	of	the single categories. After this reconstruction of political practices, chapter 6 will deal with the question of how democratic such political practices can be. 
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5.1  A Campaign for Better Working Conditions in the 
Garment Industry: the CCCThe Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) was founded in Amsterdam, Netherlands, 
as	the	“Schone	Kleren	Campagne”	in	1989.	The	campaign	is	seen	as	“one	of	
Europe’s	 most	 influential	 multistakeholder	 initiatives	 for	 pressuring	 com-
panies	 to	assume	responsibilities	 for	workers’	rights	at	 their	suppliers’	 fac-
tories”	(Egels-Zandén	2011:	259).	The	CCC	can	be	classified	as	a	permanent	campaign network that is highly institutionalized and does not merely cam-paign on a temporary basis. As of today, it consists of seventeen national plat-forms in sixteen countries that were established over time. Although the CCC consists of many sub-campaigns that are conducted by its sixteen national 
platforms,	 the	general	 issue	area	of	 the	 campaign	 is	very	 focused:	The	CCC	concentrates on “improving working conditions in the global garment indus-try”42.	The	CCC	started	 in	1989	with	a	campaign	against	 the	clothing	retail-er C&A in the Netherlands. An activist at this time summarized the reasons 
for	this	first	anti-brand	campaign	against	C&A:	“[…]	it	was	Dutch,	it	was	big	and we already had information about its use of sweatshop labour” (Sluiter 
2009: 9).	Although	internationalism	and	international	solidarity	were	big	top-
ics	among	 leftist	activists,	women’s	groups	and	a	 few	academics,	 the	wider	public was not interested at all. Where their clothes were stitched and man-ufactured was not a “hot” topic or of any concern for consumers at that time 
(Sluiter	2009:	14–15).
During	the	period	of	internationalization	of	NGOs	during	the	1990’s,	the	CCC expanded its network in Eastern Europe and outside of Europe. This devel-
opment	was	also	accompanied	and	influenced	by	the	outsourcing	of	garment	
production	outside	of	Europe,	which	began	in	the	1970’s.	From	the	1980’s	to	1993, the garment production by European retailers that was actually manu-
factured	in	Europe	dropped	from	70%	to	35%	(Sluiter	2009).	Reacting	to	this	development, CCC has led more and more international campaigns about this issue. The campaigns were often successful in getting companies to sign codes 
of	conducts	or	protect	workers	from	prosecution	and	mistreatment:
The	CCC	has	taken	up	more	than	250	cases	and	many	have	been	resolved	:	health and safety conditions improved; dismissed workers reinstated; unions recognised and activists released from prison. Some brand name companies have responded by adopting codes of conduct and drafting policies on corpo-
rate	responsibility,	considered	an	important	first	step	in	the	process	of	abol-ishing sweatshop conditions.43
42 http://www.cleanclothes.org/	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
43  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/publication-eidhr-compendium- 
2007-2010_en_5.pdf	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
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GoalsThe CCC-network wants to reach its goals through the cooperation between 
trade	unions	and	NGOs	on	a	regional,	national	and	global	level:	“Such	cooper-ation should be based on mutual respect for each others [sic] different roles and methods, open and active communication, participatory consensus build-ing and constructive criticism.” Furthermore, the empowerment of workers in their own local campaign work is a main instrument of the CCC-network. Be-sides this, public action is valued as an important instrument to reach better labor standards for workers, although the CCC does not promote boycotts.44
The	International	Labour	Organisation’s	(ILO)	Declaration on Fundamen-
tal Principles and Rights at Work (1998)	and	Article	23	of	the	Universal	Dec-
laration	on	Human	Rights	are	the	basis	for	the	CCC’s	code	of	labor	practices.	Furthermore, CCC principles state that workers have a right to know about their rights and to be educated and trained. According to the CCC, consum-ers as well have a right to information about the production conditions of their clothing and sportswear. Public campaigns of CCC should be conducted with consultation of the affected workers. Also, gender issues should be ad-dressed45. The garment industry, the CCC claims, has a responsibility to ensure good labor standards because their position of power enables them to enforce good labor standards46. The CCC spent around one million Euros in 2012 for 
“press	 and	 political	 influencing”	 and	 national	 and	 international	 campaigns	(Clean Clothes Campaign 2012). 
Organization/Formation of the Campaign NetworkThe CCC is a network of very different organizations. Most organizations in 
Europe	affiliated	with	the	CCC	are	located	in	Western	European	countries.	All	these European organizations have built national coalitions that are called CCC platforms. Some of the smaller and younger groups can be found in Cen-tral-and Eastern European countries. The national platforms in each country consist of many national organizations. Trade unions are welcome to be part of these platforms. Besides trade unions, there are social justice organizations, 
women’s	rights	organizations,	human	rights	organizations	and	church	groups	that are included in those national platforms. In most cases, one organization is the leading national organization on these platforms. Since the organiza-
44 https://cleanclothes.org/about/principles	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
45  The	gender	dimension	was	a	reason	for	targeting	the	garment	industry	in	the	first	place,	most of the sewers are women and therefore it was of course a reason to engage for wom-
en’s	groups	(Sluiter	2009:	16).
46 https://cleanclothes.org/about/principles	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
124
tions that form national platforms often existed before they joined the CCC, the size and structure of the national organizations vary. The internal organi-zation of national member organizations is diverse; some organizations have a broad membership base and/or very formal decision-making procedures while some organizations are very large with complex structures. Other or-ganizations are very small and do not have formal members. Over the years, the CCC grew into a European network. The most recent newcomers are Fin-land and Ireland who joined in 2010. The International Secretariat, which is located in Amsterdam, split from the Dutch Clean Clothes Platform in 2003 and is now working independently for the entire network. The International Secretariat is more than just a secretariat with administrative responsibili-ties. It is very dynamic and does not simply serve the membership, as one 
British	member	of	the	CCC	notes	(Sluiter	2009:	171),	but	has	started	its	own	programs and initiatives. Staff members of the International Secretariat are 
going	on	 field	 trips	 to	Asian	countries	such	as	Bangladesh,	 India,	and	Hong	
Kong	every	year.	Due	to	the	network’s	growth,	 in	recent	years,	 the	network	coordinators formed a steering committee in order to plan a restructuring of the network and adapting procedures with regard to the growing number of participants.The sample of organizations that were interviewed in this study consists of different typical types of organizations that can be found in the network as such47. Besides the European groups, there are international partner organi-zations, for example Canadian and American partner organizations that are collaborating with the CCC. International partners in garment producing countries such as Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Taiwan, India etc. also play a crucial role because they are doing research on the ground and have established rela-tionships with workers in the garment industry. Those partner organizations 
are	often	involved	rather	temporarily	in	specific	CCC	projects	and	are	not	in-stitutionally connected with the European network. The CCC has only recently 
47		Interviewed	persons	 come	 from	organizations	 from	different	 regions	 in	 Europe:	 from	Southern Europe, Western Europe, Northern Europe and Central-and Eastern Europe. There are smaller and bigger organizations, organizations with more or less resources, organizations that have been in the network for a very long time, and organizations that have recently joined the network. There are organizations that play a central role in the network and have many projects with other organizations, and there are organizations that are more peripheral and only to a limited degree involved in projects. Some of the organizations are grass-roots organizations with many volunteers; others are much pro-fessionalized with many paid staff members. Furthermore, the focus of campaigning is 
very	different	among	the	interviewed	organizations:	there	are	organizations	that	are	fo-
cusing	on	fair	trade	issues;	there	are	women’s	organizations,	development	aid	organiza-tions, Christian organizations, trade unions and human rights groups.
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established a more formal structure of regional coordinators and started to hold frequent meetings in the Asian region48. The coordination of all network activities is managed by the International Secretariat in Amsterdam. Different coordinators plan and structure meetings and forums, coordinate the commu-nication between European platforms and international partners and strate-gize about long-term plans. The operative planning of campaigns is still done by the national platforms.
Internal Relationships
The	internal	relationships	are	heavily	influenced	by	the	diversity	of	actors	in-volved. In contrast to other NGO-networks, trade unions are involved in the 
CCC.	Those	specific	NGO-trade	union	relationships	are	not	always	harmoni-ous, as the study by Egels-Zandén and Hyllmann (2011) about the cooperation of the Swedish Clean Clothes Campaign with trade unions has shown. They 
argue	that	the	different	financial	capacities	(trade-unions	being	more	or	less	
self-sufficient	because	of	membership	fees,	and	the	NGOs	getting	only	tempo-rary project-based funding) lead to different time horizons and priorities in 
campaigning	(ibid.).	This	poses	specific	challenges	for	internal	relationships	in the CCC.In general, every organization in the network is quite autonomous in their operative work. Except for the general principles, which were described above, there are no other binding rules that prescribe the way how organiza-tions can campaign and take action. This network of relatively autonomous 
groups	is	beneficial	for	a	productive	cooperation	across	ideological	borders:	“Also the coalition model implied that partners could cooperate on a practical 
level,	even	if	they	had	different	ideological	agendas.”	(Sluiter	2009:	17).	The	relationships between the single platforms in the network vary. Some of them are collaborating very closely on a transnational level, whereas others are mainly concentrating on national campaigns. The CCC-network is structured around the so-called Euromeetings, which take place three times a year in dif-ferent cities in Europe. Every platform is supposed to send a representative to those meetings. It is also a rule that the same representative should attend the meeting in order to secure continuity in information supply and negotiation. Within the Euromeetings, there are different working groups which pre-dis-
cuss	certain	issues.	Those	working	groups	are	often	formed	around	specific	topics or campaigns. Everyone who is involved in that campaign or interest-ed in that topic can participate. Usually, those working groups also prepare proposals for the general discussions in the plenary sessions. The partner or-
48 One interviewee spoke about this (C1).
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ganizations from Asia do not take part in the Euromeetings and do not have voting rights for decisions that concern the inner network. However, there are regional meetings that are mainly steered by the partner organizations and where all matters that concern this cooperation are discussed and decided49.
Mobilization/Action Repertoire
The	action	 repertoires	of	 the	CCC	differ	depending	on	 the	 specific	 contexts	of the individual groups. In Western European countries, the mobilization is mostly awareness-raising action targeted at consumer behavior. Besides con-
sumer	education,	which	is	a	priority	in	Western	Europe,	worker’s	empower-
ment	is	one	of	the	main	fields	of	action	in	the	international	network.	One	of	
the	main	campaigning	tools	for	workers’	empowerment	and	solidarity	action	is the urgent appeals network. Urgent appeals are sent from workers or work-
ers’	organizations	in	garment	factories	whose	rights	were	violated.	The	Inter-national Secretariat of the CCC examines those requests and decides if the CCC takes action and goes public with the case. It is very important for the Interna-tional Secretariat that the workers really want to attract an international pub-
lic	audience	as	well	as	that	the	workers	decide	the	demands	of	the	campaign:
URGENT	APPEALS	ACTIVITIES	include	writing	letters	of	protest	to	companies	or public authorities, launching large-scale public e-mail and fax campaigns to pressure companies or governments to take positive action, writing letters of solidarity to workers and their organizations, and carrying out a variety of awareness-raising events (speaker tours, press conferences, demonstrations) to draw attention to cases of rights violations, both among the general public and the media. (Clean Clothes Campaign 2005). Besides the urgent appeals, there are typical CCC campaigns that consist of phases of lobbying, public blaming of brands and research about working con-ditions. In Central-and Eastern European countries, which used to belong to the garment producing countries, the context is slightly different, and cam-
paigns	 focus	more	on	women’s	rights	or	education.	 In	 this	region,	a	critical	consumership hardly exists, which can be partly explained by the communist past and the short history of a free market in these countries. In the current garment-producing countries in Asia, the action repertoires are mainly com-prised of public street action. However, this can be dangerous for activists in some countries; therefore, many groups focus on counseling workers and ed-ucational activities in order to make workers aware of their rights. 
49  The information of this paragraph is taken from different interviews with CCC members. The interviewees were given pseudonyms. The pseudonyms of the interviewees that gave 
this	information	are	C4,	C7	and	C10.
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As two campaigns in the fall and winter 2012 showed, concerted local street actions are one of the main forms of public protest. In September and October 2012, CCC activists “fainted” in front of H&M stores in European and US cities to protest against bad working conditions and malnutrition of workers in H&M factories in Cambodia. In December 2012, many European and US-American activists joined “fashion mobs” to raise awareness among Christmas shoppers about the sweatshops of big brand companies50. Such actions are also taken to convince passers-by to sign petitions and letters to brand companies in which they are demanded to pay living wages or engage otherwise in an improvement of working conditions.
TargetsCCC is mostly doing public awareness raising campaigns for an audience of Western consumers. They are the main targets of CCC campaigns, as they have a great “weight” in terms of buying many kilograms of clothes per year per 
person	 (März	2010:	198–99).	The	CCC	 frames	 consumers	as	consumer citi-
zens who are responsible for their choices and not just mere passive and un-concerned shoppers. The term consumer citizen grew out of a debate about the question whether responsible citizens are reduced to infantile consumers within their commercialized life-world in Western societies and whether this 
development	 threatens	 the	democratic	political	 culture	 (Barber	2007).	The	rising of anti-corporate campaigns that address citizens as consumers can be interpreted as one part of this democratic erosion, but it can also be un-
derstood	 from	the	opposite	perspective:	 through	anti-corporate	campaigns,	consumption is politicized, the division between private and public action is dissolved, and acts of consumption become political actions (Baringhorst 
2010:	33).	Besides consumer citizens, the CCC wants to target brands and retailers to hold them accountable for the control of their supply chains. A decade af-ter the founding of the CCC, a widely debated CCC code of conduct was writ-ten down, which is used as a guideline to motivate companies to implement a code of conduct and to assess the work of many brand companies with the help of this measure. While consumer citizens and brands are the main targets of the CCC, governments and politicians are also asked to develop laws and regulations that would force companies to supervise production and pricing standards and establish transparency. Lastly, garment workers themselves are supported in their own campaigns and in the establishment of trade unions 
(Sluiter	2009:	17).
50 https://livingwage.cleanclothes.org/	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
128
5.2  A Network for Environmental Protection Worldwide: 
FoEThe second case in this empirical study is the Friends of the Earth (FoE) net-work, which is mainly concerned with environmental issues. FoE is an inter-
national	 grass-roots	 environment	network,	 the	world’s	 largest	 of	 this	 kind,	
according	to	the	organization’s	statements.	Clearly,	FoE	belongs	to	the	three	biggest environmental NGOs, but in contrast to Greenpeace and WWF, the other two main environmental NGOs, FoE addresses environmental issues in reference to social and political inequality and voices explicit critique on neo-liberalism in a broader ideological agenda than Greenpeace or WWF (Doherty 
2006:	862).	Furthermore,	FoE’s	federal	structure	makes	it	different	from	the	rather centralized NGOs Greenpeace and WWF. Seventy-six member organi-zations overall, present on every continent, and two million members51 cam-paign for environmental and social justice and sustainability. FoE was founded 
in	1971	by	organizations	from	France,	Sweden,	England	and	the	USA.	A	small	
secretariat	was	set	up	in	1981.	Annual	meetings	took	place	and	an	executive	
committee	was	built	 in	1983	in	order	to	govern	the	network	and	issues	be-
tween	the	meetings.	In	1985,	the	European	member	organizations	set	up	a	re-gional coordinating body in Brussels, FoE Europe. FoE arose from an emerging 
global	environmental	movement	 in	the	1960’s	and	1970’s.	The	anti-nuclear	protests, they envisioned, were the driving force behind the founding of FoE. 
David	Brower,	the	founder	of	FoE,	coined	the	famous	slogan:	“Think	globally,	act locally.”52 The environmental movement is according to activists as well as 
scholars	very	broadly	and	inclusively	defined	as	“very	diverse	and	complex,	their organizational forms ranging from the highly organized and formally in-stitutionalized to the radically informal, the spatial scope of their activities ranging from the local to the almost global, the nature of their concerns rang-ing from single issues to the full panoply of global environmental concerns.”(-
Rootes	1999:	2).	The	global	nature	of	environmental	movements	cannot	be	doubted since global protest events like the Seattle WTO protests in 1999 took place. FoE has also consultation status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and other relevant United Nations bodies53. 
51 http://www.foei.org/member-groups	(accessed:	01.10.2016)52	 	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1373616/David-Brower.html	Obituaries:	
David	Brower,	8.Nov.	2000	(accessed:	11.1.2013)	/	(Radkau	2011:	611)53	http://www.foei.org/about-foei/organisation	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
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GoalsFoE state that their mission is “to collectively ensure environmental and social 
justice,	human	dignity,	and	respect	for	human	rights	and	peoples’	rights	so	as	to secure sustainable societies. To halt and reverse environmental degradation 
and	depletion	of	natural	resources,	nurture	the	earth’s	ecological	and	cultural	diversity, and secure sustainable livelihoods.”54. Besides those environmental goals, FoE include in their mission statement the empowerment of indigenous peoples, local communities and women. Furthermore, it is part of the mission statement to broaden public participation, further the equality between and within societies, and to link diverse groups in the global struggles (ibid.).FoE does not only react to the complexities of global environmental prob-lems by campaigning comprehensively on all problematic details, they also campaign on issues, which are not originally environmental. FoE also cam-paigns for economic justice and against neoliberalism for example55. Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE), the European branch of FoE, name their focus 
areas	as	 follows:	climate	and	energy,	corporate	accountability,	 finance,	 food	and agriculture, and resource use56. Those areas are divided into “programs”, 
which	are	all	coordinated	by	a	program	coordinator:	 ●  “Climate Justice and Energy:	 including	the	EU’s	climate	respon-sibility, UN climate talks strategy, energy savings and communi-ty-based renewables; 
 ●  Economic Justice: including corporate transparency and respon-sibility, impact of European companies on developing countries, corporate lobby power, food speculation and extractive indust-ries; 
 ●  Food Agriculture and Biodiversity:	including	GMOs,	biofuels,	EUs	Common Agriculture Policy and biodiversity; 
 ●  Resources and Consumption:	 including	measuring	and	reducing	
Europe’s	resource	use	(waste	policy,	resource	use,	consumption	and production patterns); 
 ●  Sustainable EU Funds (in co-operation with CEE Bank watch Net-
work):	including	environmental	and	social	indicators	as	the	ba-sis for the programming of EU funds over the period 2013–2020; 
54		http://www.foei.org/about-foei/mission-and-vision	(accessed:	01.10.2016)55	 	http://www.foei.org/what-we-do/economic-justice-resisting-neoliberalism	 (accessed:	01.10.2016)56	 	http://www.foeeurope.org/	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
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 ●  Network Development:	 including	 capacity	 building	 within	 the	network, strengthening Young Friends of the Earth Europe and support to campaigns”57 The broad range of issues, FoE is tackling, stands in contrast to their rather 
small	budget.	 In	2012,	FoE	spent	around	4,5	Mio.	Euros	 in	total	(Friends	of	
the	Earth	2012),	compared	to	183,4	Mio.	Euros	that	for	example	Greenpeace	spent on their campaigns in 2012 (Greenpeace 2012). However, the capac-ity to maintain a broad range of issues comes also from the local organiza-tions, which often set their own agenda. This allows for a broader frame and the capacity to pursue different topics as well as use different strategies to reach the aims. While the Brussels organizations naturally focus on lobbying, other organizations are concentrating on maintaining relations with specif-
ic	countries	by	helping	other	local	organizations	or	considering	one	specific	environmental issue as their top priority. FoE Europe is mainly funded by EU 
institutions.	The	Vice-President	of	the	European	Commission	responsible	for	
Administrative	Affairs,	Audit	and	Anti-Fraud,	Siim	Kallas	 says	 in	his	 report:	
“Last	year,	Friends	of	the	Earth	Europe	received	50%	of	their	funding	from	the	EU and EU national governments – a high proportion for a ‘non-governmental 
organisation’.	Despite	receiving	€	635,000	 from	the	Commission,	 they	were	
initially	very	highly	critical	of	our	car	CO2	emission	proposals.”	(Kallas	2007).
Organization/Formation of the Campaign NetworkEach of the above named programs is usually managed in a steering group. All 
program	coordinators	are	located	in	the	Brussels	office	and	take	the	decisions	for strategic and operational choices. Bigger questions are decided with the whole network, for example at one of the general meetings (F2, P.11). The An-nual General Meeting (AGM) is their “ultimate decision-making body”, where all organizations in Europe should be present58. Besides this, there are also annual meetings of climate change campaigners and other campaign areas 
(F2,	P.24).	The	general	meeting	is	supposed	to	be	attended	by	representatives	that have a leading role in their organization. There is also the opportunity to send a “proxy”, if representatives from one organization cannot come (ibid.). Besides the representatives of the single organizations, Brussels staff is at-tending the meetings in order to provide facilitation or follow up on other 
developments.	Those	meetings	are	divided	 in	 two	parts:	a	 formal	part	with	approval of the accounts, the election of Executive Committee and setting strategic priorities. The second part includes workshops and discussions with 
57		http://www.foeeurope.org/about/how-we-work	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
58	 	http://www.foeeurope.org/about/how-we-work	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
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members (ibid.). The Executive Committee meets four times a year and takes strategic decisions, oversees the implementation of strategies and appoints the director of FoEE59.FoE International consists of seventy-four national organizations, thirty- one of them are situated in Europe, fourteen organizations in Latin America, 
fourteen	organizations	in	Africa,	thirteen	in	the	Asian-Pacific	region	(includ-ing Australia) and one organization in the US and Canada respectively60. Thus, 
around	42	%	of	all	organizations	come	from	European	countries	and	for	ex-
ample	only	17,	5	%	are	situated	in	the	whole	Asian-Pacific	region.	There	are	
regional	umbrella	 associations	of	 FoE	 in	Latin	America,	Asia-Pacific	 region,	Africa and Europe. The FoE-network integrates different local organizations that are independent organizations and often have existed before they joined the FoE-network.
FoE	International	has	three	official	languages:	English,	French	and	Span-
ish.	In	FoE	Europe	English	is	the	only	official	language.	FoE	International	meets	biannually at a general meeting. National member organizations are supposed to send representatives to the general meetings. The national member organi-zations are quite autonomous; the network is coordinated like a federation. It is emphasized that all local organizations are enabled to participate in all in-ternational campaigns and activities of the FoE-network. The Executive Com-mittee of FoE Europe is elected annually by the member organizations at the 
annual	general	meeting.	The	Executive	Committee	consists	of	five	represent-atives of member organizations and is responsible for the general agenda and strategies together with the managing board (F4,	P.60).	Further	responsibili-ties are shared between the Executive Committee, the secretariat in Brussels 
and	the	director	in	Brussels:
I’m	not	sure	if	it’s	really	an	executive	body	i	mean	friends	of	the	earth	europe	is a strong secretariat in Brussels with a lot of staff and a director, so the work of the excom is to support the work of the director and of the main coordina-tors of the programs, and of course take a number of decisions which have to be taken by STATUTE by such a body which is elected, we are elected by the general assembly which takes place every year. and so we meet i think 
four	times	every	year	for	two	days	in	brussels,	HAVE	some	e-mail	conversa-
tion,	it’s	not	something	very	huge	in	fact	BECAUSe	it’s	the	OFFICE	as	we	say	is very strong and work very well and very competent people, strong director 
et	cetera	so	it’s	a	bit	formal	but	not	only,	i	mean	we	have	real	discussion	when	we meet have to take decisions but i mean everything is well prepared and documented (F5, P.30)61
59	 	http://www.foeeurope.org/about/how-we-work	(accessed:	01.10.2016)60	 	http://www.foei.org/member-groups	(accessed:	01.10.2016)61	The	interviewees	were	given	pseudonyms	from	F1-F14.
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Internal RelationshipsOur vision is of a peaceful and sustainable world based on societies living in harmony with nature.62There are different principles that member organizations need to agree with. First and foremost, the democratic principle is important and there is a com-mitment to participatory democracy in the network, which is demanded to be 
reflected	in	local	organizations,	too:	“Our decentralized and democratic struc-ture allows all member groups to participate in decision-making.”63. The mem-bers need to be dedicated to the FoE vision, participatory democracy, gender balance, grass-roots and national activism, transparency and accountability 
to	their	constituents	and	FoE’s	fundraising	principles.	Furthermore,	the	mem-ber organizations should work independent from political parties, economic interests, state and religious organizations, work on multiple environmental topics and justice perspectives and engage also on the international level of FoE64. The internal relationships in the FoE-network are characterized by a deep commitment to equal north-south relations. This commitment is not always easy to pursue. During the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa in 2002, FoE went into a crisis over the balance of north-south 
agendas,	which	 finally	 resulted	 in	 the	 resignation	 of	Acción	Ecológica	 (FoE	
Ecuador)	 (Doherty	 2006:	 862).	 The	main	 dividing	 lines	 were	 identified	 in	different ideological visions (Southern organizations being more radically an-ti-neoliberal, whereas northern organizations are sometimes either apolitical nature conservation organizations or rather moderate lobby organizations) and different capacities in putting forward the own agenda. (ibid.).
Action Repertoire
Local	 direct	 action	 is	 a	main	 part	 of	 FoE’s	work.	 FoE	 Europe	 focuses	 their	
action	 on	 influencing	 European	 policies	 and	 raising	 public	 awareness	 on	environmental issues. They provide information and expertise on different campaign topics. Grass-roots activities are supported from the Brussels of-
fice	through	knowledge,	skills	and	resource	sharing.	The	European	network	of FoE concentrates much on lobbying in Brussels and their role as experts. 
Thus,	they	focus	much	on	providing	reports	about	EU	legislation	and	specific	circumstances in EU countries and to a lesser degree on public mobilization. 
62	 	http://www.foei.org/about-foei/mission-and-vision	(accessed:	01.10.2016)63	 	http://www.foei.org/about-foei	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
64	 	http://www.foei.org/about-foei/frequently-asked-questions	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
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Public mobilization is done in rather spectacular events that try to raise me-dia attention and get into national news all over Europe. The mobilization of citizens and potential activists is primarily organized on the national level in the respective organizations in one country. In national organizations, most-
ly	classic	mobilization	strategies	and	action	repertoires	prevail:	 from	public	street action to informational campaigns. The international network mobiliz-es also via online-petitions and on big global events like UN conferences. In contrast to CCC, the FoE-network does not have a short-term campaigning tool like the urgent appeal actions. The campaigns are in general longer lasting and often broadened in their issue focus. Permanent campaigns with broad political goals are initiated mainly by one local organization, which cooperates 
with	other	organizations.	Alliances	with	farmers’	movements,	indigenous	or-
ganizations,	women’s	organizations,	human	rights	organizations	and	unions	are quite usual.
Targets While FoE Europe targets mainly EU institutions, above all the EU Commis-sion, the local organizations and the international network targets different actors, ranging from international institutions like the UN or the World Bank to multinational corporations like Shell to state governments like in the “Big Ask”-campaign to reduce CO2-emmissions. FoE claims to speak to the citi-zens of the world, but there is a clear concentration in European and North-ern American countries. The public is spoken to as a potentially environment sensitive constituency, which is informed and mobilized through different 
campaigns	on	various	topics.	Thus,	also	the	type	of	audience	can	be	defined	
very	broad:	peasants,	consumers,	pacifists	are	only	few	organizations	that	are	talked to.
5.3  The Political Practices of Representation, 
Participation and DeliberationAfter the general description of the two networks, the following chapters will present in detail the results of the interview analysis. The analysis of the cases of CCC and FoE is based on thirteen qualitative semi-structured interviews for each network. These twenty-six anonymous interviews are numbered con-secutively from C1 to C13 (CCC-network) and from F1 to F13 (FoE-network) respectively. Single quotes of the interview texts are included in order to make the analysis more transparent and comprehensible. Since the interviews were 
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transcribed with intonations and accentuations, the quotes read differently compared to standard language. The quotes represent spoken language to the degree that they are still readable. Accentuations are marked by capital let-ters and all words, also nouns and pronouns such as “I”, are not capitalized. Furthermore, if interviewees refer to concrete persons, names, countries and nationalities are anonymized.
This	 chapter	 is	 organized	 as	 follows:	 at	 first,	 the	 general	 perception	of	the networks in which campaigns take place and network members interact is summarized. After that, the main part of analysis concentrates on the three 
core	elements	of	analysis:	participation	practices,	deliberation	practices	and	representation practices. New forms of practices, which were inductively dis-
covered	in	the	interview	material	and	did	not	fit	into	broader	heuristics	are	described at the end of each section. 
Inside the Transnational Civil Society Networks: General PerceptionsThe network character and the respective joint missions of the two trans-
national	civil	society	networks	greatly	influence	the	perception	of	members	about their own organizing. This is insofar interesting, as it gives a broader overview of the general positions in the two networks. I will start by describ-ing the perceptions in the CCC-network and after that will outline the general positions in the FoE-network.
At	first,	 the	 interviewees’	shared perception of the network contributes to the collective identity65 of the Clean Clothes Campaign. The main meaning that is attributed to the network is that of a loud and powerful coalition. Single organizations become stronger and louder when entering the network and therefore join the network (C5 P.55). When network member organizations speak for a whole network of very many organizations, it gives their word 
more	power;	they	say	(C1,	P.177–180/C10,	P.65;	C4,	P.138–144;	C5	P.55).	The	network is also meant to be a mouthpiece for the interests of workers in Asian countries. Through the campaigning in Europe, fueled by the ground research in affected countries, the issues of workers are heard, and there is more and 
more	pressure	on	the	companies	(C14,	P.62).	Thus,	the	network	is	perceived	as a strong community that strengthens individual members and reinforces the common cause. However, the CCC-network is perceived very differently from the central members in the network and peripheral members in the network. It can be divided into different (geographical) areas. While the core network consists 
65	 	Collective	identity	can	be	defined	as	“an	individual’s	cognitive,	moral	and	emotional	con-
nection	with	a	broader	community,	category,	practice	or	institution”(Polletta	2001:	285).
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of the oldest members in Western Europe, there are peripheries that vary in their marginal status according to self-perceived peripheral positions or peripheral positions that result from exclusionary rules or routines. The pe-riphery stretches from Central-and Eastern Europe and Southern Europe to South-East Asia. Peripheral organizations have regular contact with other net-work members, but contacts are not very tight. They have few contact persons or manage their communication via the International Secretariat. Peripheral network members perceive the network as a highly professionalized network with a lot of complex structures and procedures, a very advanced network. They ascribe much expertise to the network. Beside the image of the net-work as having a strong outward voice, these organizations thus add another 
meaning	to	the	network:	a	place	for	learning	and	struggle	(C	7,	C8,	C12).	The	perceived high level of professionalism has ambivalent consequences for pe-
ripheral	organizations:	On	the	one	hand,	the	network	is	perceived	as	a	place	where everything about successful campaigning can be learned; on the other hand, the adaptation to habits and practices in the network is critically eval-
uated	as	 sometimes	quite	hard	and	difficult	 (C7,	C8,	C12).	One	person	of	 a	
new	member	organization	in	the	network	summarized	those	difficulties	in	the	
following	way:	“Sometimes	like	i	said	before	we	have	to	adopt	different	ways	of working here and there is no space for such big discussion in euromeeting 
(…)	so	that’s	why	it’s	so	difficult,	 i	 think	it	takes	us	more	time	to	follow	the	processes in a way that it makes sense for us.” (C7,	P.12).	A	peripheral	organ-
ization	in	the	network	describes	a	contrary	experience:	“i	have	also	learned	a lot because at the beginning i was really inexperienced but now i can really 
work	with	the	projects	and	everything	so	it’s	really	good	for	me,	i	understood	
the	logic	of	EC	projects”	(C8,	P.75).	Although	both	organizations	are	in	the	pe-riphery of the network, they look at the network from a different angle. The 
first	organization	is	a	new	official	member	of	the	network,	whereas	the	second	
one	is	not	an	official	member	of	the	network.	This	results	in	different	expec-tations about the participation in the network. The second organization uses the advantages of being associated with the network without having to take 
part	in	Euromeetings,	whereas	the	first	organization	is	involved	in	all	the	net-
work	activities	and	has	to	fulfill	obligations	and	might	have	more	expectations	
about	the	network’s	functioning	as	such.	The	longtime	established	practices	in the network can make smooth participation for peripheral or new mem-
bers	very	difficult.	Since	peripheral	members	are	often	also	new	members	of	
the	network,	this	specific	perception	of	being	marginalized	is	also	reflected	in	the practice of welcoming new organizations.Core network members have a different outlook on the network than peripheral members. Many of them express how proud they are about the achievements of the Clean Clothes Campaign and frequently describe the 
efficient	use	of	the	network	structures	with	few	capacities	as	a	real	asset	of	
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the Clean Clothes Campaign. One network member describes this from the 
perspective	of	an	outside	visitor:	“they	[outside	visitors]	quite	realized	how	small we actually are and how much work we get done” (C10, p.63). Besides many examples, given by interviewees, that illustrate the public visibility of the campaign network, central members of the network do not see the pro-
ficiency	of	the	network	organization	and	the	complexity	of	 its	structures	as	something that has to be mentioned explicitly or even should be seen as a problem. Rather, members of the International Secretariat and core members 
of	the	CCC-network	praise	the	efficient	mode	of	collaboration	through	a	dy-
namic	information	flow	inside	the	network:I would say beCAUSE we are a network and also because you have a kind of formal structure in place it means campaigns like the sandblasting campaign can go very quick and have an imPACT because you have the some different organizations involved and they KNOW the network they know the basic premises so SOME campaign topics can very easily be can go very quickly 
spread	and	have	some	impact,	right?	(C2,	P.114)Core members in the network appreciate the participatory approach to de-
cision-making	in	the	network,	although	they	also	see	flaws	in	realizing	par-ticipation practices (e.g. C1, C9, C3). There is a critical, realistic, but overall positive meaning ascribed to the network, which is above all substantiated by 
the	efficient	information	flow	in	the	network	and	the	successful	public	cam-paigning. Similarly, many FoE-members are very enthusiastic and emotionally at-tached to their network. As one interviewee states, FoE “is one of the great-
est	networks	in	europe,”	(F6,	P.58).	The	network	is	perceived	as	an	alliance	of	
like-minded	environmentalists	with	a	diverse	set	of	approaches:	“i	 think	the	fact that we are a network of thirty autonomous national member groups who all have their NATional level strategies and campaigns and LEgal structures and so on vision and mission, means that we have a very diverse range of voic-
es	when	we	discuss	the	issue”	(F2,	P.70). Political alignment plays an important role in the network, as well as the diversity of voices and interests. Although political ideals must be shared, different approaches of campaigning and dif-
fering	political	opinions	and	goals	in	specific	thematic	fields	are	tolerated.	The diversity of the organizations in the FoE-network is, in general, a frequently referred category. Diversity means uniqueness, because other large NGOs, such as Greenpeace or WWF, are not that diverse. Activists in the FoE-network understand the network as a coalition of very passionate grass-roots people (F2, F6, F9). However, there are organizations that also value strategic choices and an output orientation more than the original grass-roots or social movement framed activism (F2, F3, F5). Thus, the diversity of the 
network	organizations	with	a	common	political	understanding	is	valued:	
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We have enormous diversity we have enormous victories we have enormous 
strength	 in	our	groups	but	also	 in	some	cases	significant	challenges	within	our groups we have a WIDE range of different ways of working we have a very i think high level of common understanding of the MAIN environmental ISSUES facing us and or is driving those environmental issues in terms of kind of political structures and economic structures driving some of the problems. 
(F2,	P.80)This wide range of difference among the organizations in the network can be seen very clearly when looking more deeply at some of the interviewed organ-
izations:	Some	of	the	organizations	are	big	organizations	that	are	quiet	giants	in the network. They are concerned with nature conservation and biodiversity issues, i.e. issues that are not automatically political. Those organizations do not, or only to a limited degree, prefer (radical) public protest actions. They see the network as an umbrella organization for their interests and often see their own role in the network as a supporter for smaller or weaker organiza-tions. Traditions of the organizations and of the environmental work are also very important. The language spoken by their representatives (the interview-
ees)	 is	 rather	 formal	and	 self-confident.	Those	organizations	are	 located	 in	Western/Central Europe. Other organizations are very passionate about their campaigns and see the formal network framework as a second-range matter that helps to keep up their ideals and meet friends with same mindsets. They are not so much concerned with formalized procedures, but are rather attract-ed by the political opportunities and cooperation. They seem to have a grass-roots background, although they have somehow grown out of being a pure grass-roots organization. Still these organizations show a very strong commit-ment to grass-roots democracy. Typically these organizations are to be found in Southern European and Scandinavian countries. A third group of organi-zations can be characterized as active, independent, standing at the edge of the network. These organizations emphasize their own projects and the coop-eration with other international networks. The contacts and communication with the network is not that intense. They are mostly also geographically at the edge of the network, in Central-and Eastern Europe or outside of Europe.Whereas there are very obvious differences between the European or-ganizations, the international differences are even more striking. This can be troubling when a common position is needed to be found. Different views on issues can inspire discussions, but it can at the same time prohibit any consensus on a matter of discussion. As pointed out in the quote below and 
also	in	other	interviews,	the	difficulty	to	even	find	an	agreement	on	how	to	articulate claims or problems comes mainly from the different cultural and political backgrounds of the involved organizations. Different organizations specialized in different topics such as climate change or anti-nuclear politics. Thus, other interviewees also say they would desire a stronger, more united 
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campaign network, although they value the grant of autonomy for every or-
ganization	(F4,	P.92).	This	will	be	again	picked	up	in	the	chapter	about	delib-eration practices and consensus.
 There are groups that are well like [org. in country] or friends of the earth [country] that are more mainstream and not that well lefts left-win and then we have groups in latin america that are really environmental organizations but also in the forefront of the struggle for human rights and democracy so that have a completely different position in their society and different view of 
the	struggles	that	have	to	be	fought	to	get	sustainable	future	and	then	it’s	of	
course	very	difficult	to	find	a	common	language”(F1,	P.39)The diversity of the FoE-network goes hand in hand with a certain degree of 
complexity	and	the	questioning	of	effectiveness	of	the	network:	Of course the structure is relatively, especially if we speak about ah if we think about the international or the global level is relatively complex, not complex but i mean relatively not effective in the sense that very much bottom-up con-trary of an organization like greenpeace which is maybe more effective in the 
sense	that	many	things	are	decided	in	amsterdam	in	the	head	office	and	then	the groups just implement. this FoE-networks totally different at friend of the earth so especially the international level, i mean the approach the cultural context, the views et cetera of the groups in the different regions are SO dif-
ferent	and	diverse	so	sometime	 it’s	even	a	miracle	 that	we	can	 increa-	our	number of BASIC position et cetera. but then when it comes to REALLY make 
international	programs	work	really	challenging(F5,	P.104)
Thus,	the	diversity	of	organizations	can	be	seen	as	both:	a	gain	in	strength	and	a loss in decision-making effectiveness. It seems to be a matter of perspective, 
and	position	in	the	network,	what	is	weighted	more:	the	advantages	or	dis-advantages of diversity. Whereas grass-roots-minded organizations are more 
inclined	to	value	the	diversity,	lobby	organizations	are	rather	seen	the	ineffi-ciencies in overly long discussions. This results in different speeds of internal decision-making and a situation at the transnational level, which produces different perceptions of the procedures of decision-making.
If	two	organizations	work	in	VERY	different	WAYS,	let’s	say	that	you	have	one	organization that make all their decisions within on a volunteer base that they all have to agree with every decision and the other organization makes their decisions only by a BOARD or a small GROUP that makes their decisions or by 
their	office	or	whatEVER	then	they	gonna	work	in	very	different	PACES	they	are gonna be one is kind of running but the other one is walking- you know so of course that is a fact but then you have to plan a project after the politics that the organization has as well so and it is always important to be aware of the effect (F9, P.129)Besides the European focus of campaigning, international solidarity with grass-roots organizations is viewed as something, which makes FoE quite 
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unique:	“we are probably the only network of environmental groups in europe which takes seriously solidarity with grass-roots struggles in other regions” (F2, P.81). Furthermore, the diversity of the network is raising the feeling of 
political	efficacy.	We can link the struggles you know. we can SEE when we are in a federation, that we are not alone, i mean as affected groups affected people, you know you see, we are not alone. the same problem is happening in amazonia and the same problem is happening in indonesia and it is linked with a campaign 
in	the	netherlands,	(…)	this	federation	GIVES	to	us	this	opportunity	to	LINK	the struggles, to work with other local groups to exchange the experiences 
and	experiences	with	campaigns	you	see,	 (…)	 it	makes	us	stronger	 to	 fight	against something or for something. as a federation we have more power to 
FIGHT	yes,	with	a	company	for	example	or	court,	or	government.	(F	13,	P.97)If many different organizations are participating in campaigns, so the line of 
reasoning,	 it	 raises	 the	pressure	and	has	a	bigger	effect	 (F4,	P.86;	F6,	P.56).	This membership in a big and well-known environmental protection network 
can	not	only	put	more	strength	on	specific	campaigns	and	claims,	it	can	also	make local members more attractive “at home”. This can be a motivation to join the network because it helps in recruiting new members at the local level 
(F11,	P.81).
Learning and Empowering The major effort of learning and empowerment in the CCC-network is target-ed toward the workers in garment producing countries. The empowerment of 
workers	in	production	countries	is	an	important	part	of	the	network’s	self-un-
derstanding.	It	is	reflected	in	their	principles	as	follows:Workers themselves can and should take the lead in their own organising and empowerment. Workers can best assess their needs and the risks they take when asserting their rights. Public campaigns and other initiatives to take ac-tion in cases of rights violations and the development of strategies to address these issues must be done in consultation with workers or their representa-tives.66 The empowerment of workers is not only written down in the principles; it 
is	also	seen	as	a	central	part	of	 the	mission	of	the	CCC:	“besides	the	princi-ples we then have what we should disTINGuish. are four areas of work, so in order to reach our mission, which is improving working conditions in the global garment industry AND empowering workers in those industries” (C 10, P.29). This mission is practiced through coordinated projects with NGOs in the 
66	 	http://www.cleanclothes.org/about/principles	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
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producing	countries.	Via	mediation	through	these	NGOs,	workers	are	encour-aged to raise concerns, problematize issues and get support for campaigns and self-organization. This empowerment-approach aims on the one hand 
at	 increasing	the	participation	of	workers	in	 local	workers’	committees	and	workers organizations; on the other hand, it aims at increasing the participa-tion in the international NGO network. NGOs that work locally with garment workers67	have	the	difficult	respon-
sibility	to	bridge	participation	problems:	they	are	translators,	supporters	and	educators of the workers and help them in regard to negotiations with local factory owners and multinational companies. Furthermore, local NGOs con-sist of researchers and educators for the international network and become the mouth-piece for the workers in a transnational public sphere. The follow-ing quote of an Asian NGO activist, who works in close collaboration with the 
CCC-network,	exemplifies	how	difficult	it	is	to	support	and	educate	workers	in	their struggle for better working and living conditions. Here, we can also see 
that	empowerment	involves	also	a	gender	aspect:Then you know that garment workers are always feel powerless many of 
course	young	women,	those	women	who	are	very	submissive	some	well	that’s	
why	it’s	difficult	i	mean	to	organize	them,	so	that’s	why	we	have	DESIGNED	the PROgrams how to involve the garment workers, how to train training up the unions support them to i mean bargain with the company with the compa-ny with the owners with their bosses, so that, or even the governments so that their wages right can be guaranteed or i mean increased. (C12, P.26)The interviewee describes the young women working in garment factories 
as	very	submissive,	 thereby	making	it	difficult	to	mobilize	them.	In	general,	this quote captures the implicit aim of education and empowerment. Workers 
feel	powerless;	 they	do	not	 see	 their	political	 efficacy.	The	aim	of	designed	programs is to train and support workers and union members. “Submissive” (woman) workers should develop awareness of their rights and learn skills of 
how	they	can	“bargain”	with	the	companies	(C12,	P.58).	The	empowerment	
approach	in	participatory	democracy	can	be	identified	in	the	practices	of	en-
couraging	workers’	participation.	The	wording	in	the	previous	quotation	from	one of the interviewees already reveals that this seems to be a more top-down empowerment than a bottom-up learning process. The empowerment, or capacity building, as FoE members call it, is prac-ticed in the FoE-network in a very systematic and formalized way. One pro-
67  The learning and empowerment of workers, as an important part of participation practic-es, can only be described from the perspective of the NGOs in producing countries and not from the workers themselves because they were not interviewed. It would have been al-
most	impossible	to	do	that	because	it	is	very	difficult,	even	for	the	European	NGOs,	to	get	in contact with the workers because of existing language barriers.
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gram, which is called “capacity building through campaigns”, is mainly aimed at building the capacity of the campaigners to “win campaigns” (F2, P.22). The program contains skill sharing, information and knowledge exchange be-
tween	national	 campaigners	and	 the	Brussels	office.	This	means	concretely	that network events are set up to support campaigners in their development of necessary skills, but also that campaigners are supported in and through their campaign work at the national level (F2, P.22). 
In	order	to	find	out	how	organizations	are	working	and	what	they	could	
need,	a	questionnaire	was	designed	by	the	Brussels	office	and	sent	around	to	
the	organizations:	“based	on	that	we	are	developing	some	interventions	with	
specific	groups”	(F2,	P.22).	This	questionnaire	had	also	other	impacts	in	that	it	
inspired	one	organization	to	reactivate	their	connections	to	FoE:	“THEY	sent	us a questionnaire membership development questionnaire and many organ-izations also raised this question about membership of friends of earth. so we decided to reconnect with them again”(F11. P.73).Besides those activities, which are centrally planned from the Brussels of-
fice,	there	was	a	twinship	program	aiming	at	bringing	stronger	and	“weaker”	organizations together in order to develop a peer-to-peer learning process.We have been involved a lot during some years in friend of the earth europe CAPACITY building projects which were BASED on the idea of twinship be-tween STRONGER groups and weaker groups or more developed and less developed groups et cetera so we have been part of this program and con-tributed to support we have been supporting, i mean the program was a rule with common activities et cetera but there was also this twinship and so we have been supporting foe [country 1] and foe [country 2] with visit, training, organized by ourselves et cetera. now this model has been a bit put aside, not because it was not good, i think it worked RATHER well in most of the cases, but well it was also a bit some time-expensive or time consuming or meaning a lot of resources so NOW we are developed we have developed more capacity 
within	the	campaigns.	another	approach	that	we	find	interesting	currently	in	friend of the earth europe. so we are a bit LESS involved than before but will 
be	contributing	to	that	(F5,	P.80)Although this program is already stopped, there is a huge sense for solidar-ity in the FoE-network, which is expressed in much formalized practices of 
systematic	support	from	the	Brussels	office	as	well	as	through	a	peer-to-peer	
system.	This	formalized	support	practices	from	the	Brussels	office	are	also	ap-plied to the participation of general meetings. Organizations that cannot come 
are	supported	by	a	specific	budget.	However,	there	are	growing	difficulties	on	
how	to	distribute	the	financial	support,	as	more	and	more	organizations	are	
in	need	of	a	travel	budget:
There	is	a	there	is	a	budget	to	support	such	groups	who	have	difficulties	i	can	
i	couldn’t	explain	you	how	exactly	this	budget	is	shared	but	there	are	there	
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is some money europe to support some european groups, for example this year there were MORE groups willing to get this budget than we had. so for example this was a decision from the board from the european board to de-cide to not whom will come but to whom we will give the money which is not 
necessarily	an	easy	decision	of	course	but	you	have	to	share	the	budget	(…)	
it’s	really	something	difficult	especially	as	we	have	more	and	more	groups	so	the organization of such a meeting is something quite big, expensive and not easy to organize (F5, P.62)One of the organizations even sees support for other member organizations as 
one	of	their	main	activities	(F5,	P.6):Of course when other groups want to do something at that meeting we try 
to	arrange	our	plans	so	that	it’s	not	prohibitive	for	them	or	we	try	to	support	
other	groups	that	want	to	join	in	so	it’s	mostly	that	we	DESIGN	our	campaigns	
so	that	it’s	attractive	for	other	friends	of	the	earth	groups	to	join	then	that	we	
first	sit	together	and	we	try	to	really	design	it	together	(F1,	P.35)
The	sense	of	an	increased	political	efficacy	through	participating	in	network	meetings is a second dimension of learning and empowerment practices in 
the	network,	which	 is	underlined	by	many	 interviewees,	exemplified	 in	 the	
following	quote:	“It’s	the	opportunity	to	see	US	altogether	all	the	groups,	this	is really, really good because it makes the feeling that we can achieve BIGGER things if we work altogether than every than each group does what he wants” (F3, P.53).The empowerment practices in the FoE-network are very comprehensive and cover mainly the capacity building of organizations. Financial support is given to organizations with lesser capacities in order to establish equal oppor-tunities of participation. Additionally, the second dimension of empowerment 
practices,	which	can	be	observed	as	the	increased	sense	of	political	efficacy	and the consideration of different perspectives, is an important part of em-powerment practices in the FoE-network.
Cooperating and Making Joint Decisions
Decision-making	 is	conducted	on	different	 levels	 in	 the	CCC-network:	with-
in	 the	European	CCC-network,	within	specific	campaigns	with	 international	partners, and on the local level with workers and trade unions. A Western European NGO coordinator from the International Secretariat, who describes 
a	 scene	 in	 a	 Sri	 Lankan	union’s	 office,	 provides	 a	 first	 example	of	 the	 local	
workers’	level	of	decision-making.	The	interviewee	takes	this	example	to	em-phasize the general principle of providing equal participation, especially at 
the	workers’	level.	Workers	are	the	represented	group,	which	makes	a	claim	for legitimacy even stronger. This coordinator described the practice of talk-
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ing	to	workers	in	union	offices	as	a	practice	of	formulating	demands	in	col-laboration with union staff. The coordinator described the overall campaign in very positive terms. The team that coordinates campaigns and cases from Western Europe is always “hyper careful” to make sure that workers decide what should be done. Although this interview does not allow us to estimate how common the described practice is, it shows that there is a deep aware-
ness	of	how	practices	should	look	like:The demands are actually formulated by the workers or at least by their rep-
resentatives	so	by	the	union	you	know,	that	THEY’re	talking	to	so	you	know	i	was in sri lanka last year and there was a case going on at that time and i went 
to	one	of	the	union	offices	and	some	of	the	workers	were	IN	the	office,	talking	
to	some	of	the	people,	and	they	were	discussing	the	case.	so	you	know,	that’s	how you can SEE how it works, how the demands are formulated in that way 
(C10,	P.42)A local NGO activist, who states that there are several practices of getting in 
touch	with	the	workers,	confirms	the	practice	of	inclusion	as	described	by	the	International Secretariat coordinator; however, this interviewee describes practices that involve the pro-active locating of workers in their factories and 
the	 surroundings	 instead	of	 awaiting	 them	 in	 their	 office.	 Similar	practices	
are	described	by	another	local	activist	who	was	also	interviewed	(C14,	P.60).	
Thus,	here	we	can	observe	two	similar	practices	of	workers’	participation	that	are described quite differently from the “local” and the European perspective. The local NGOs emphasize their active part in “reaching” the workers or go-
ing	to	their	factories	or	homes,	whereas	the	coordinator	from	the	CCC’s	Inter-national Secretariat suggests that workers pro-actively show up talking and 
discussing	 in	 the	office	of	a	 trade	union.	Overall,	both	descriptions	of	 these	participation practices draw a picture of a mutual, collective practice that is conducted without disruptions. So we have a several ways to reach the workers right the one is that well we can go to the industrial zone when we do the research right that so-called na-tional wage research and then we will go to the factory and then wait for the workers, right and then meet with the workers and also interview them the other way is go through the brand company and brand company they invite us go into the factory the supply factories and then to meet with the workers 
(C12,	P.58)The participation of workers in decision-making is drafted as a dialogue be-tween the representatives (local NGOs or trade unions) and the workers. How-ever, none of the interviewees focuses on participatory decision-making as a 
collective practice of workers. It appears that the practice of involving actors is rather a person-to-person practice. In general, local NGOs and representatives of the European network position themselves in favor of a pro-active inclusion of workers in decision-making within the network.
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In contrast to the fairly smooth cooperation between workers, local NGOs, and the International Secretariat, NGOs that work as partner organizations in the periphery of the CCC-network seem to struggle with cultural differences and their role in the network. Both issues are ambivalent. Cultural differences produce misunderstandings and make it hard to adapt to practices of the net-work (C12); however, border-crossing cooperation is a source of enrichment 
and	power	for	the	project	and	the	involved	NGOs	(C14).	The	cooperation	with	European NGOs makes the work for local NGOs sometimes more secure be-cause the public visibility in European countries protects them from threats 
from	local	factory	owners	(C14).	In	that	way,	participation	in	the	network	is	very valuable for NGOs in producing countries. However, when looking at par-ticipation practices of international partners, it can be observed that there 
are	different	meanings	of	participation.	For	example,	one	of	the	organization’s	representatives explains that they are from time to time “called for these meet-
ings and workshops to Europe”	(C14,	P.6).	This	is	an	indicator	of	a	rather	in-strumental and unequal partnership within the network. In other interviews, this instrumentality of participation practices is highlighted by assigning roles of mere researchers and information suppliers to international partners. For example, one person from Western Europe describes the way how most Eu-
ropean	partners	begin	to	cooperate	with	“international	partners”	as	follows:Normally you would look at the country and think which group can be doing 
what	kind	of	research	or	you	have	a	discussion	with	groups	and	it’s	decided	so	
it’s	i	mean	you	in	china	you	want	to	use	a	group	that	can	connect	with	workers	know the situation and et cetera. i think we normally choose more activist and client organizations so because then they know what we expect and they are not expensive (C2, P.36)Here, the instrumental rationality of involving international partners is cho-sen over a normative participatory argumentation. The practice of begin-ning cooperation and negotiating about research work is characterized by a reasoning of how to get the best results they need without spending too much money. In this positioning towards practices of cooperation, a norma-tive participatory approach is not involved. The participation of international partners is framed like an asymmetrical contractual relationship, where the activist organizations do not have much to say. This marks a contrast to what 
the	same	person	says	about	the	principle	beliefs	and	norms	of	the	network:We would probably be careful to describe things in in geographically convined 
terms	because	it’s	almost	NEVER	a	euroPEAN	camPAIGN	if	WE	do	a	campaign	well and i would say we always do that well but or our STARTing point should be that SOUTHern organizations should be involved in the camPAIGN on a de-CISIOn-making level so and this is not always how things happen cause some-times you have campaigns where southern partners are probably relatively 
SMALL	(C2,	P.17)
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With the comparison of the both statements above, there seems to be a gap between rules and norms on the one hand and the perception of practices on the other hand. Although these rules are described in the interview, they are to a certain degree avoided or re-interpreted in the practices. This cannot only be observed in the wider global network, but also inside the European network. Some working groups, for example, that form around organizations 
that	are	not	official	platforms	in	the	network,	struggle	to	have	a	voice	in	the	network. This makes them subordinate groups, which are sometimes overrun 
by	bigger	and	more	influential	groups.	This	is	exemplified	in	a	description	of	a	
working	group	that	is	mainly	composed	of	peripheral	organizations:The people who are involved in this group are not in euromee- eurocoordi-nation group so they are they do not have decision-making power so i guess it will be good to involve more people from european platform in this group THIS was also what we discussed during one meeting, but i was also near to this group so i did not i thought it has more IMPACT, but it seems that it all i 
think	all	in	clean	clothes	depends	on	how	people	are	engaged	(C	7,	P.23)Besides the lack of formal participatory rights, the interviewee also thinks that this working group does not have a concrete enough topic to lobby it effective-ly inside the network. It seems that the initiative to do something in these working groups lies with the International Secretariat. Thus, the practice of decentralizing responsibilities can also lead to the opposite of participation. Groups that are less experienced and not in the core network are having dif-
ficulties	to	adapt	to	the	working	routines	of	the	network	and	thus	fall	behind.	
Although	the	CCC-network	is	very	open	to	influence	and	input	from	the	network environment, the actual procedure of integrating new members in the network is perceived by some new members as a challenging task on both 
sides:	 the	network	and	 the	new	members.	Some	organizations	only	recent-ly joined the CCC-network while others have been long-term members. New members had different initial experiences with the CCC-network. These ex-periences present an unbiased and fresh outside perspective on the network. Some CCC organizations value their initial contact with the network as a very 
positive	and	inspiring	experience.	They	describe	the	first	meeting	they	attend-ed as very creative, vivid and varied (C11) with a lot of opportunities to get in contact with fellow campaigners, which also helped them in future projects 
(C8).	In	the	Euromeetings	and	other	network	meetings	methods	of	facilitation,	moderation, note-taking and evaluation are applied that are sometimes quite uncommon in the national contexts of the platforms. Besides the creativity 
of	different	brainstorming	and	workshop	methodologies,	the	network’s	work	
is	perceived	as	very	constructive	and	efficient.	This	is	seen	as	a	consequence	of the professionalized methods used in the meeting. However, it is also per-ceived as an obstacle for integration into the network, especially when organ-izations evaluate their own work as being different, for example by being less 
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efficient	or	doing	things	differently	(C5,	C12).	Then,	new	organizations	have	
doubts	about	how	they	can	“fit	in”.	Furthermore, member organizations also perceive the integration pro-cess into the network differently. While some feel that they were supported very well, especially by the International Secretariat, during the adaption pe-
riod;	other	organizations	do	not	see	that	they	were	helped	much	in	the	first	phase of becoming a network member. Network member candidates have to 
fulfill	certain	criteria,	for	example	having	an	office	and	forming	a	platform	that	consists of many organizations and trade unions. These criteria must be met before they can be a CCC platform. The dividing line between being a CCC plat-form in the network and just being an organization in the network is very clear. While organizations without a platform are not involved in Euromeet-
ings,	other	relevant	forums,	and	decision-making	processes,	official	CCC	plat-forms receive many more “services” (C11) from the International Secretariat and are much more involved in information distribution, meetings and strate-gic planning. One interview person describes the transition from a non-mem-
ber	 to	 a	member	 as	 being	 enabled	 to	 participate	 (C7).	 Thus,	 new	network	members gain many opportunities to participate and capacities to campaign, 
but	the	transition	and	integration	process	as	such	is	quite	difficult.	Adapting	to	established practices of collaboration in general seems to lead to frustration and an inability to cope with certain rules and procedures. International solidarity is a cornerstone of the international FoE-network and an important rule for cooperation in the European FoE-network. Howev-er, there is a certain distinct role allocation between European and non-Eu-ropean organizations within campaigns of FoE Europe. As it was described above, most of the funding for FoE Europe organizations comes from the EU. 
Therefore,	 there	 is	 often	 a	 clear	 capacity-related	 role	 distribution:	 Europe-an organizations have money that they can spend on campaigning, where-as Non-European organizations are often the organizations that represent affected people, villages or regions of diverse environmental damages. The non-European organizations in FoE Europe campaigns are “where the prob-
lems	are”	(F1,	P.80).	Cooperation	between	an	African	FoE	organization	and	a	European FoE organization shows the dilemma between maintaining mutual communication and at the same time having differences that cannot be easily 
diminished:We want to be involved of course as an organization and what our involve-ments is that we make the case for the wider environmental issue is not only the harm done to the [local]citizen but also harm done to the [local] environ-ment in general and then of course the lawyer is doing the case for us and the 
[locals]	so	it’s	not	that	we	do	it	for	the	[locals]	It’s	a	[local]	and	WE	together	
do	it	(…)	the	LAWyer	has	the	leading	role	and	the	farmers,	they	are	the	most	
important	persons	but	because	they	are	quite	far	away.	(F1,	P.63–68)
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While there is a law suit going on in Europe against a big oil company causing environmental damage in Africa, the campaigner of the European organiza-tions broadens the frame of participation in the quote above. The claims of the campaign is made on a much more general level as a “case for the wider environmental issue” being not only a local problem in this country. On this ground it is made clear that the European organization is not doing this for the African organization but together with the African organization. When it comes to the concrete practices of involving the local FoE organization as well as even the farmers (who are the group of affected people in this case), the 
language	of	the	interviewee	changes:So the farmers are not very much involved on a day-to-day basis, we tell them 
about	what’s	happening	in	general	terms	and	[the	local	FoE	group]	has	an	im-portant role in also translating what`s happening in [own country] to THEM 
and	to	their	villages	which	is	very	important	(…)	[the	local	FoE	group]	is	very	
important	in	explaining	what’s	happening	and	also	organizing	that	and	pre-paring people that if the court case will be successful (F1, P.69)Now, the practice of participating in a campaign together is described dif-ferently. The European FoE organization explains the local FoE organization what is happening and the local FoE organization explains to the farmers the proceedings of the campaign and translates documents. This gives the impres-sion of a rather unidirectional interaction between the European and the Afri-can organization. There is surely a dilemma between the participatory claims of a desired form of cooperation and real practices. Many such claims cannot be realized fully because of constrains of daily work and structural conditions. The perspective of a Central-African FoE organization coordinator under-lines these observations. The urgent need for more campaigns that serve the 
local	needs	is	articulated:	
Most	of	the	time	campaigns	are	designed	for	international	people,	you	see?	
and	there	is	most	no	coordination	no,	so	you	can	do	five	years	of	activities,	but local people of the country will not be affected of the origin, the country of origin will not be affected the situation will not be changed that much, so what 
we	really	need	is	YES,	it’s	good	to	have	national	or	international	campaigns,	
and	 sometimes	 national	 campaigns	 in	 europe,	 european	 countries	 but	 it’s	also good to have some possibility to convert or to use the part of the project, data and everything for NATIONAL cause to national problem, we are trying to face, because there is SOMEthing to share the situation with international 
campaign	it	to	international	awareness	BUT	it’s	also	good	to	TACKLE	prob-
lems	to	find	solutions	to	the	national	problems	(F12,	P.64)In this quote, the different target levels of campaigns are compared. There are many campaigns for “international people”, which are targeted in order to share problems that occur at the national or local level. However, with these international campaigns, the shared problems at the local level are not solved. 
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This would be a different sort of campaign, according to the interviewee. The interviewee wishes to use the data they collect locally for European partners about e.g. environmental damages and their consequences, for primary local campaigns, too.A strong hint towards the relevance of practices instead of institutions in the implementation of rules and norms in transnational civil society networks is the way how people get involved in campaigning. Here, it can be observed that there are no clear rules of how to include whom in which phases of cam-
paigning.	It	is	rather	a	matter	of	perception	and	dynamic	decisions:I would guess about TWENTY of those people are really involved in cam-PAIGning and that mainly people that we call campaigners and some people who are program coordinators who are responsible for coordinating two or three camPAIGNS within a particular topic and most of that negotiation, most of that discussion and strategic planning happens at the level of campaigner 
or	occasionally	the	program	coordinator	would	be	involved	if	it’s	a	bit	more	strategic discussion or if there is maybe a bit more at STAKE where we feel 
that we maybe have a DIFFerent position from some allies then the pro-
gram coordinator might get involved or potentially the director to come 
in (F2, P.20)It can be learned from the quote above, which is similarly stated by many oth-
er	 interviewees	 too	 (e.g.	 F4,	 F1,	 F5),	 that	 rules	of	 inclusion	are	 inherent	 in	practices. They evolve dynamically and are probably rather based on experi-ence than on explicit rules. Furthermore, inclusion is also dependent on the engagement of those that would need to be included. As one interviewee from a Central-African country states, being included and being heard is a constant 
active	struggle	over	awareness:
I	think	MOST	of	the	time	our	role	is	to	bring	to	show	or	to	display	some	EV-
Idence	from	the	field,	so	we	have	to	give	the	INsight	the	regional	view	of	the	situation of people on the ground. WHAT really matters in our countries in 
the	fields	where	we	are	from,	what	we	need	or	what	we	would	LIKE	people	to	
do	in	europe,	for	example	in	order	to	help	changing	the	situation.	(F11,	P.57)In stark contrast to this organic evolution of cooperation, the formal gathering, 
such	as	 the	Euromeetings	 in	 the	CCC-network,	are	very	structured,	2–3 day	meetings where all representatives (one per country) meet in a European city and discuss urgent issues and longtime strategy. There are plenary sessions as well as working group meetings. Normally, the plenary sessions are prepared 
by	working	groups.	The	aim	of	all	discussions	is	to	most	efficiently	find	a	con-sensus in the end. One interviewee from an international partner organization articulated the impression of being in the way of a consensual decision be-cause they need to understand, clarify and discuss so many issues that it takes too much time. One interviewee even described participating in these meet-
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ings and coming to a shared understanding as “a painful experience” (C12, 
P.76).	Another	interviewee	has	the	complete	opposite	impression:
The	methods	are	very	trying	to	involve	participants	as	much	as	possible,	(…)	because sometimes we could be sixteen twenty people sitting around a table 
and	that	can	be	boring,	so	it’s	always	organized	with	the	WAYS	to	make	small	discussions on the way and to different ways to work and sometimes in-be-tween some games to make it more vivid, and that was positive too. (C11, 
P.54)The big strategic choices in the international general meetings of the FoE-net-
work	are	 taken	by	majority	vote:	 “officially	our	general	meetings	make	de-cision by majority rather than by consensus so you could in THEORY have a situation where one group or two groups or even ten groups have said NO 
to	the	strategic	plan”	(F2,	P.75).	However,	this	majority	voting	is	only	the	last	
step	after	discussion:	“it’s	not	the	voting	itself	which	makes	the	decision	but	the decision is more like based on the consensus EARLIER and then the voting is more formal just a formal manifestation because it has to be in line with the 
statute	and	so	on	so	on	but	it’s	rather	a	matter	of	discussion.”	(F3,	P.59).	Con-sensus is the desired outcome of deliberation (F5, P.36). Since organizations send representatives that have different degrees of knowledge, expertise and mandate about the discussed topics, decision-mak-ing at international or European general meetings is often seen as preliminary 
and	 it	must	be	possible	 to	 go	back	 to	 the	home	organization	before	 a	 final	
decision	at	the	next	general	meeting	is	taken	(F4,	P.32).	At	least	one	person	of	each member organization should be present when decisions are taken at the general meeting. This is not always the case, since some organizations do not have the capacities to attend every general meeting. This issue will be further explored in the section on representation practices. However, the position-ing towards a transparent and democratic decision-making procedure is very 
strong	and	positive:The process is mostly transparent, yes of course for the decision we have to 
take	or	to	get	at	democracy	in	friends	of	the	earth	is	very	broad,	(…)	they	in-vest we invest a lot in their on the democratic process of taking decision or to get at it, when we are talking about stuff to do together, it is a political decision so a political position or something that we have to proceed or the get at or to do, this is it happens without USUAlly without problem. it happens that some-
one	doesn’t	agree	on	a	political	position	with	another	country	or	with	another	political position and in THIS case in the network we have the opportunity to 
say	it	can’t	we	insist	on	our	position	and	we	don’t	(?)	your	position,	so	there	is	
a	lot	of	independence,	but	it	happens	not	so	often.	(F6,	P.38)The general information practice in the CCC-network has two sides. On the one hand, information spreads easily through the whole network, and net-
work	member	organizations	feel	that	they	receive	regular	updates	(C7,	C8).	On	
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the other hand, this less formalized way of distributing information through different actors and channels of communication cannot guarantee that infor-mation is really accessible by everyone in the network. As one interviewee states, due to this large amount of information, it can happen that actors are simply forgotten in the information distribution or receive the information 
with	a	certain	time	lag	(C1,	P.166–167).	This	can	be	the	case	when	network	
members	are	not	directly	 connected	 to	 central	 coordination	offices,	but	 re-
ceive	the	information	indirectly	through	other	network	members	(C	8,	P.8).	The information diffusion from wider parts of the network to the Europe-
an	core	of	the	network	seems	to	work	quite	well:WE came to i mean there are activists came to know about some labor rights violations and then workers were given capital punishments on the, were 
beaten,	trashing	and	everything	happening,	on	the	shop	floor,	which	we	can	–	we got to know and we raised it and we and we also shared it witch ccc, then and ccc wrote an article and a campaign criticizing [brand name] because 
they	were	there.	(C14,	P.40)
This	fast	information	flow	between	affected	groups	of	workers	in	South-East	Asia and the campaigners in Europe also contributes to the output of cam-paign work and provides the CCC-network with relevant information for ef-fective and target-oriented campaigns.Informal contacts and formal meetings established a functioning informa-
tion	practice	in	the	FoE-network	as	well:In my perception friends of earth is very transparent organization, like the 
decisions	are	with	open	voting	and	everything	is	visible,	they’re	sending	all	the reports all the conclusions TIME and circulating through the members so 
i	think	that	is	very	democratic	and	very	open	organization,	so	i’m	really	sat-
isfied	regarding	with	the	work,	and	the	way	of	choosing	all	the	members	and	
everything	else	which	is	connected	to	transparency	(F11,	P.77)Whereas many network members state that they appreciate the easy com-
munication	and	the	resulting	good	 information	 flow,	especially	 in	regard	 to	new events and cooperation, the decision-making processes are perceived as 
difficult	to	understand.	One	interview	person	put	it	in	a	nutshell:	“The	deci-
sion	making	process	is	often	very	mysterious”	(F1,	P.98).	The	reasons	for	this	evaluation of decision-making processes as very opaque and complex are ex-
plained	by	this	interviewee	as	follows:
Not	even	in	friends	of	the	earth	it	could	be	transparent	for	ME	but	i	just	don’t	
have	the	time	to	be	involved	in	all	those	decision	making	processes	only	if	it’s	really related to oil and mining my colleague or i will really be involved in the 
decision	making	process	(F1,	P.94)It can be observed, that the transparency of decision-making processes is tightly connected to representation practices. The dialogue between repre-
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sentatives, who go to meetings where decisions are taken, and the members of 
the	organization	that	stay	at	home,	influences	the	degree	of	information	shar-ing about decision-making process. Of course, as stated in the quote above, this information supply by representatives is an interaction between both 
parties:	representatives	and	represented.	If	the	represented	individuals,	such	as the interviewee quoted above, do not have time and capacities to follow up on decision-making procedures, then this results in the perception of a “mys-terious” process of decision-making. One interviewee also evaluates the decision-making procedure as usually 
not	that	top-down,	meaning	not	through	majority	voting	(F10,	P.85).	However,	
many	interviewees	criticize	that	it	is	sometimes	very	difficult	to	find	consen-sus on certain important issues. This debate is going on in the CCC-network as well. Many interviewees state that deliberation is time-consuming and gets on their nerves from time to time. The consensus-building process poses prob-lems. Decisions are postponed to next meetings, which is not conducive to 
campaigning	 effectively	 and	 cooperating	 efficiently.	 Similarly,	 FoE-network	
members	argue	that	long	processes	of	finding	consensus	disturb	the	efficien-cy of campaigns, when there is not the one voice, the one statement which FoE can promote. Many FoE-activists compare FoE to Greenpeace, which just has very powerful message because they do not have this inclusive internal de-liberation process. Especially across the continents, there are many disagree-
ments	that	cannot	be	solved	(F13,	P.49),	but	also	inside	Europe	it	is	difficult	
and	leads	to	unfortunate	and	uncomfortable	situations:
The	problem	then	is	that	we	don’t	have	a	EUROpean	position	which	is	some-times is a shame because it of course european union also gives huge funds to CCS projects and maybe even the groups that are NOT against CCS would op-
pose	putting	so	much	public	money	into	the	projects	but	then	it’s	difficult	to	
really	have	a	press	release	because	then	it’s	this	ongoing	discussion.	(F1,	P.84)Thus, the outside message of FoE is sometimes complicated by their internal deliberation practices. However, despite those downsides, network members are still convinced of these procedures. One very important argument for de-liberation is that decisions last much longer than if single individuals take de-cisions that the rest of the network does not want to live with.
Governing in a Decentralized Network
Decentralization	in	the	network	can	work	in	two	ways:	through	the	establish-ment of autonomy of national member organizations and even local organiza-tions within national member organizations, and through the consideration of local and national perspectives in transnational campaigning. The following 
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quote from a non-European activist shows how local perspectives differ from 
transnational	campaigning	goals	and	how	they	can	be	taken	into	account:We need to TALK to that research institute to understand well if there are some aspects we need to understand well, at that we can still have or bring more informations about some aspect that we THINK we need to display in the report. because sometime you can just contribute to international cam-
paign	without	taking	into	account	WHAT	the	people	are	LIVING	to	what’s	the	
local	situations	of	people,	WHAT	we	really	need	to	make	(…)	like	consent	of	local farmer, if for example the report is about water, it can be really great to know what the situation of water in the cotton commodity cultivations, BUT 
most	of	the	time	you	can	realize	that	on	the	fields	the	needs	of	people	is	above	water. so at that time we need to add that aspects of the discussion, so that the report can take it into account. and to display it in a general report. (F12, P.22)However, different interests or even different realities, as stated in the quote 
below,	 also	 produce	 difficulties	 in	 coordinating	 projects:	 “Maybe	 they	 have	
good	things	to	say	cause	i	 think	is	very	difficult	coordinate	all	 these	groups	
i	think	we	are	twelve	groups	twelve	or	i	don’t	know,	more	than	that,	and	we	
work	with	the	impacts	of	european	consumption	(…)	so	it’s	the	realities	are	very different and of course interest are very different” (F13, P.62–63).The practice of different forms of participation is suggested as a solution of the dilemma of diverging interests in a decentralized network. If network members can decide relatively autonomously in which way they want to par-
ticipate,	some	conflicts	would	be	resolved.There are different levels of campaigning that are decided during the when we write the projects and for instance for this project, the [project name] pro-
jects	there	are	in	Europe	six	or	seven	(…)	that	CAN	participate	and	there	is	and some decided at the beginning to participate with a broader approach so being more propositive, more active and some other does decided to par-ticipate in a in a more passive way which means that some group decided to participate and do also the dissemination of the campaign contents in the schools, some other not and decided only to participate to the campaign to disseminate reports that are produced by issue and couple of press release 
per	year	et	cetera	so.	 (…)	and	of	course	the	budget	 is	allocated	 in	different	
way.	budget	for	the	campaign	that	is	moved	from	let’s	say	from	the	BIG	budg-ets is moved a budget to one country that does few things less budgets more 
things	more	budget	(F	6,	P.54)Network member organizations are autonomous in their decisions about op-erative questions. The network structure is equated with a federal democratic 
system,	with	no	steep	hierarchies	and	long	chains	of	command	(F6,	P.58).	This	decentralized structure especially within the European network of FoE is seen as a real asset in the daily lobby work in Brussels. Local knowledge can be 
transferred	to	the	center	of	decision-making:
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When the brussels ngos are working with the brussels institutions they tend to exchange this very formalized brussels language which does not always 
reflect	what	are	the	problems	on	the	ground	in	the	countries	because	they	do	not have neither the commission european commission nor the ngos them-selves without these networks would have really the understanding of what are the problems on the ground so we are with the structure we are very ef-fective in transferring this knowledge very fast (F3, P.103)Network organizations in the CCC-network are in constant negotiation over the degree of local autonomy in a global network. Many interviewees state 
that	they	have	the	possibility	to	plan	and	conduct	specific	national	activities,	stand aside in decisions they do not agree with, or adapt campaigns to their national contexts (e.g. C9, C10, C3). The role of the International Secretari-at is seen by many as ambiguous. Some interviewees argue the International 
Secretariat	does	not	 influence	national	groups,	whereas	others	say	 that	 the	International Secretariat is of course the central coordination institution that 
exerts	its	influence	on	members.	This	tension	between	autonomy	and	central-
ization	is	also	reflected	in	outward	relations	and	the	network	identity:This is one of the KEY mechanisms of ccc, both in term of decision-making as 
in	terms	of	campaigning	and	it’s	this	DIFFerent	way	of	looking	at	in	terms	of	
decision-making	and	in	terms	of	campaigning	(…)	i’m	not	sure	if	it’s	a	balance,	
but	is	this	changing	or	shifting	from	tell	me	what	to	do,	don’t	tell	me	what	to	do. both in terms of when we are in the euromeeting, we take a decision and 
there	is	like	okay.	we	want	to	know	what	we	–	please	please	let’s	decide	so	we	
know	what	to	do.	tell	us	what	to	do	and	then	there’s	the	other	part	that	says	
DON’T	tell	me	what	to	do.	yeah?	because	i	will	decide	and	then	in	terms	of	
when	you	have	to	decide	on	what	are	demands	or	what’s	an	approach	towards	
companies,	okay.	tell	the	companies	what	to	do,	don’t	tell	the	companies	what	
it’s	not	our	role	to	tell	the	companies	what	they	should	do.	(C4,	P.106)
Even	on	the	 local	 level,	 it	 is	a	difficult	negotiation	process	about	 the	auton-omous space of action for local groups (C5, P.6). Therefore, the tensions be-tween autonomy and decentralization on the one hand and centralization and support from the International Secretariat on the other hand cannot easily be dissolved. However, the interview material suggests that these tensions are constantly and interactively dealt with through discussions. 
Leadership Practice
A	 rather	 unexpected	 finding	 from	 the	 interview	 analysis	 is	 the	 practice	 of	
taking	over	 leadership.	The	question	arose:	Which	network	actors	position	
themselves	as	leaders	in	which	practices?	At	first,	it	can	be	observed	that	there	are explicit norms and rules that identify certain persons or organizations as leaders. For example, if network actors apply for funding from the EU, it is 
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obligatory to name one leading organization. The (implicit) rule is that the 
active	and	often	bigger	members	will	“take	the	lead”.	The	justification	for	sin-
gle	leaderships	is	based	on	daily	experiences:	“my	experience	is	that	we	need	
somebody,	who	takes	the	final	decision,	because	first	time	is	always	running	and there are just so many ways on how to write an application for funding” 
(C9,	P.86,	author’s	own	translation).	This	quote	shows	that	decision-making	is	
interpreted	with	reference	to	functionality	and	efficiency	of	processes. Also, 
the	reference	to	the	implicit	rule	of	leadership	is	taken	as	a	justification	of	in-equalities in decision-making: “well in this project we are very small partners, very small but we are the small the smallest partner so we usually stick on the if there is a decision made between [organization a, organization b] and the 
International	Secretariat,	we	usually	stick	to	it.”	(C8,	P.27).	The	clear	emphasis	
on	the	small	size	of	the	organization	justifies	the	practice	of	not	including	this	organization in decision-making processes in one campaign although formally they are equal partners. On the other hand, some interviews reveal that there is not always agreement on who takes the leadership role. As two partners in one campaign claim to be the only leaders in the campaign, it seems that there is no absolute consensus about who is the leader (C1, C9). The performance of 
these	“leading	practices”	is	also	evaluated	by	others	in	the	group:	“because	it’s	different in various projects, in THIS project we have leading partner from [or-ganization] and [person] is very like capable of really sticking to agenda and sticking to a time plan and so this is a good thing that the discussion remains 
constructive	in	a	way”(C8,	P.16).	The	explanation	for	the	good	quality	of	lead-
ership	is	explained	by	the	individual	personality	of	the	leader:	“i	mean	this	is	i	guess really like in the individuality of the leader, and also were of course the individual the personality of the coordination, here the coordinator here, for example my coordination and cooperation with other (organization) leader 
is	really	good	and	i’m	really	glad”	[C9,	P.47).	Being	the	leading	organization	means also taking responsibilities within certain practices. The leading part-
ner	prepares	the	deliberation,	moderates	and	stimulates	the	discussion	(C8,	P.19). Thus, leadership practices are on the one hand evaluated as conducive for constructive, structured participation. On the other hand, the legitimation of leadership reproduces inequalities, for example based on the size of organ-izations.
Identifying Problems and Setting Agendas 
The	identification	of	problems	is	the	first	step	of	a	campaign,	followed	by	an	
agenda	setting	practice.	The	overarching	goals	of	the	CCC	have	been	defined	through a broad, long-term consensual process. Core members of the CCC-net-work refer to this extensive deliberation about their own code of conduct as 
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an initiating ritual, which is fundamental for the collective identity of the cam-paign network (e.g. C1, C10). 
In	contrast,	the	definition	of	concrete	campaign	goals	is	often	an	ad-hoc	
process:	 “you have some brainstorm and then one says okay i will make a 
proposal”	 (C4,	 P.92).	 Those	 brainstorming	 meetings	 take	 place	 in	 national	groups as well as at European meetings (C1, C9). Many ideas or frames for campaigns are taken from the urgent appeal cases, which are perceived as mini-campaigns. Some of the urgent appeals that are evaluated as relevant 
are	broadened	and	perpetuated.	Consequently,	the	definition	of	new	agendas	
often	takes	place	in	reaction	to	concrete	events,	such	as	workers	getting	fired	or people getting killed in factories. Most often, interviewees say that things come up somewhere in the network and then go viral in the network until a critical mass is reached and a campaign starts (C10, P.31/C5, P.16). Thus, the 
identification	of	problems	is	practiced	in	very	diverse	ways.	Furthermore,	the	practices of problem formulation are interconnected, interchanging between brainstorming sessions, authoritative decisions and rewriting of proposals. 
After	problems	are	identified	and	ideas	are	formulated,	the	preliminary	fram-ing of such campaigns is often done in national platforms or working groups of the international network. Those preliminary proposals are then included in the agenda of the Euromeetings. However, much of the agenda setting is steered by the International Secretariat, which initiates new campaigns and 
suggests	plans	for	further	action.	This	can	be	very	well	exemplified	by	a	typi-cal agenda setting discussion at one Euromeeting, as described by one of the 
interviewees:
Well	it	used	to	be	sort	of	like	an	empty	flip	chart	and	then	people	start	calling	out things but sometimes that took a bit much time so basically the way i do it now i KNOW some topics that we have just discussed that will need an either 
an	update	or	a	 longer	discussion	so	they	are	pretty	clear	right?	so	 i	sort	of	
make	ah	a	suggestion	i	write	on	the	flip	chart	a	few	of	the	topics	that	i	think	
will	probably	people	will	want	to	discuss	but	you,	people	don’t	always	agree	
with	me	so	then	we	start	sort	of	almost	like	negotiating	(…)	then	we	just	sort	
of	see	where	most	people	think	it’s	most	useful	to	discuss.	but	you	know	it’s	
that’s	a	way	a	bit	EASier	because	it’s	yeah	some	of	the	topics	it’s	pretty	CLEAR	that you know need to be on the agenda but there is often one or two that you know that COULD be interchanged by something else or sometimes that i 
would	say	ah	it’s	fine	have	an	update,	people	say	no	no	no	we	really	think	we	should discuss it longer or vice versa (C10, P.19)The quotation above is also interesting insofar as it describes a development of a very open agenda setting. The interviewee states that “it used to be an 
empty	flip	chart”.	Everyone	could	contribute	to	the	practice	of	finding	topics	that need to be added to the agenda. However, over time, this practice seemed to become too time-consuming, and the International Secretariat learned 
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about the crucial topics in the network. As a result, the agenda setting prac-tice became more goal-oriented, driven by the majority and less open. Still, 
according	to	the	interviewee,	it	is	possible	to	exchange	and	emphasize	specific	
topics.	In	sum,	it	can	be	observed	that	problems	are	identified	in	the	network	through different channels of information. After that, the agenda setting prac-tices are rather centrally coordinated. Deliberation procedures are often extensively planned in the CCC-net-work, especially the preparation of deliberation practices at meetings is very thorough. A typical preparation practice of international meetings goes on as 
follows:Basically the way it works is that the local national coalition will do a lot of the preparation on the ground. regarding the venue, accommodation, getting 
a	note	 taker	 there	 you	 know	 those	 kinds	 of	 logistics	 (…)	 it’s	 the	 european	
coordinator	at	 the	 international	secretariat(…)who	then	prepares	more	the	
content	side	and	(…)	the	content	side	 is	basically	after	you	know	we	we’ve	set the different items of the agenda previously but to sort of then determine the ORder which day will be discussing which item and in what order trying to make the agenda kind of not too intensive and you know interesting for different people and stuff. and so then the draft agenda is made and then the euro coordinator contacts the different working groups about their input doc-
uments	that	they	will	prepare	and	also	(…)	will	discuss	with	the	facilitator	of	
the	meeting	about	different	sessions.	(C10,	P.8)
The	central	coordination	office	prepares	the	deliberation	procedure	with	re-gard to the order of topics, the intensity and length of discussions, and the role of the moderator. The central coordinator takes into consideration the diversity of participants and receives input documents from different working groups. This suggests a structured central preparation process with different opportunities to open up the preparation to the input of participants.
Deliberations	on	Skype	are	also	extensively	planned:
Normally	a	skype	meeting	is	PLANNED,	so	first	is	an	email	contact	about	we	have a meeting at this and this TIME, the agenda will be and the- we have a list we have a list for eurocoordinators, so they distribute a lot of joined emails and on this email list that there will be a skype meeting and this is this time, 
sometimes	it’s	coordinated	who	will	be	able	to	when.	we	use	some	of	the	tools	
for	to	finding	to	find	a	time	where	most	of	the	interested	people	can	join	so	
it’s	decided	when	to	have	a	meeting,	who	is	responsible	for	calling	the	others	and quite often it is also distributed an agenda on the email before you start 
the	meeting	and	 then	 the	person	who’s	responsible	 for	 the	meeting	calling	the others, also is responsible for the agenda and leading the discussion. and 
quite	often	one	of	the	participant	is	appointing	(…)	a	short	note	of	the	meeting	
and	that	is	also	distributed	afterwards	on	email,	so	that’s	the	way	it	normally	works. (C11, P.30)
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Skype meetings often include fewer participants, which makes it possible to expand the preparation practice even more. The quote above seems to suggest that almost all preparatory questions are decided collectively. However, it is not really clear who is involved in the decision-making since the interviewee articulates these phrases in passive constructions. Overall, preparing deliberation is mainly a practice of setting a suitable 
agenda	that	fits	with	the	interests	and	expectations	of	the	participants	and	to	gather input from different angles about the contents of discussion. Therefore, a lot of material is gathered beforehand in order to prepare participants for the deliberation practice. Some interviewees even note that the preparation is very, almost too extensively planned. There is much to read beforehand (C12, 
P.24),	and	the	focus	of	the	planners	is	very	much	on	efficiency	of	the	debate	
and	much	less	on	deeper	discussions	(C3,	P.98–99).Prior to deliberation practices, which are mainly conducted either at net-work meetings or at campaign meetings and telephone conferences, agendas and preparative information is circulated by the organizers of the meetings. These practices are strongly dependent on the responsible person or organi-
zation.	The	timing	of	preparation	is	specifically	diverse:I would say at the european level usually it comes much BEFORE than at the 
international	level,	it’s	a	bit	a	question	of	culture,	but	even	it	comes	late	if	you	compare to swiss or i think german standard, so some people sometimes they 
it’s	impossible.	so	i	have	to	deal	with	all	these	differences	you	know,	but	that	
the	international	level	it	comes	sometimes	a	bit	late,	at	european	i	think	it’s	quite okay, we get all the documents we can we can work out if we wish if we 
are	willing	for”	(F5,	P.70)Similarly as in the CCC network, the problems and ideas for campaigns in the FoE-network come to the network from different members of even partners 
of	the	network.	This	open	process	is	made	possible	by	the	specific	network	structure, which connects organizations so that they are just one e-mail away 
from	each	other:We were involved and come there, so from the beginning. but this is because actually in a friends of the earth we are a NETwork, everytime it a group 
wants	to	apply	or	at	european	level	on	a	specific	budget	for	a	project	and	usu-
ally	 these	projects	says	that	you	have	to	 involve	at	 least	 three	 four	 five	(…)	different groups in different countries, we as a network are quite facilitated 
in doing this because we are a network and it’s simply an e-mail in the in 
the network e-mail address to say HEY we are preparing this who want 
to join?	and	who	want	to	join,	says	okay	i’m	interested	let’s	talk	about	and	the	
process	start	this	way.	(F6,	P.34)
This	identification	of	problems	and	brainstorming	of	ideas	seems	very	com-
mon	 in	 the	 FoE-organizations	 (F4,	 F6,	 F10).	 Besides	 e-mail	 requests,	 cam-paigns are often initiated through informal personal contacts within the 
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network	(F6,	P.34).	This	process	 is	a	step-by-step	project	within	a	group	of	organizers. Finally, the ideas that everyone can agree to are implemented 
(F10,	P.67).	After	finding	an	idea	and	possible	campaign	partners,	the	process	gets more centralized in that the campaign idea is subsumed under one of the programs of FoE Europe and a steering group is formed, which functions as a leading committee of the campaign. This very initiation of a campaign is 
centrally	steered	by	the	Brussels	office	(F6,	P.14)	due	to	better	facilities	and	in-
frastructure	in	the	Brussels	office.	Furthermore,	the	elected	board	is	in	charge	
of	the	general	agenda	setting	(F4,	P.60).	However,	the	questions	in	the	agenda	such as when to launch the project, how to approach issues or how to commu-nicate to the public are discussed afterwards with the whole project groups. Thus, the process of agenda setting is opened again after an initial phase of 
formulating	the	campaign	and	setting	the	preliminary	agenda	(F6,	P.22–24).	
Structuring the Deliberation Process Core members of the network are very concerned about the rules of proce-dures and the “real” implementation of those rules in practice (C1, C10, C9). This is a very important point that is often made because democratic stand-ards of equal participation and consensus are highly valued (C1, C11, C10). However, the time-consuming exercise of deliberation is not always seen as 
positive,	also	among	the	core	members	in	Western	Europe	(C11,	C1,	C4).	One	interviewee from a smaller Western European organization shares the im-
pression	that	there	is	an	interest	in	the	network	to	avoid	conflicts	and	arrive	
at	a	consensus	as	early	as	possible:	“it’s	also	a	way	of	pushing	for	or	for	stop-ping discussions you do not want to have because you think it would be too 
tricky	 too	difficult	 […]	 i	 think	 sometimes	 it’s	 an	easy	way	 to	not	 enter	 into	lot of disagreements also” (C3, P.55). From the perspective of a newcomer to the network, the formal structure of the network meetings prohibits further discussion that would be helpful for individuals who are not yet that familiar 
with	the	structure	and	topics	of	the	meetings:	The euromeetings are very structured, there is certain method of facilitation, 
there	is	usually	the	way	of	discussing	things,	it’s	the	network	works	for	very	
long	time	so	some	things	are	you	know	established.	(…)	for	us	everything	was	
new,	not	only	the	way	the	euromeeting	is	organized,	but	also	the	topics	(…)
maybe	it’s	enough	discussion	for	people	who	are	working	on	this	because	you	know the platforms are different. and but there are people who are working on this topic for twenty years so sometimes they do not need to discuss things from the beginning and i understand this because it would be you know a waste of time, but you know when you are just dropped there as a new person sometimes you would MAYBE need more explanation, but there is no space 
for	it	because	the	agenda	has	to	be	you	know	followed.	(C7,	P.12–21)
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This	interviewee	described	this	situation	as	a	dilemma.	The	person’s	organ-
ization	 is	new	 to	 the	network	and	has	difficulties	 to	 adapt.	 Comprehensive	discussions and explanations would help to understand and make participa-
tion	easier.	However,	there	is	also	the	necessity	of	proceeding	efficiently.	The	
first	 quoted	 interviewee	 from	 a	 long-time	member	 organization	 identified	
conflicts	and	disagreements	with	regard	to	specific	topics	in	the	network	that	are not solved in structured discussions. Similarly, the younger network mem-ber would welcome such discussions that could facilitate an easier adaptation, which in turn would increase their ability to participate in discussions.Although formal procedures are important, there should be room for dis-
cussing	informally	about	important	matters.	Thus,	efficiency	and	deep	delib-eration are hard to combine in one practice. What this person thus suggests, is a combination of structured deliberation practices and informal deep dis-cussions. 
I	think	in	one	way	what	is	really	efficient	in	the	network	is	the	organization	
with	schedules	timelines	moderators	note-takers,	i	mean	it’s	a	guarantee	of	
efficiency	but	 i	 think	 it’s	not	enough	you	sometimes	you	need	to	 forget	the	schedule because some points have to be discussed as priorities so i think 
efficiency	cannot	be	a	goal	as	such	we	do	not	we	just	do	not	we	do	not	just	
NEED	to	be	efficient	as	such	and	sometimes	yes	our	obsession	for	schedule	
consensus	really	prevents	us	from	being	maybe	MORE	efficient	if	we	take	the	time to discuss very DEEP questions (C3, P.99)It can be observed that the different network members share the understand-
ing	that	deliberation	practices	are	very	important	and	are	not	too	inefficient	to	further proceed with them. Some actors in the network would even argue for more frequent, deeper and even more informal deliberation practices.In this situation, we can see the different positionings towards deliber-ation practices in the network. While a certain degree of inequality in delib-eration is accepted somehow by both sides (core members and peripheral members), tension arises when concrete and closer cooperation develops. As seen in the last quote, the concrete practice of understanding, learning and 
strategizing	at	common	meetings	remains	a	difficult	experience	for	both	sides.	This tension is not only a tension between different cultures of cooperation, 
but	it	also	reveals	the	basic	dilemma	between	efficiency	and	“deep”	delibera-tion, which might be even more dramatic in a transnational network. As it is pointed out by some network members in the FoE-network, fa-cilitation is only used, when there are really important strategic decisions to be taken, or when there is a long input and brainstorming session about the start of new campaigns or kick-offs of certain developments (F2, F6). There are efforts to increase the rate of facilitation by training the staff in the Brus-
sels	office	in	facilitation	and	moderation,	but	since	there	are	no	rules,	when	to	apply facilitation, it is not clear, when facilitation really takes place in meet-
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ings:	 “we	would	HOPE	 that	people	are	equalizing	participation	 in	meetings	
which	they	are	facilitating,	but	we	can’t	you	can’t	really	enforce	it”	(F2,	P.47).	Thus, the facilitation of meetings by FoE-staff is desired but not enforced, and usually conducted in meetings where people do not know each other or when 
difficult	decisions	are	to	be	made	(F2,	P.47–49).	External	facilitators	come	in	only at the European level in order to have someone without interests in spe-
cific	campaigns	(F2,	P.51).	“during	the	meeting	we	have	a	moderator	usually	it is a person of friends of the earth, sometimes in the network are we when we meet at friends of the earth europe level to discuss network and programs 
for	the	networking	strategies	then	he’s	also	an	external	moderator”(F6,	P.44).	However, engaging an external facilitator is a matter of costs and sometimes 
this	function	is	taken	over	by	leading	staff	in	the	Brussels	office	(F2,	P.51).	It is already mentioned, that the purpose of facilitation is to “equalize par-ticipation in meetings”. This is done also through a large variety of facilitation 
methods:
VArying	 between	 having	 plenaries	 and	 if	 you	 are	 having	 plenaries	making	sure that everyone can really participate, using small group discussion, hav-ing some time for informal discussion or for example PAIR discussion making really CLEAR what the obJECTives of the meeting should be so that the people 
can	prepare	in	advance	[…]i	think	that	is	kind	of	cru-	some	crucial	skills	if	you	are really gonna engage in network and not just bring thirty people together to kind of nod and listen to some two or three experts standing on a panel speaking cause you might as well just send them the notes of the meeting afterwards. (F2, P.60)In this quote the necessity to facilitate and structure deliberation meaningful-ly is made very clear. However, there is also the other side of the coin. Those methodologies are also used to push deliberation process into certain direc-
tions	and	outputs:I think we have some really skilled facilitators within our network and within 
the	groups	 that	 i’m	working	with	and	 i	also	know	that	we	have	some	peo-ple who are very able to manipulate is probably too strong a word but kind of SHAPE the outcome of discussions because of the methodologies they are 
using	because	of	the	way	the	meeting	has	been	set	up,	and	i	think	that’s	you	
know	that’s	not	ALways	illegitimate	way	of	running	of	doing	things,	because	as long as everyone AWARE of these sort of different methodologies then you 
know	you	are	not	abusing	someones	trust	(F2,	P.66–67)
This	is	certainly	a	difficult	practice,	where	much	depends	on	the	facilitator.	As	
the	network	coordinator	points	out,	there	are	shades	of	grey:	some	facilita-tors are just not that open to disagreement and diverging opinions, whereas others (as mentioned in the quote above) are clearly and consciously leading discussions into certain directions (ibid.). Although we would commonly as-sume that the facilitation of deliberation is an asset because it structures the 
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deliberation, opens up discussions and balances the consideration of argu-ments, we can see in this case, that facilitation is not always the same matter. If and when facilitation is taking place seems to depend very much on the persons involved in organizing deliberation meetings and even if deliberation takes place, it is a matter of personality and interests of the facilitator, how the facilitation is conducted.
Speaking and TranslatingThe aspect of language in deliberation practices is very crucial in a transna-tional network. The interviewees in the network articulate their positions to-wards deliberation that show how important language skills are for an equal balance of arguments as well as the self-evaluation of effective participation in deliberation practices. It begins with the access to information prepared 
for	deliberation:	some	policy	papers	are	only	available	in	English.	If	people	in	the national network want to discuss them, they must read them in English 
(which	can	be	difficult	for	many	people)	or	they	must	be	translated,	which	is	an extra effort in terms of time and costs for the organization. Also, informa-tion brochures or policy papers that are written in other languages than Eng-lish cannot be read by members of other national platforms. This also limits the informational basis before deliberation. While some non-native speakers 
feel	confident	using	the	English	language	in	meetings	and	for	general	commu-
nication	(C4,	C14,),	others	are	describing	difficulties	in	practicing	deliberation	
because	of	 their	 lack	of	English	proficiency.	One	network	member	explains	
this	as	follows:	“When	you	need	to	explain	complex	things	(…)	it’s	very	diffi-
cult	to	use	i	mean	more	simple	and	maybe	more	generic	words.	(…)	so	you	feel	
that	your	idea	is	never	translated	in	a	very	accurate	way”	(C3,	P.43).	When	de-liberation starts, some interviewees have had the impression that they cannot push their arguments convincingly because they lack the self-esteem or capa-bilities to discuss them in a way that they would discuss them in their native 
language.	Furthermore,	it	is	difficult	for	some	actors	to	follow	native	speakers.	It is a very frustrating situation when members cannot express their ideas very well. This problem is also recognized by the International Secretariat. One coordinator points out that meetings would of course have a different dy-namic if all participants could speak in their mother tongue (C2). In addition, the fact that every meeting is in English limits the group of people who can participate at all. Some organizations must send the same person to each and every meeting because there is only this one person in the organization who 
speaks	English.	The	experience	of	having	difficulties	to	“make	my	point”	is	also	relevant for skilled English speakers who are confronted with native speak-ers. Thus, translation is crucial, but hinders again the deliberation process as 
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such (C2, P.60–62). One person from the Asian region stresses the importance of translators. Without translators, international cooperation does not make 
sense	according	to	this	interviewee	(C12,	P.45).	However,	deliberation	practic-
es	are	modified	due	to	the	need	of	translators.	These	translators	disrupt	the	deliberation process and impose breaks in the deliberation. Also, the direct contact with the campaigners from different countries is hindered by trans-
lations.	Deliberation	without	translation	is	difficult,	too.	One	interviewee	in-terprets this unfortunate situation as being an instrument to shut discussions down, namely using the English language as a tool to exert authority where there is no legitimate authority ascribed (C3). In conclusion, those inequali-
ties	in	the	level	of	language	proficiency	also	influence	the	outcome	of	delib-
erations	because	different	degrees	of	English	proficiency	limit	the	ways	how	
arguments	can	be	formulated	and	even	limit	the	arguments	made	as	such:	
When	you	don’t	have	the	same	LEVEL	of	language	(…)	you	can’t	PUSH	for	your	ideas or for what you want with the same strength that someone who speaks 
VEry	good	english	or	so.	it	can	be	(…)	you	are	a	bit	reluctant	to	speaking	out	loud and in front of everybody because your english is not so well so either you do not really speak enough you do not tell what you would need to tell or you are misunderstood or you do not know how EXACTLY to yeah express the ideas, so it has to my opinion an impact on the results of the discussion. 
(C3,	P.45–46)In this quote, the practice of deliberation is interpreted as a practice where power through skills plays a very dominant role. Language also becomes a distinguishing dimension when transnational campaigns consist in parts of national organizations that share the same or a similar language. These mem-bers of national organizations usually speak with each other in their mother tongue. However, as in one case, this has led to an at least temporary exclu-sion of members of other organizations who do not understand the language. These tendencies can also be caused by other circumstances, but it seems that 
language	is	often	a	catalyst	for	already	existing	inequalities	(C1,	C8,	C9).	An-other crucial point concerning the impact of language is the remark of one interviewee who states that it is not only the English language that poses problems, but the technical jargon. For this person, it was hard to understand all internal abbreviations used during discussions, especially in the begin-ning. The technical jargon that is used in many meetings of course increases 
efficiency,	but	again	presents	an	obstacle	for	newer	and	more	passive	partic-ipants in deliberation, especially in combination with the use of English as a 
foreign	language	(C7,	P.41).
In	the	European	FoE-network,	English	is	the	official	language.	The	posi-tions towards the policy of speaking English in all the meetings varies from 
extreme	difficulties	 in	 even	understanding	what	 is	 spoken,	 to	holding	back	
opinions	 because	 of	 difficulties	 speaking	 English	 to	 the	 absolute	 irrelevan-
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cy of language skills in deliberation processes and the highlighting of other differences, like class, age, experience, that matter much more than language 
proficiency	(F8,	F4,	F2).	I	want	to	compare	those	three	positions	below.	The	
first	quote	exemplifies	the	position	of	a	non-native	speaker,	who,	at	least	in	the	beginning of the network membership, “could not understand anything”. The person makes an even broader claim in generalizing this experience to “the rest of Europe”, who has this impression as well, and also formulates the con-
sequences	of	this	impression:	namely	that	people	do	not	dare	to	speak	Eng-lish. Taking this seriously, we must assume that communication in meetings is hardly possible. We can see parallels to the CCC network, where one person 
expressed	similar	difficulties	in	participating	successfully	in	English	deliber-
ation	processes:	“In	my	first	meetings	ten	years	ago,	sometimes	 i	could	not	understand anything. well this is i mean i suppose all the rest of europe, ex-cept english people have this impression, so well in the north you speak much 
better	but,	it’s	a	problem	also	because	you	know	you	do	not	dare	to	speak	SO	
MUCH	than	native	English”	(F8,	P.103).A more moderate position comes from a person, who acknowledges that 
a	lack	of	English	proficiency	can	be	a	problem	for	the	participation	of	some	people. The person even admits that people are naturally excluded from delib-eration. This applies to people, who do not speak English. However, persons, who have basic English skills can somehow learn to deliberate in English and learn to not be shy of speaking in front of others because other persons speak the same basic English. The most positive evaluation of language and deliberation comes from a person with a central coordinating position in the network, whose native lan-guage is English. This person does not necessarily see a link between language skills and participation in deliberation processes. It is rather assumed that people do not express their opinions out of other reasons like being less ex-
perienced	than	others,	being	shy	in	general	or	coming	from	a	specific	political	culture. Also gender, age and class, the typical categories of intersectionality 
are	named	in	order	to	explain	difference	in	speaking	out	loud:
I	mean	some	people,	 i	mean	to	put	it	really	bluntly	it’s	not	because	you	are the best english speaker or a native english speaker that you have a big 
mouth	(…)	i	 think	there	are	also	native	english	speakers	who	are	not	confi-
dent	about	speaking	in	groups	(…)	we	certainly	do	have	some	native	english	speakers who like speaking and have a lot to say in meetings but i think that`s 
not	necessarily	because	 they	are	native	english	speakers,	 (…)that	can	be	 to	do with GENder that can just be to do with all sorts of LIFE experience or to do with HOW OFTen you have to speak in meetings and that you develop that 
confidence	or	it	can	be	to	do	with	CLASS	or	it	can	be	to	do	with	AGE	quite	often	in some meetings so i think those are all cutting across also having language issues and DIFFerent cultural traditions of DEference and resPECT and will-
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ingness to challenge authority and all these other things which are also not purely kind of NATionally determined but i think to certain extant come from having a background in former communist country or having a background in northern european kind of scandinavian democracy where i think people 
seem	to	be	more	willing	to	speak	so	i	think	that’s	you	know	i	think	that’s	many	
different	sorts	of	ISSUES	cutting	across	that,	as	well	as	just	the	personality,	it’s	
kind	of	a	very	personal	thing”(F2,	P.45)However, the interviewee still admits that language might be a problem in the selection of persons for the participation in deliberation. Those people that come to the meetings mostly have a quite good command of English, where-as the real problem arises earlier. The people who do not speak English that well do not even come to the meetings. This exclusion process could be also observed in the CCC network. The implications are that there is no balanced participation of people within one organization in the network meetings and the selection of participants is done on the grounds of already established ca-pacities (here language skills) instead of equal share or knowledge. In sum, it can be seen that language plays a more or less important role, depending on the position of the speaker. Persons at the center of the network and/or with excellent language skills see the relation between language and deliberation very positive, whereas persons who position themselves at the margins of the 
network	have	sometimes	a	very	negative	outlook	on	the	influence	of	language	skills on deliberation.
Deliberating OnlineOnline telephone/video conferences are a very useful communication tool within both networks because they allow campaigners to have meetings with-out needing to travel. Network members say that they only recently began to use Skype for video conferences. Since Skype meetings are often not that large in terms of the participating persons, they are often a little less pre-structured. 
The	context	of	having	a	Skype	meeting	evokes	certain,	very	specific	delibera-tion practices that are adapted in the light of the conditions of online meet-ings. Online meetings change the way people interact and talk to each other. Although Skype meetings are similarly structured as face-to-face meetings, i.e. there is an agenda that is sent out beforehand, and there is also more often a moderator, there are certain limits of practicing deliberation on Skype. At 
first,	it	is	not	possible	(and	this	is	confirmed	by	many	interviewees)	to	discuss	with more than a handful of people on Skype. The methodology that is used in face-to-face meetings to initiate or reinforce more and broader participa-
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tion cannot easily be adapted on Skype68. Technical problems, especially in countries with slower internet connections, make the deliberation as such dif-
ficult.	Thus,	there	are	some	factors	that	limit	the	possibilities	of	deliberation	on Skype and consequently disturb the equality of voices in particular. If par-ticipants cannot really follow the discussion because their internet connection breaks down frequently or if there is no chance to make deliberation more accessible through different moderation methods, the consideration of argu-ments in deliberation is severely obstructed. This is not that much a problem in the European network, but when we look beyond the narrow borders of the 
European	network,	we	see	many	difficulties	with	that.	Internet	is	of	course	not	that naturally available in other continents of the “South” than it is in Europe. 
In	africa	internet	is	not	good,	the	bandwidth	of	internet	is	not	good	(…).	so	
most	of	the	time	it	will	be	difficult	to	have	a	voice	call	you	will	just	type	it	and	
then	you	wait	for	the	reply	and	you	type	another	time,	(…)	it’s	not	really	usual	to have internet with voice with discussions like we are DOing with because in [home country]i have a café cyber café, where i can have such discussions live 
voice	and	message	you	can	type	the	message	i	can	have	VOICE	and	discussion,	
but	IN	the	office	it’s	not	usual	it’s	not	common	to	have	people	on	skype	with	
voice,	it’s	not	usual.	and	in	togo,	the	situation	is	WORSE	there.	so	most	of	the	time they can just call them through the telephones and they can to through telephone easy, just to have an information, yeah they can try to call them like that but most of the time for MEETing for discussions for long discussions, we 
use	skype,	conference	calls.	(F12,	P.49)This representative of an African network member of FoE clearly points out 
how	difficult	it	is	to	have	those	skype	meetings,	which	became	the	main	way	to	communicate in the network. In order to handle the situation, adaption prac-tices are conducted. Since the internet is too slow for voice call, they type in their messages in Skype while others are talking on Skype at the same time. Thus, these actors with slow internet connection participate in deliberations through written texts, while the rest of the group is talking at the same time. This of course obstructs them from hearing what is said during discussion. While they could talk on the phone, phone calls seem to be rather used for giving information, while discussions take place on Skype. This is of course a disadvantage for organizations with slow internet and even their coping prac-tices do only mildly solve the problem. However, this practice of deliberation as a mixture of writing messages and talking is clearly a unique one, and inter-esting to further evaluate. A similar experience is described by an interviewee from Latin America, who concludes that it was impossible for them to commu-nicate with Skype. This campaign group, which consists of many organizations in Asian, Latin American, African and European countries took the decision to 
68 Working with cards, using visual media etc. 
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communicate	via	e-mail	instead	of	Skype	(F13,	P.70),	which	might	impede	the	coordination process in the campaign as such, but at the same time does not produce inequalities between campaigners in different countries.Besides this tendency towards exclusion, the limits of communicating in a wholesome way are also interfering with a smooth deliberation. Deci-sion-making during deliberation on Skype is only possible if you have met once in person (C11). The interviewee, who mentioned this, argued that regular 
decision-making	ends	with	non-verbal	signs	of	agreement	or	disagreement: 
“When	you’re	with	a	group	of	colleagues	and	you	have	to	make	a	decision,	you	always look around of people faces whether they oppose or whether they con-sent what is going on and you can see much more than they actually express” (C11, P.25). Since on Skype the deliberation participants cannot see each other this non-verbal communication is not possible. Consequently, Skype delibera-tion is very time-consuming if everybody expresses their opinions verbally or involved persons must already assume how this or that person might decide because they already know each other. 
The	identified	difference	between	Skype	and	face-to-face	meetings	makes	
also	clear	how	the	increasing	role	of	Skype	meetings	influences	styles,	struc-turation and outcomes of deliberation. There are different reasons, why delib-eration on Skype is perceived as something different. One argumentation is based on cultural characteristics and a sort of long-practiced habit of person-
al	meetings,	which	makes	it	difficult	to	adapt	to	those	technology	supported	meetings. Later on the interviewee who expressed this cultural characteristic, also raised the issue, that due to a language barrier, people have much more opportunities (probably non-verbal) to express themselves in face-to-face contacts than during a Skype call. Thus, using Skype calls reinforces the lan-guage problem, which was already outlined above.
There	is	a	difference.	(…)	when	you	have	a	skype	meeting(…)	it’s	sometime	
it’s	not	easy	to	express	exactly	what	you	have	to	let	people	know	about	but	
physically	 is	more	as	africans	 is	 i	do	not	know	but	 it’s	really	GOOD	to	have	people physically, to talk to people to meet people we are used to that and we 
really	like	that.	as	african	i	think	is	like	a	CULTURAL	so	it’s,	but	coming	back	to the contents IF we have a topic to discuss, normally we can discuss, it even through skype maybe, we do not have problems to share or discuss our view so that but we prefer to have a physical meeting physical contacts with people 
(F12,	P.38)	A similar alienation from Skype calls is expressed by a Central-Eastern Eu-ropean interviewee. While the reference to the African culture in the quote above is an expression of cultural identities, the positioning towards Skype calls in the following quote is taking place on the level of working routines. The major disadvantage is not the limited opportunities to communicate, but 
the	not	very	efficient	and	focused	way	of	communication.	
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We	also	have	skype	talks	which	is	(…)	i	think	this	is	major	feature	of	our	work,	
and	personally	 i	 find	it	a	bit	even	you	know	it’s	a	bit	even	exaggerated,	 the	amount of time that we spend on this discussions because they tend to be quite slow especially if you have a group of people and then people might not be always focused on the call if you are just sitting on your earphones for one 
and	half	an	hour,	so	but	this	is	definitely,	THIS	was	for	me	new	when	i	came	to	[own organization] and i do not think that many organizations work like this 
to	this	extent	but	i	have	some	colleagues	in	the	office	who	were	even	more	involved in this international activities and they really spend a lot of time on 
skype.	so	i	think	that	this	is	very	characteristic	feature.	(F3,	P.14)
The	 contrary	 position,	 namely	 that	 Skype	 conferences	 are	 a	 very	 efficient	
communication	 tool,	 can	be	 found	 in	 the	network	as	well	 (F4,	P.74).	 In	 this	
person’s	argumentation,	 the	reasons	for	the	efficiency	of	Skype	calls	can	be	
found	in	one	of	the	advantages	of	it:	there	is	no	space	for	chatting	over	coffee	and possibly coming to new (and unintended) ideas or projects in the coffee breaks. However, even Skype conferences are getting unproductive at a num-ber of around 15 people (ibid.). Another interviewee from an Italian NGOs 
underlines	the	limitation	of	communication	and	the	inefficiency	of	Skype	calls,	
what	is	described	here	as	pure	“chaos“: „Chaos	because	conference	call	with	
five	six	people	on	phone	you	know	each	other	by	person	but	on	phone	you	do	not know you do not see the gesture of the people so you do not, some-some-
one	 is	 speaking	maybe	he’s	 speaking	 too	 long,	 you	want	 to	 say	 SOMEthing	
then	it’s	right	to	interrupt	but	then	the	communication	is	slightly	postponed	
(…)	but	in	the	very	end	it	works”	(F6,	P.30).In sum, we can see many disadvantages that Skype deliberation brings for deliberation. Skype of course eases deliberation in that it does not neces-sitate travel costs and travel time to meetings. Everyone can install it on their computers. But this is only a conditional advantage when we look at the posi-tions of the interviewees above. Especially those organizations that are at the 
periphery	of	the	network	have	difficulties	in	participating	in	Skype	meetings.
Talking About PoliticsIn the FoE-network, there seems to be a particular European deliberation style, which is very strategic, goal-oriented and straight-forward. A Southern American activist describes that there are sometimes adoption problems and 
even	a	lack	of	understanding,	why	European	don’t	talk	politically:
It’s	very	good	meetings	you	know	they	are	very	productive,	they	do	a	lot	of	
things	in	a	short	time,	but	still	 it’s	very	different	from	our	meetings	here	in	south america for example. cause we include more how can i say that, we 
include more POLitical issues, you know current issues and we talk about, 
first	of	all,	we	talk	about	what	is	going	on	in	the	continent	in	a	political	and	
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economic level and THEN we start to work in you know in very RATional things, to DECIDE some campaigns and what strategy we take with some partners and so and sometimes in europe in a meeting of some campaigns, 
they don’t do it. i	don’t	know	if,	i	really	don’t	know,	but	i	have	some	idea	but	
i	don’t	know	WHY	they	don’t	do	it,	because	i	think	i	believe	it	is	really,	really	important for friends of the earth, since we OUTSIDE you know outside the 
federation	we	do	it.	we	discuss	in	a	political	level.	(F13,	P.33–34)
It	could	be	even	said,	that	the	deliberation	that	is	classified	as	specifically	Eu-ropean is not deliberation but negotiation or strategy talk. The open and sub-stantive quality of deliberation cannot be found in the description of this FoE member from Southern America. However, naturally European activists see this differently. They see the deliberation quality in the open access to deliber-
ation	and	the	consideration	of	all	voices	in	deliberation	(F10,	P.143).	The	con-tents of deliberation are not considered a feature of the quality of deliberation. 
Selecting and Instructing Representatives The preparation of representatives for their representational tasks regularly takes place “at home” in the member organizations. Before representatives of a national platform in the CCC go to a Euromeeting for example, the meeting and tasks of the representatives are prepared in the national platform. The thoroughness and scope of preparation differs among national platforms. The initiative of such preparation often lies with the representatives themselves because they are mostly the national coordinators of the platform. How much they involve their constituency of national groups often depends on their per-ceived role in the platform and their knowledge about the platform. The more knowledge they have about their fellow group members and the more they feel secure and trusted, the less they involve other members in the prepara-tion process of meetings. For example, a newer member of the network from Central-Eastern Europe describes the preparation with national organizations 
for	Euromeetings	as	very	thorough:	“so	when	me	or	another	person	goes	to	
the	meeting	we	have	a	Skype	call	and	we	I	circulate	first	the	agenda	and	the	materials so they can look at it and then we have goal issue by issue what we 
want	to	know	what	we	want	to	be	decided	or	what’s	important	for	us	what’s	
not”(C7,	P.49).	This	very	formal	practice	of	preparing	the	representative	for	their task of representing the platform in transnational network meetings is very uncommon in other platforms and could be explained by the novelty of the network practices for this national platform. This platform copes with the insecurities about the treatment of certain agenda points by including all na-tional organizations of the platform in the preparation process. Other older 
network	members’	representatives	seem	much	more	confident	of	their	own	
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ability to judge what is important. One interviewee of a Western European platform, who has been in the network for over a decade, says that the person knows beforehand what will be discussed within the Euromeeting and that checking back with the national organizations is no more than a formal exer-
cise	without	any	surprises	(C4,	P.71).	Due	to	the	interviewee’s	long	experience	with the network, the representative only checks back with the platform when 
it	is	really	relevant:	“i	have	been	the	coordinator	for	sixteen	or	have	worked	with ccc for sixteen years. i know what is issues are delicate. so i know when i have to get back to my platform to be able to express our position at the eu-ro-meetings” (C4,	P.70). Thus, trust is an important factor in the selection and authorization of representatives. Many representations are practiced on the basis of the trusteeship model. This is interesting insofar as inside the Euro-pean network, trusteeship prevails, but in the global context and among the constituency of workers in garment factories, there is the claim that the net-work representatives are delegates of their constituency rather than trustees. A representation modeled on trusteeship does not only develop out of the longtime experience of the representative, but this practice can also evolve out of a different priority setting at the national level, as the following quote 
indicates:I can say have the chance that they (the national organizations in the platform, H.K.) really trust me for the international level because i think i mean there are different kind of involvement for the national platforms in the interna-tional network some are really involved because they have either more capac-
ities	or	decided	that	it’s	that	the	international	network	is	the	priority,	in	[own	
country]	it’s	not	really	the	case	so	it’s	not	that	people	are	inter-	interested	or	
do	not	feel	it’s	important,	but	they	feel	the	work	i	do	as	a	national	coordinator	
participating	in	the	international	network	is	sufficient	or	is	enough	and	that	we have to deal with other with a LOT of other topics at the national level” 
(C3,	P.77)In this case, it seems that the instruction of the representative is nothing that 
seems	to	be	relevant	for	the	platform.	One	interviewee	describes	the	difficul-ties of the delegation model of representation within his own national plat-
form:	Besides	the	top	level	decision-making	board	with	representatives	of	all	organizations involved, working groups are formed at the national level that must report to the board. Topics are then delegated into the working groups. 
However,	 sometimes	 time	 restrictions	make	 it	 impossible	 to	 first	 report	 to	the board and then decide. Much more often, decisions are already taken in 
the	working	groups	without	 further	consultation	(C1,	146).	Thus,	 there	are	many reasons why representatives decide that trusteeship is a better and less cost-intensive way to handle representation. However, for some organiza-
tions,	it	might	have	specific	advantages	to	consult	beforehand,	especially	if	the	
representatives	are	inexperienced	and	would	benefit	from	advice.	This	seems	
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to be a rather horizontal peer-to-peer consultation and representation than a top-down or bottom-up representational relationship.The selection of representatives is conducted differently in the individual national member organizations. Some organizations send their managing di-rector, others send international coordinators and some organizations decide the selection according to the agenda. If there are many agricultural topics, for example, they will send the agriculture expert. This is very different among the organizations in the FoE-network because organizations are differently 
organized.	 Some	are	working	on	a	 volunteer	basis,	 others	have	a	big	office	with many staff members. Thus, some organizations cannot select represent-ative out of a big pool of possible candidates, whereas others have even spe-cialized experts for different topics. Trust is an important matter in the instruction practices of representa-tives in the FoE-network as well. On the one hand, there is a need for trust, because not all decisions can be discussed with the sending organization out of time constraints. Similar as in the CCC-network it is also described that the interest in matters of international meetings is sometimes not that high in the national organization (F1). One interviewee also articulates the aspect of trust 
as	follows:	“I	know	in	the	spirit	of	whom	I	have	to	act” (F4,	P.54,	author’s	own	translation). Only if so-called ad-hoc topics arise at the meeting, the represent-ative decides depending on the importance of the issues, if the national board should be consulted (ibid.). This is a main practice of representation. Asked on which grounds an international coordinator represents, the interviewee 
responds:	 ”good	will	good	understanding	of	how	the	organization	operates	
and	yeah.	in	my	own	thinking.”(F5,	P.72).	Thus,	the	knowledge	of	the	repre-sentative plays a very important role in this kind of trusteeship representation practice. Under the condition that national organization members are not that in-terested in “high level” international meetings, the chances are good that rep-
resentation	is	practiced	as	trusteeship:Because the meetings and the results of those meetings are often quite or the 
general	meetings	are	quite	on	a	high	level	so	they	are	not	really	VERY	impor-tant for the day-to-day work of me and my colleagues so therefore there is not TOO much interest in really preparing those meetings and the person going 
there	knows	generally	what’s	is	important	for	[own	organization]	so	there	is	no NEED to prepare it in a better way but it i think it would be good to give more attention so that people feel more connected to the process and for the campaigns meeting well there will be a campaigner going generally the coor-
dinator	of	a	campaign	so	he’s	supposed	to	know	EVERything	so	then	there	is	also no need for bigger preparation but if well if necessary discuss it before 
the	meeting.	(F1,	P.45)
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This lack of instruction of representatives is critically evaluated. A common preparation would let people in the local organizations “feel more connect-
ed	to	the	processes”	(F1,	P.45).	Intensive	instructions	of	representatives	take	
place,	when	representatives	go	to	international	meetings	for	the	first	time	(F7,	
P.24)	or	when	new	campaigns	start.	Most	often	this	dialogical	instruction	of	representative takes place within a restricted circle of interested persons in the organization (F1, F5, P.66). When the topics are more sensitive or more political, then more people or even directors are involved in the preparing 
discussions	(F4).	Thus,	also	the	envisioned	topics	to	be	discussed	at	the	inter-
national	meetings	are	influencing	the	way	how	representatives	are	instructed	by the represented constituency.
Communicating Between Representatives and RepresentedThe knowledge of representatives in the CCC-network can be characterized 
in	two	dimensions:	On	the	one	hand,	representatives	of	the	whole	network	in	the International Secretariat are not always best informed about what is going on in the European member groups. They position themselves as being able to get feedback from groups via social media such as Facebook pages and twitter posts, but the bulk of information gathering should be done by the national platforms (C10, C2). On the other hand, the relevant and needed information is gathered from the constituency that is geographically farther removed, the workers. What their preferences and interests are is of much more interest and a focus of deeper research (ibid.). It seems that the interviewees from the International Secretariat perceive their roles as informed representatives in terms of the substantive interests of workers rather than as informed repre-sentatives of European national groups. At the representative level of nation-al platforms the information situation is mostly very good. Representatives 
themselves	evaluate	their	own	knowledge	of	constituencies’	interests	and	po-
sitions	as	very	high,	especially	if	issues	are	not	completely	new	(C4).	If	this	is	not the case, representatives not knowing what is going on poses problems to the functioning of campaigns,(C9). Thus, the national representatives need to stay informed.
The	degree	of	 knowledge	 that	 is	 needed	 to	properly	 fulfill	 the	 roles	 as	representatives, differs between the International Secretariat and national or-ganizations. Representation at the International Secretariat is accounted for at the Euromeetings. Thus, there is a quite tight and frequent control of the representation practices of the International Secretariat. This is not the case in the representation of workers, where control mechanisms are at best in-formal. This explains the worry of International Secretariat staff about a good 
information	flow	from	the	workers	to	the	International	Secretariat.	At	the	na-
172
tional level, representatives, as was described in the former section of this chapter, rely much more often on their experience and anticipations. Formal 
meetings	where	representatives’	mandates	are	formulated	and	controlled	are	not as common on the local level than on the transnational level. The practice of going through the decisions, topics and deliberation re-sults of the Euromeetings with the national partner organizations also differs among the CCC national platforms. Whether there is a practice of informing the represented constituency at the national level about decision outcomes and new developments in the international network depends on many factors. One person from a Western European platform described this reporting as 
very	difficult	because	documents	(e.g.	written	reports)	have	to	be	translated	from English into the native language, as almost nobody speaks English in the national platform. Furthermore, there are time constraints that hinder a thor-
ough	 translation	 until	 the	 next	meeting	with	 platform	members	 (C3,	 P.75).	Other network members view the reporting of representatives to the national membership as a necessity in order to either comply with certain norms of representation in the national platform or to get the campaign work done, in other words to coordinate the work with other activities at the national level. Issues from the international network level must be discussed in the national groups in order to see if there are disagreements in the group on the one hand and to start working on the campaign in order to stay on schedule on the other 
hand	(C12,	P.47).	
Reporting	back	to	the	represented	organization	also	requires	that	this	fits	with the working routines of the national organization. While some organiza-tions meet very frequently, for example every week, others meet only once a month or even less frequently. The lower the frequency of general meetings is, the lower is the chance that representatives transfer their knowledge to the 
other	organizations	about	 the	decisions	made	at	 the	Euromeetings	 (C3,	C4,	
C8).	Some	interviewees	say	that	they	fall	back	on	e-mail	communication	as	an	alternative, but such communication does not really reach their constituency 
(C3,	C4).	In	general,	it	can	be	observed	that	newer	members	of	the	network	are much more prone to reporting back and deliberating with their constitu-ency at home about the experiences and decisions at European or internation-al meetings of the CCC-network than older members. Representation dialogues differ among different target groups and repre-
sentatives’	responsibilities.	The	representative,	in	this	case	the	international	coordinator in a national campaign, represents the international campaign in the national group as well as vice versa the national group at international campaign meetings. The representation of the national group in international meetings is more relevant because at the international meetings, decisions are taken that affect the national groups. International coordinators see them-selves as the bridge or the mediator between two very different spheres. One 
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interviewee talked about the representative role as being the hinge between individual groups in the national platform and the international campaign net-work (C9). This role as a hinge often requires a balance between suggesting new ideas for projects in the international and national meetings and coordi-nating the wishes and ideas of the represented, i.e. the national groups. Many of these representational dialogues are done by e-mail. However, some people from the national groups might not read their e-mails or only some of them get back to their representative, the international coordinator, in order to dis-
cuss	whether	they	agree	on	certain	projects	or	not.	This	specific	characteristic	of e-mail communication is sometimes even desired because the represented are not that interested in all matters of international campaign activities. This can be because there is not much time left for the decision (C5, P.2), or because the representative does not want to disturb the national groups during their 
work:In fact i report in between euromeetings and in between steering meetings 
by	e-mail	(…)	let’s	say	these	ten	people	of	my	network.	they	are	very	busy	so	if i send an e-mail i do not disturb them during their work and they can read 
if	they	like	and	if	they	don’t	read	it,	it’s	a	pity	but	after	a	while	i	can	tell	them,	
they	start	reading	like	five	e-mails	one	after	the	other	an-	okay	they	catch	up	with it. so the e-mail is like a sort of NICE way to stay in touch. if i REALLY need input i will call them. and i do this, both when i expect they will support some 
point	OR	when	i	suspect	they	will	completely	disagree	because	i	feel	it’s	my	role both to deal with agreement and disagreement. sometimes i even know that beforehand, that some organization or some person in organization will disagree, so i will look for that disagreement just to make sure that they have 
done	a	proper	consultation	(C4,	P.73)In the quote above, it seems as if the representative is seeking the discussion with the represented groups only if the representative senses a sort of disa-
greement.	This	can	be	a	zigzag	course	between	convincing	and	disapproval:	“maybe two-thirds of the steering committee who thought it was not a good 
idea	so	they	dropped	–	i	dropped	the	idea	fine.	i	mean	i	need	the	backup	of	i	
will	try	to	if	i’m	really	convinced	i	will	try	to	convince	them	but	if	they	disagree	
i	will	drop	 the	 idea.”	 (C4,	P.77).	The	ability	of	 the	represented	constituency	to build an informed opinion and express feedback about the representa-
tive’s	performance	very	much	varies	between	national	platforms	and	highly	
depends	on	the	involved	persons.	This	influences	the	deliberation	processes	among representatives at such international meetings. If directors who can-
not	 know	all	 the	details	 of	 one	 specific	 campaign	 sit	 together	with	 experts	of one campaign, these discussions can be only preliminary. Consequentially, there is a practice of going back home after deliberation and talking to the 
constituency	again	(F4,	P.31).	
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If coordinators represent volunteers in the international campaign, they 
have	 to	manage	 this	bridging	role	 in	a	very	ambitious	way.	Volunteers	who	give their spare time for projects expect more from their representatives than people who are employed in a member-NGO of the international campaign 
network.	Volunteers	want	to	agree	to	projects	because	this	is	their	only	mo-tivation to join a project. They are not contracted employees who need to do projects because they are paid for them. Thus, the dialogue between repre-
sentatives	and	 represented	 is	much	more	essential	 in	 this	 situation.	Volun-teers can literally always opt for the exit option. Thus, representatives care 
much	more	to	“fill	out”	their	role,	help	with	coordination	and	office	services,	and above all keep the communication channel very open. In order for this to work well, there must be an institutional frame, reliability of the representa-
tive,	and	clarity	of	responsibilities	(C5,	P.42).	This	picture	of	the	relationship	between representative and represented is characterized by a very caring role of the representative, which initiates much of the decisions to be taken, 
filters	 information	 for	 the	represented,	and	helps	out	 in	other	matters.	The	represented are dependent on the good will and power of judgment of the representative. The representative in turn is dependent on the represented, too. If the represented volunteers decide that the representative is not doing a proper job, they can just quit. The representation practice involves a high amount of deliberation be-tween representatives and represented, which go beyond the mere delegation of tasks or the anticipation of preferences. As exemplary shown in the quote below, the mandate of the representative for an international meeting is, at least in contested issues, broadly and openly discussed in order to have a real mandate to decide in the name of the national group of volunteers. 
I	think	it	is	about	to	DISCUSS!	all	things	like	that	this	is	not	something	that’s	
happening	often	(…)	but	if	it	DOES	happen	it	is	important	to	have	a	meeting	WITHIN the organization where you discuss PROs and CONs and if it is some-thing we stay beHIND or NOT and if it is NOT we then just go back and say 
sorry	this	is	not	something	that	we	can	WORK	on.	so	it	is	VERY	important	to	have this implemented within the organizations since a lot of the work is done 
by	volunTEERS.	(F9,	P.41)
Here,	the	representative’s	function	is	not	only	to	gather	preferences	from	their	constituency, but to actively engage in discussion with the constituency and 
try	to	find	a	solution	that	suits	all.	However,	the	dialogue	of	representative	and	represented can look very different from the perspective of an employed cam-paigner. In the following quote, we can see a different practice of representa-
tion	that	creates	an	impression	of	opacity: I think the decision making processes in other organizations are always big 
mysteries	 for	 their	 colleagues	 and	 then	 sometimes	EVEN	 for	 the	organiza-
tions	themselves	because	it’s	always	a	big	struggle	in	because	organizations	
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are	part	of	 international	networks	well	and	often	it’s	the	director	that	goes	there and then there is a big discussion and then there is a result and there 
were	so	many	steps	involved	and	then	inbe=	and	then	also	that’s	mixed	with	
FUNDing	cause	if	it’s	possible	to	get	money	a	lot	is	possible	(F1,	P.98)In addition to the opacity of a multi-step decision-making process, that is con-ducted by the representative and cannot be traced by the constituency, the interviewee also articulates a suspicion why there is so little representative 
interaction:	“if	it’s	possible	to	get	money	a	lot	is	possible” (ibid.). This means it is better if decision-making processes are not attuned with the national or-
ganizations,	if	funding	is	already	in	place.	The	difficulties	in	the	representation	
dialogues	between	representatives	and	represented	is	confirmed	by	a	repre-
sentative.	Asked	the	question:	“Would	you	say	you	represent	Friends	of	 the	
Earth	here	in	[local	organization]?”	The	following	interviewee	becomes	very	clear it is necessary to explain and advocate the matter of FoE at the national 
level:	Yeah i do. CLEARLY, i have really to constantly EXPLAIN and yes because 
most	of	the	peop-	especially	friends	of	the	earth	europe	you	know	it’s	mostly	
dealing	in	the	eu	level	(…)	i	mean	many	of	things	are	not	really	relevant	for	us,	
and	friend	of	the	earth	international	yeah.	we’re	not	involved	in	many	of	the	
of	the	programs.	for	MANY	here	and	here	it’s	a	HEAD	office,	but	if	i	speak	or	think about people you know in our local groups, they really have very they know very little of friend of the earth and CARE really little about it, i guess 
and	our	members	well	i	don’t	know	but	yeah.	we	in	general	(local	organiza-
tion)	does	not	communicate	a	lot,	it’s	really	euphemism,	about	friend	of	the	
earth	for	different	reason	that	i	don’t	always	understand	myself	but	it’s	like	
that.	(F5,	P.75–76)	
Peer-to-Peer RepresentationSince networks do not have a much formalized hierarchical structure, rep-resentation more often takes place between network members. The practice of representing each other at formal meetings seems to be quite common. This is for example the practice of proxy vote in the FoE-network. If one national or-ganization cannot come to a meeting, the organization can ask another organ-ization to vote for them and be their proxy. This seems to be a representation 
practice	which	works	on	a	horizontal	peer-to-peer	basis	(F4).	The	so-called	proxy-vote, which is practiced in the annual general meetings, is formalized insofar as the delegating organization has to give a written declaration that another organization is authorized to vote on their behalf. There is also a quite formal purpose behind it. It is not necessarily the interest of the represented organization, which drives this representation practices, but rather the need 
to	 fulfill	a	certain	quorum	in	the	annual	general	meetings	 in	order	to	make	
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valid decisions. Thus, the organizational interest (instead of individual pref-erences of organizations) might preponderate in the motivation to practice this peer-to-peer representation. This proxy-vote is practiced among organ-izations which are similar to each other or share similar languages like the 
Scandinavian	or	Central-Eastern	European	organizations	(F4,	P.48).	Thus	the	reason for delegating a vote is resemblance. This is plausible from the angle of a trusteeship modeled representation. Resemblance is a good basis for mutual trust. If the represented organization and the representing organization share a language or other characteristics, it is easier for the representing organiza-tion to understand the interests of the represented organization. Here, we can observe a representation practice that is close to descriptive representation. Similarly, members of the executive committee have an alternate, a depu-ty, which is supposed to come, if the member cannot come. This sounds quite common and not very innovative. However, the practice around this alternate is, that this person is sometimes also from a “weaker” organization and is supported by the original member insofar, as the original member sometimes pays their travel costs alone and let the alternate come to the meetings on the expenses of the member attendance fund (F5). In this representation practice, it can be observed that the representation has a complete different function than to represent in the classical way. The representative, here the alternate, is brought into the executive committee in a way of fostering the participation of subordinate organizations. Although, there is a formal horizontality in the relationship among organizations, there is also a difference in terms of capac-ities. The formal representatives (alternate) are supported in their capacities to take part in decision-making processes and the represented (here the origi-nal member of the executive committee) is the supporter of the representative without necessarily needing the representation.
Making Representative Claims About Individuals and DiscoursesThe practice of making representative claims differs depending on the con-stituency that is targeted by the claim and on the range of the claim, i.e. how many people/groups or how many matters are covered by the claim. Nobody in the CCC-network, for example, made a general claim to represent the gar-
ment	workers	in	Asian	countries:	“i	do	not	really	know	how	to	formulate	this,	because i think it would be to BOLD to say that we are actually represent-
ing	the	workers?	but	they	are	the	ones	that	it	in	the	end	it’s	all	about.”	(C10,	P.39). While this was expressed by a Western European organization, similar 
statements	were	made	by	NGOs	that	are	 in	close	contact	with	the	workers:	 “I will think that as campaigner we are only play these supportive role and the 
garment	workers	they	have	to	stand	up	to	the	fight	for	their	own	rights.	but	of	
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course the method, we will we design a lot of programs and activity trying to 
s=support	the	worker	garment	workers	to	fight	for	higher	wages.”	(C12,	P.26).The role of the representative is limited to that of an assistant who sup-
ports	the	workers	in	their	fight.	Both	quotes	show	a	denial	of	real	agency,	the	agency is ascribed to the workers themselves. In this network, we can observe a complex interplay of representation practices. While the local NGOs normal-
ly	 represent	 the	workers’	 demands	 towards	 the	 international	 or	 European	network organizations, those European organizations, unlike the local NGOs, 
represent	 the	 workers’	 demands	 towards	 companies	 and	 national	 govern-ments. Local NGOs receive the legitimate right to participate in the network 
through	their	“working	with	workers”:	“Well	because	we	are	this	is	in	the	hu-man rights project or in urgent appeal we are not, i mean we are not getting funds for a project a particular so= amount, but this just because just for the fact that we are working with the garment workers for their rights and enti-tlements, that allow us to be in ccc, and that is why ccc also involves us in their 
work”	(C14,	P.16).The representation of local workers towards companies and in the in-ternational network entitles these NGOs to participate in the network and to 
benefit	 from	 funds	and	 support.	 If	 asked	whom	a	 local	NGO	 represents,	 an	
NGO	activist	 refers	 to	 the	workers’	 rights, not the workers themselves and to corporate social responsibility. Thus, they rather claim to represent cer-
tain	normative	concepts	instead	of	a	constituency	as	such:	“we	represent	the	
workers’	rights	(C2)	and	CSR	interested	to	call	corporates	accountable	and	to	
uphold	workers’	rights	“(C14,	P.55–56).	It	seems	that	many	of	the	represent-ative claims are very cautious and rather abstract. NGO activists in Western Europe and Asia alike emphasize the autonomy of workers and the mere in-strumental role of the representative serving the represented. If direct claims 
are	made,	then	they	are	made	in	relation	to	norms	such	as	workers’	rights,	or	standards for socially responsible entrepreneurship.Inside the European network, representative claims are pronounced with much more self-esteem and implicitness. Representative claims are made here in a very formal way. Interviewees see themselves as representing the matters of their organization in the network meetings. They are the representatives of 
their	organization,	platform	or	even	campaign	(C1,	C4,	C5).	It	becomes	com-plicated to decide if they represent their organization or the entire European 
CCC-network	only	when	facing	the	international	network	(C2,	14–15).	The following representative claim points to a topic that was discussed 
earlier:	representing	a	whole	network	gives	more	strength	also	at	the	national	level and vis-à-vis politicians and other decision-makers. In this representa-
tive	claim,	southern	organizations	are	specifically	named	as	being	important	represented organizations because they give even more credibility to the or-ganizations in Europe. International solidarity is thus claimed, as a concept to 
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serve northern and southern interests. It is very important that the claim to speak for Southern organizations is substantiated by the reports of Southern 
organizations.	Thus,	the	constituency’s	“testimonies”	are	the	backbone	of	the	general message of international solidarity.
In the end we represent here in [country] what seventy-six organization 
are thinking,	so	it’s	very	important	for	example	in	our	relation	north-south	
it’s	ah	really	important	for	us	to	be	of	an	organization	that	has	a	lot	of	mem-bers in southern countries. so this is quite often part of our message, that the impact of the north on the south and we can translate, we can show that 
because	we	are	testing	on	it	from	our	southern	groups,	so	it’s	not	just	because	
of	their	view	or	because	we	saw	image,	NO	it’s	because	people	from	the	south	
TELL	us	what	is	going	on	and	altogether	we	try	to	find	solutions	that	fits	for	north and for south together, so this is, it think this is really the strength of friends of the earth international, that the northern and the southern compo-
nent	are	together	and	try	to	find	a	solution	valid	for	both.	(F8,	P.87)Besides the north-south solidarity that is that basis for broader representative claims, the federal character of the FoE-network is also used to argue that one 
can	claim	to	represent	the	whole	FoE-network:Well i well whenever i speak in [country] or communicate with the outside world like media and politicians the way i see it is that i am communicating on 
behalf	of	[own	organization]	which	is	part	of	(…)	the	international	federation	
so	i	don’t	i can also say I’m representing (…) in some cases like the entire 
federation because we have a common position on something so there is 
this double identity i’d say. (F3, P.90)This quote can be complemented by another interview passage, in which the 
interviewee	speaks	about	 representing	at	 first	 the	network,	because	 this	 is	
where	all	stand	together	(F4,	P.64).	So,	the	national	and	transnational	sphere	are of course two spaces, where constituencies are spoken for but it seems that the transnational network is the main reference point for representative claims. However, for global network actors outside of Europe it can be quite 
unclear	what	the	representative	positions	of	the	FoE-network	are:Friends of the earth europe work at the parliament, so but they talk with everybody at the parliament and when they when we have to when i have a 
meeting most of the time it’s not clear what POSition does friends of the 
earth europe have. you know, is not clear. IF you are in the parliament, okay because we talk with someone from the conservatives, someone from the link, someone from the greens but and friends of the earth is really important, is really very clear WHAT position about something do you have. and sometimes 
for	me	it’s	not	clear	you	see	from	me	as	an	activist	in	[home	country]	it’s	not	
clear	when	i	go	europe,	some	groups,	i	don’t	know	if	they	if	they	have	the	same	
position	of	the	whole	federation	or	of	us	,	it’s	not	clear	(F13,	P.36)
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Another representative claim targets the other way around, representing the own organization and especially the volunteers, who cannot go to the inter-
national	meetings:
What	i	repreSENT?	i represent MY organization – i hope, i mean i am there beCAUSE basically because nobody else in my organization has been elected to go when it comes to like volunTEERs when they have the ability to go then follow me but it is also that i have a responsibility to make their work easier as volunteers that is basically my=so i take up their ideas and i motivate them to do stuff within the organization what they are expected to do -and i also 
handle	the	boring	parts	of	projects	(…)	and	such-reporting	so	therefore	i	very	much feel that i represent my organization when i go. (F9, P.113)In this representative claim is an emotional component of representation. The interview partner expresses the feeling to represent the organization, because there is a felt responsibility towards the volunteers. The one strong represent-ative claim towards the main cause of FoE, the environment, is articulated by 
a	big	Western-European	organization’s	activist,	who	claims	to	“give	effect”	to	
the	“voice	of	the	environment”	(F10,	P.2,	author’s	own	translation).
5.4 ConclusionsThe political practices that are conducted in the networks alter through dif-ferent phases of campaigning and in different contexts within the networks. The practices also changed over the time of the existence of both networks. 
This	variability	of	practices	can	be	specifically	observed	in	the	way	participa-tion practices change their mode of including actors in the course of campaign 
work	 or	 how	 representation	 practices	 are	 adopted	 and	 configured	 toward	
specific	 groups	of	 constituents.	Besides	observing	 this	 flexibility	 in	practic-ing participation, deliberation and representation in the two networks, the interview analysis helped to explore new features of political practice. Partic-ipation practices are for example accompanied by certain practices of leading 
and	steering.	Deliberation	practices	show	specific	forms	of	language	practice,	technologically co-produced forms of deliberation and forms of political talk-ing. Representation in the two networks often materializes as a practice of peer-to-peer representation.
The	 participation	 practices	 in	 both	 networks	 are	 in	 the	 first	 phases	 of	campaigning based on long-term processes of broadening the access to prob-
lem	identification,	closing	and	steering	the	concrete	formulation	of	campaign	goals and then opening up processes again. The empowerment and learning practices inside the CCC-network are differently interpreted by the inter-viewees. While core European network members value the norms of em-
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powerment	and	try	to	foster	their	practices	through	workshops	and	workers’	participation, local NGOs in the garment producing countries identify a lack of 
a	sense	of	political	efficacy	among	workers,	which	makes	it	hard	for	local	NGOs	to effectively reach workers with their empowerment strategies. Additional-ly to empowerment in the form of capacity building, the interviewees in the FoE-network also describe learning processes that evolve out of the collective experiences at meetings. These learning processes encompass the increasing sense of being part of a strong network. The networks are generally open, but specialized network practices create boundaries between the core and the pe-riphery. Since the funding comes for most parts from European donors such as the European Commission, the European network members administer the money, whereas non-European network members are often responsible for 
the	field	work.	Although	non-European	network	members	feel	included	in	a	
way,	 they	 raise	 concerns	 about	 this	 specific	 role	 allocation	which	produces	problems for participation. Leadership practices are on the one hand rein-forcing existing inequalities to a certain degree, but on the other hand, lead-ers contribute to a more formalized, structured participation and they take charge of time-consuming administrative responsibilities so that others in the campaign have more time for the actual planning and decision-making prac-
tices.	We	can	observe	two	gaps:	one	gap	between	the	norms	and	practices	of	core member coordinators in the network, who value participatory decision 
making,	but	on	the	other	hand	equally	value	the	efficient	provision	of	research	
information.	A	second	gap	can	be	identified	in	the	appliance	of	rules	in	differ-ent parts of the network. If rules do not apply for certain organizations in the network, for example the right to participate in decision-making, then partic-ipation is only equalized among the members in the network that hold these rights.Deliberation practices in the CCC-network are generally very thoroughly 
planned	and	prepared.	A	big	difference	can	be	 identified	between	 the	 face-to-face Euromeetings and Skype meetings. While the Euromeeting delibera-tions are accompanied and structured by different deliberation methods and a moderator, Skype talks are often more informal and unstructured. Both forms of deliberation are structured by an agenda. Skype talks differ from Euromeet-ings in that they allow for a broader access to deliberation due to the lower costs of participation. However, there are restrictions of expressing oneself, following the deliberation and encouraging participation in deliberation that make Skype deliberation an ambiguous experience. Similar restrictions are 
caused	by	the	different	level	of	English	proficiency	in	both	networks.	Thus,	de-liberation practices are usually prepared and conducted in a very considerate 
manner	with	an	eye	on	efficiency.	The	deliberation	practices	in	the	FoE-net-work are characterized by step-by-step procedures of agenda-setting, which change between openness and authoritative steering. A huge variety of facil-
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itation methods are outlined by many interviewees. However, due to scarce 
capacities,	facilitation	is	only	used	at	the	big	general	meetings,	if	people	don’t	know each other that well or if the issues are delicate or very important. The deliberation seems also very dependent on the moderators or facilitators in charge. Generally, it can be observed that just the formal practices can pro-hibit comprehensive deliberation from the standpoint of participants. Formal practices can have exclusionary effects because they assume a knowledge base about the complex rules and procedures that might not be shared by everybody. Moreover, these formal practices seem to channel the discussions 
into	specific	directions	that	 increase	efficiency,	but	 leave	out	topics	that	are	relevant to participants. Representation practices in both networks depend very much on the national organizations. Due to the high autonomy of network members, the representation practices of instructing representations, informing represent-atives and constituencies, and reporting back to the constituencies depend on the internal coordination practices of the member organizations. This means especially the degree of internal formalization, the priority setting, and 
the	member’s	 familiarity	with	network	practices.	The	 trusteeship	model	 of	representation is practiced in the national organization to different degrees. 
The	overall	 representational	 claims	with	 regard	 to	workers’	 representation	
are	rather	cautious	 in	terms	of	workers’	self-determination.	Representation	practices in the FoE-network are the most diverse practices among the three different types of practices. This can be explained by the diversity of network member organization which are directly involved in conducting representa-tion practices. The positionings towards representation thus vary from organ-ization to organization and are conducted in many different ways. This results in the gathering of very differently mandated, skilled and experienced rep-resentatives at international meetings and is also expressed in the practice of horizontal representation. However, far geographical distances, structur-
al	 inequalities	and	differently	organization	network	members	 influence	 the	agency of actors to practice representation.
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6 Situated Democratic Norms
The previous part of this book presented a broad spectrum of political prac-tices in the two networks of the Clean Clothes Campaign and Friends of the Earth. These practices show how coordinators, activists, campaigners decide about future actions, coordinate their activities and gain shared understand-ings of their goals. Since both networks subscribe to ideas of democracy and community, the political practices already have a normative meaning for the 
actors	 involved.	When	 actors	 ‘do’	 participation,	 they	 already	 have	 in	mind	
democratic	norms	such	as	self-efficacy	or	the	creation	of	equal	opportunities.	Thus, political practice and democratic norms cannot be separated neatly. There is diffusion between these two spheres of normative democratic theory and political practice. In general, political practices result from interactions between actors as well as between actors and pre-given rules. Thus, demo-
cratic	practices	can	develop	out	of	the	actors’	(collective)	examination	of	rules	(in this case rules that serve a democratic normativity) and the positioning towards other actors. The following table shows on the left hand the reconstructed political practices in the two networks and on the right hand the democratic norms of participatory, deliberative and representative democracy, which were out-
lined	and	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	book.	The	dotted	line	symbolizes	the permeability of boundaries between both spheres. 
Political Practices Democratic Norms
• Learning and empowering
• Cooperating and making joint-decisions
• Governing in a decentralized network
• Leading
• Identifying problems and setting agendas
• Structuring deliberation processes
• Speaking and translating
• Deliberating online
• Talking about politics
• Selecting and instructing representatives
•  Communicating between representatives 
and represented
• Representing peer-to-peer
• Making representative claims
•  Participatory and Deliberative Democ-
racy
• Self-efficacy, equal opportunities
• Self-rule, autonomy
• Equal inclusion
• Openness
• Diversity in talk
• Considered judgement
• Representative Democracy
• Responsibility of the representatives
• Accountability
• Considerate claims
Table 2:  Political Practices in the Transnational Civil Society Networks and Democratic 
Norms
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Following	the	account	of	a	‘citizen	standpoint’	(Saward	2010,	Disch	2015),	the	following chapters shall discuss, if these practices are done “in a democratic way”. As Disch points out, taking up a “citizen standpoint” as opposed to act-
ing	as	“self-appointed	adjudicators”	(Disch	2015:2)	facilitates	an	exploration	
of	the	conditions	that	have	enabled	citizens’	judgements	(ibid.).	Such	kind	of	exploration resonates with an understanding of democratic norms as “mean-
ing-in-use”	 (Wiener	 2014:	 30)	which	 are	 context-dependent	 and	 thus	 can-not be evaluated by supposedly unalterable and universal criteria. We rather should ask questions about the contexts and conditions (Disch 2015) under which political practices are framed as democratic by participants, delibera-tors, coordinators, constituents, representatives; namely all actors involved in the political practices described above. Therefore the local knowledge and positionings should necessarily be taken into account not just as study objects but as legitimate forms of knowl-edge that stand beside and not behind forms of knowledge produced by schol-
ars	 (see	 e.g.	 Saretzki	 1997,	 Jaeggi	 2014).	 Thus,	 what	 democratic	 practice,	
as	practice	 ’in	 a	democratic	way’	 could	mean	 in	 the	 two	 transnational	 civil	society networks studied here, will be discussed in a dialogical manner be-tween the strands of normative democratic theory that were outlined in the 
first	part	of	this	book,	and	the	political	practices	and	their	interpretation	by	involved actors. Bringing normative democratic theory and empirical political practice into dialogue means equally weighing both forms of knowledge and their normative claims. Including the “citizen standpoint” in the discussion on democracy does not mean to throw normative democratic theory overboard. However, the inclusion of local situated knowledge and evaluations is a neces-sary condition for the transforming spaces of democracy in the transnational sphere. Philosophers and political theorists should contribute their knowl-edge and expertise, but they do not stand alone in the discussion, critique and 
definition	of	norms	(see	Jaeggi	2014:	53).	Therefore,	the	following	discussion	of both, theoretical perspectives on democracy and empirical standpoints on the politics of transnational civil society networks will serve the goal of 
a	mutual	 learning	process.	The	researcher’s	and	activists’	understanding	of	
democracy	is	of	course	heavily	influenced	by	theoretical	accounts	of	democ-racy. However, in the practices of activists new forms of politics occur that can be considered democratic. A back and forth movement between theoret-ical approaches and empirical practices can be fruitful for the discussion on transnational democracy. This dialogue about democratic norms in transna-tional practice shall start here but should be taken further in future research. The following three chapters will thus discuss under what conditions and in which contexts political practices were considered democratic by the involved actors. Furthermore, it shall be discussed in how far those practices and the attendant positionings relate back to normative democratic theory. The chap-
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ters are divided along the lines of participatory, deliberative and represent-ative democratic norms. Since the deliberation practices showed many new features in the empirical observation, they are discussed in a separate chapter and not included in the following chapter on participatory norms and prac-tices.
6.1 Participatory Norms and PracticesParticipation practice in the two transnational civil society networks is in-formed by the norms that stem from grass-roots democratic ideas in social movements. The transnational network character of organizing makes these practices, however, quite complex and sometimes even opaque in their alter-nation between the different levels of local, national and transnational cam-paigning. At the same time, practices in the CCC-network evolve dynamically and are open to the diverse input in decision-making due to the easy and quick practice of information sharing. Similarly, interviewees from the FoE-network successfully reframed what is usually seen as one of the main struggles in conceptualizing democratic legitimation beyond the nation- state, namely the large heterogeneity of interests (see Friedrich 2009). Many FoE-network members evaluate the huge diversity inside the network as a factor that gives much reason for all of the participation practices described above. While di-versity lets them learn much more from each other, feel stronger about their 
own	political	efficacy,	it	is	also	a	reason	why	autonomy	of	network	members	and a decentralized federation structure is viewed by network members as necessary. In the following, I will discuss the empirical observations in the two networks and contrast them with theoretical insights in the debates on participatory democratic theory. I will depart from the central terms of nor-mative participatory democracy, namely (1) equal inclusion, (2) self-rule and 
autonomy	and	(3)	self-efficacy	and	equal	opportunities	and	will	then	engage	in a critical discussion between theory and practice.
Equal inclusion. Equality of participation is a fundamental value of all kinds of participatory democracy. Beginning from the selection of representa-tives by lot in the Athenian city state to Rousseau, who argued that no citizen 
can	be	free	if	society	is	unequal	(Rousseau	1762),	participatory	equality	was	
central	for	those	first	theories	and	practices	of	participatory	democracy.	Mod-ern participatory democrats reinforced the equality argument by referring to feminist critique of representative democracy (Phillips 1996) or to radical 
concepts	of	democracy	(Macpherson	1977,	Mouffe	1997).	In	practices	of	par-ticipatory democracy, the value of equality is often seen in the educational and transformative effect of participation (see e.g. Warren 1993).
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The	inclusion	and	exclusion	practices	in	the	two	networks	are	fluid	due	to	dissolving boundaries and decisions that are sometimes made on the spur of the moment. This makes equal inclusion in the broader network not a gener-
al	democratic	practice.	Including	groups	or	persons	in	specific	campaigns	or	
campaign	phases	is	often	an	ad-hoc	decision	left	to	a	small	group	of	persons’	discretion. This decision-making process is an inclusion practice between dif-ferent representatives of member organizations. It is practiced horizontally among peers. Organizations are sometimes included temporally if they suit a 
campaign’s	interest,	without	becoming	formal	members	(e.g.	partner	organ-izations doing research in Asia or Africa are called to participate). However, they are often not included in the agenda setting of the campaign. Only a few 
persons	in	the	central	coordinating	office	or	member	organizations	in	Europe	seem to decide about this functional inclusion. Thus, most often inclusive and 
equal	campaigning	is	difficult	as	soon	as	the	borders	of	Europe	are	crossed.	The role allocation between European and non-European organizations is quite clearly divided in the organizations that apply for and receive the fund-
ing	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	organizations	that	do	the	field	work	on	the	other	hand. Although the positioning of European network members is often egal-itarian and very respectful for the non-European groups, positionings occur that show a rather paternalistic or instrumental relationship with non-Euro-pean partners. Similarly, the positionings of non-European organizations are undecided between the recognition and indignation about an unequal and 
less	 inclusive	campaigning	and	the	acceptance	of	one’s	own	role.	Thus,	net-work members are included, but not necessarily on equal terms.Besides these principal decisions about campaign team compositions, the 
concrete	work	on	campaigns	in	smaller	teams	of	three	to	five	organizations	is often well balanced between participatory equal inclusion and leadership. The necessity of leadership for the functioning of participation practices is clearly perceived and accepted by almost all groups in the networks. As Polletta (2002) pointed out in her study on participatory democracy in social movements groups, participatory democracy is not anymore seen as a total power-free enterprise. The dogmatic norms of participatory grass-roots de-
mocracy	developed	by	new	social	movement	groups	in	the	1970’s	are	often	relativized by present-day activists. This can be clearly observed in the par-ticipation practices of the members in the CCC-network. The discursive posi-tioning of interview partners demonstrates the valued contribution of leading persons to an equalized and easily accessible campaigning process. Leaders do not only take over power, they also take over responsibilities and tasks, which can relieve others for example from exhausting administrative work and give them the time to concentrate on the contend of campaigns for exam-ple. Thus, a certain amount of leadership can structure procedures and reduce complexity, which can be even motivating for people to participate. Thus, in-
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clusion practices work much better on a small-scale than on the large-scale of the broader network. The equal distribution of information is a precondition for equal inclusion. Sharing of information can range from a very centralized and exclusive infor-mation distribution to a rather egalitarian mode. Information is distributed in both networks quite frequently and easily due to the network character and the digital communication patterns. Everyone is connected to everyone in the network via e-mail lists and network databases. This is a very accessible practice of information sharing. It provides broad access for literally everyone, regardless of geographical place or capacities. Everyone has the opportuni-ty to be informed and to gain knowledge about procedures as well as issues 
and	campaigns	at	stake.	However,	this	information	flow	can	be	overwhelming	and can lead to confusion about which information can be accessed by whom. Thus, equal access is granted, but not always equal opportunities are guaran-teed. The overload of information can also lead to an excessive demand for the participating member groups. This can lead to the practice, that representa-tives do not always forward the information to their national member groups. These members can thus sense the practices of decision-making for example as something “mysterious” that they do not understand, as one FoE member 
claims	(F1).	Thus,	the	network	members’	evaluation	of	information	transpar-ency is mixed, although the prospects of quick information sharing for more inclusive political practice must be underlined.
Self-rule and autonomy. As in debates on associative democracy, the norm of self-rule or self-governance is strongly connected to decentralization efforts in the network. While the network character seems to provide a well-suited infrastructure for the self-determination of its members, the autonomy of sin-gle organizations can be threatened by a very excluding way of decision-mak-
ing	 in	 the	 central	 offices	 of	 networks.	 Those	 top-down	 decisions	 limit	 the	choices of network members to organize campaigns, decide over the form of campaigning and contribution in the network as well as their own identity in 
their	respective	country	or	region.	However,	it	resembles	Fung	and	Wright’s	concept of Empowered Participatory Governance (2003 20–21), which claims that a centralized supervision and coordination is necessary to guarantee ac-countability. The International Secretariat in the CCC-network plays a quite important coordinating role and contributes to a centralized coordination, es-pecially when member groups themselves cannot be that active due to a lack 
of	capacities.	This	results	in	very	context-specific	understandings	of	self-rule	across the network. On the one hand, the network is seen as very decentral-ized and organizations are perceived as autonomous by stronger and more active network members. On the other hand, it is seen as more centralized and controlled by weaker and more passive network members. This partly centralized coordination, however, can also imply an empowerment of these 
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weaker groups and thus can give way to a more independent campaigning of such groups. However, some dependencies of network members on the Inter-national Secretariat seem to endure over years. FoE-network members refer to FoE as a federation of like-minded organ-izations. The identity of FoE as a federation has a very important meaning to many interviewees. It is stressed as very productive in particular because of the high diversity of network members. The decentralized coordination is also 
a	tool	to	hand	over	coordination	work	for	which	the	central	coordination	offic-
es	do	not	have	enough	capacities.	Every	organization	participating	in	specific	campaigns can choose their degree of participation in the campaign. However, this kind of autonomous rule can also lead to a reinforcement of existing in-equalities in that weaker network members might choose to participate less due to fewer capacities. If it is assumed that the more prosperous organiza-tions choose to take the more active part in campaigns, they in turn get also the higher budgets and consequently unequal structures are reinforced. Thus, self-rule can be perceived by network actors as over-stretching their capaci-ties. While some see the burdens of much administration work, others view the virtue of self-determination as very important for their own work. This has also to do with the self-understandings of the organizations. This is mir-
rored	 in	 their	positionings	 toward	different	 self-rule	practices:	While	 some	see themselves as learners in a network of very experienced organizations, others are very much grounded in their own local campaign work. Thus, self-rule and empowerment are in different situations mutually reinforcing or hin-dering their respective democratic way of practice. 
Self-efficacy and equal opportunities. A strong commitment towards work-
ers’	empowerment	 is	one	main	characteristic	of	 the	CCC-network.	The	con-duct of such empowerment practice is balanced and sometimes charged with tension between European network members and local partners in the Asian region. The	CCC-network	empowerment	approach	is	first	of	all	targeted	at	the	workers in garment producing factories. As a secondary form of empower-
ment,	new	and	smaller	CCC-network	members	are	empowered.	The	worker’s	
empowerment	is	practiced	with	a	reflective	and	cautious	positioning	and	the	awareness of the inequalities between workers in South-East Asia and Euro-pean NGOs. It is desired, that workers are leading their own empowerment, 
as	written	 in	 the	CCC	principles:	 “Workers	 themselves	can	and	should	 take	the lead in their own organising and empowerment.”69 This	norm	of	workers’	self-empowerment, which is discursively reiterated and reinforced by Euro-pean NGOs, is not necessarily what local NGOs experience. They are not so 
much	aware	of	the	norm	of	self-empowerment	and	see	even	many	difficulties	in a top-down-led empowerment because workers are sometimes not easily 
69	 	http://www.cleanclothes.org/about/principles	(accessed:	01.10.2016)
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contacted and in a second step not easily convinced of an empowerment, posi-tioning themselves in a submissive way, as one NGO activist describes it (C12, 
P.26). Local organizations are more interested in educating workers more ba-sically and supporting them, especially in risky situations. This tension points to the dilemma that theorists face in deliberative and participatory democ-
racy:	people	need	to	be	in	a	certain	already	empowered,	informed,	educated	state in order to be able to actively participate or “take the lead in their own 
organizing”.	This	is	reflected	in	the	tensions	between	the	ideal	vision	of	Eu-ropean NGOs and the assessment of local NGOs in the Asian region. Although 
the	general	empowerment	goals	are	the	same,	there	are	partly	conflicting	in-terests of local, mostly Asian, network members and European network mem-bers. Thus, overlapping interests interfere with the norms of empowerment which were constituted at the beginning of campaign work.
The	learning	of	‘citizen	skills’	and	political	efficacy,	coined	as	“self-trans-formation” by Warren (1993) is crucial for participatory democratic theory. Within the core networks, it can be observed that this is taking place almost solely at face-to-face meetings. Participation practices at international meet-
ings	lead	to	a	better	sense	of	the	individual	members	for	political	efficacy	of	the network and for the different legitimate perspectives on political issues 
at	 stake	 (see	e.g.	F8). This can be one reasoning, why the FoE-network has 
defined	a	quorum,	which	sets	a	mark	of	28–29	out	of	31	network	members	
participating	in	international	meetings	(F4,	P.46).	The	attempt	to	reach	a	par-ticipation rate as high as possible is reasoned by one campaign coordinator as an attempt to create broad ownership of decisions. Only if as many network 
members	as	possible	discuss	and	finally	agree	on	important	topics,	the	cam-
paign	work	is	done	“with	high	quality”	and	in	time	(F3,	P.49).The concept of ownership which is used here to argue for a broad par-ticipation points to the relationship between participatory decisions and the responsibility by all participants to properly carry out the decisions that were once taken by them. It is strategically reasonable for network actors to adopt participatory decision-making. Furthermore, broader participation legiti-
mates	the	campaign	and	makes	the	campaigners	more	credible	(	F1,	P.80).Besides the legitimation of organizations through the broad global partic-ipation of organizations in the network, the federal structure of the network and the participation of various organizations from all over the world increas-
es	effective	and	efficient	campaigning	through	the	exchange	of	strategy,	expe-rience and knowledge and the increase of voice. The more organizations are involved and the broader “struggles are linked (F13), the better the campaign will be heard by the public and decision-makers.Participatory practice in these two transnational civil society networks means the working with participatory norms in different contexts. Norms of empowerment by European organizations are reinterpreted or even neglect-
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ed by Asian organizations. Instead, other norms of participatory practice are invented that put more emphasis on guidance, awareness-raising and educa-tion of workers in the garment industry. In different contexts, for example in the self-assurance of the network, empowerment is emphasized as a crucial outcome of participatory practice (in international meetings). Thus, the norm of empowerment is used to justify the participatory character of practices and the legitimation of the networks as such. In linking the struggles of environ-mental activists around the world, the network itself and its goals is legitimat-ed by its participatory practice. Furthermore, empowerment practices unfold their democratic potential especially in face-to-face meetings. Here, they con-
tribute	to	more	self-efficacy	of	network	members	and	equalized	participation	opportunities. Participatory practice in these two transnational civil society networks thus evolves in a back and forth between the formal norms of partic-ipatory democratic coordination, that network actors either gave themselves in a constituting act during the foundation of the networks or that were for-mally decided upon by member assemblies or international secretariats, and the situated interpretation and invention of empowerment practice through actors.
Fluid Participation Practices: ConclusionsIn the overall view, three main aspects of participatory democracy in the 
studied	transnational	civil	society	networks	are	important:	(1)	the	emphasis	on difference and pluralism in participatory democracy and (2) the claim of self-transformation. Furthermore, (3) the personal contacts between network members seem to be of crucial importance for participation practice.
(1)	In	general,	 the	 inclusiveness	of	participation	practices	 is	quite	high:	many organizations can get easily access to the networks and become part of 
it.	The	fluent	information	circulation	eases	this	access.	The	other	side	of	the	coin is that once organizations are really part of the network, the network structures of interfering levels, multiple participation practices and a large crowd of organizations makes the networks appear very complex and opaque and thus makes participation sometimes very unlikely and unattractive for the individual campaigner. A retreat to national or local arenas is a common reaction. The participatory norm to include the diversity of groups and in-dividuals in participation processes is realized in practice in both networks. While Warren (2001) and Polletta (2002) argue that civil society groups tend to be homogenous and action oriented, or tend to consist of befriended per-sons (Polletta 2002), which both undermines participatory processes, we can observe that only rarely do befriended groups exclude others. To the contrary, although FoE groups are quite like-minded in their goals, attitudes and or-
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ganizations structures (as any civil society network is, compared to the diver-sity of the broader society), FoE groups developed very strong participatory practices through the emphasis of their (relative) diversity. The inclusion of difference is treated with much care and sensibility in the FoE-network. It could be observed that the diversity of network members is a crucial part of the identity of the network and almost always considered as very important. There are attempts to avoid allegedly universal positions and on the contrary praise diversity as a main characteristic of the network. 
(2)	This	 is	 in	 line	with	the	findings	of	 the	 interview	data	that	the	more	often people of different organizations are present in face-to-face meeting, the more aware they are of the different perspectives in the networks and their overall shared cause. In contrast to the CCC-network, which does not empha-size its diversity that much, the FoE-network members more often state that they gain a better sense of their own power when they meet with all the di-verse groups of FoE at international meetings. The diversity of organization-al voices in the networks enriches many participation practices by manifold inputs. This furthers the democratic transformation of individuals, in the two 
ways	that	were	described	by	Pateman	(1970)	as	increasing	sense	of	political	
efficacy	and	by	Warren	(1994)	for	example	as	enhancing	psychological	quali-ties, which are important claims of participatory democracy. Through meeting people with the same cause but a different perspective face-to-face, network members become aware of the wide range of different perspectives and the worthiness of their shared cause. Thus, although homogeneity of civil society exists, inclusive participation and self-transformation can be a successful and common practice within transnational civil society networks, if civil society actors value their internal diversity.(3) Participation practices in the contexts of transnational networks can reinforce positive aspects of participatory democracy, such as inclusion, trans-parency of information and empowerment. However, in the single procedural steps, it looks as if the borderless networks with multiple arenas of interaction give more access than real equalized opportunities to participate, at least for some network members. This can be understood as an erosion of democratic rule bindingness through disembodied and dispersed participation practices. Transnational civil society networks, such as the two networks investigated in this study, live from the informal and spontaneous participation of many volunteers in many different places. This participation of active citizens and organization members is geographically very dispersed, often temporal, in-formal and dynamic. As one network member states, activists come and go 
(C1).	 This	 is	 mirrored	 in	 the	 respective	 organization’s	 participation	 at	 the	transnational level. If an organization has many motivated activists and vol-unteers, it will be more likely to actively engage at international meetings with other organizations. In turn, a very participatory international meeting will 
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radiate from the event to the local groups and national organizations. Since coordination of activities in-between meetings by e-mails, Skype meetings or telephone conferences are for many active volunteers a rather frustrating participatory experience, the meetings and workshops that take place as per-sonal gatherings build much of the collective identity that is needed to moti-vate activists to keep on participating. Especially the equal participation of the poorly resourced and small organizations is only provided by the offering of personal meetings. Otherwise, it is quite hard to stay on track under con-ditions of uncertainty and high personal costs, if the goals and ideals of the 
network	are	not	strengthened	and	reaffirmed	on	international	network	meet-ings. For many network members, the international meetings also give them 
a	 sense	of	 their	own	political	 efficacy	and	 the	 strength	of	 the	 international	
network.	Thus,	online	meetings	might	be	an	efficient	mode	of	coordination,	but they can only rarely contribute to participation practices inside the trans-national civil society networks. Regarding the inclusion and empowerment of new and/or weaker organizations, international network meetings are very effective to introduce new and marginalized groups to the networks, empow-er and educate groups through workshops and include marginalized groups in giving them the opportunity to gain contacts and voice. These experiences of network members point to the essential relevance of face-to-face meetings for the quality of participation practices. Although participation practices take place locally and via the Internet throughout dispersed places, the need for a central gathering on international events is expressed by many network mem-bers. 
6.2 Deliberative Norms and PracticesDeliberation practices in both networks are very skillfully planned and goal-oriented, which is done so in order to guarantee equal chances for all 
to	participate.	However,	 as	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 interview	analysis	 show,	 the	formalization of equalized deliberation does not automatically make partici-pants of deliberation perceive themselves as equals. The goal-orientation can also impede deeper deliberation and an easy participation of newer and more marginal network members. Furthermore, the increasing use of Skype as a tool to deliberate online reinforces existing inequalities and can even com-plicate deliberative decision-making. The deliberation practices will be dis-cussed along the dimensions of deliberative democracy, namely (1) openness, (2) diversity in talk and (3) considered judgment. 
Openess. Seyla Benhabib (1996) famously argued that participants in de-liberation should be able to decide and debate upon the purpose and object of 
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deliberation itself. Such openness at the beginning of deliberation procedures 
is	practiced	with	some	effort	in	the	CCC-network.	While	the	very	first	phase	of	
problem	identification	is	very	open	to	input	from	any	corner	of	the	network	and even the network environment, the agenda setting process is increasingly steered as the process goes on. However, this must not necessarily impede the openness of the agenda. Even if certain points are already set by the In-ternational Secretariat, for example in preparation of the Euromeetings, there seems to be always room for discussing the points on the agenda, as many interviewees state. However, the accessibility of agendas at least for certain participants can be questioned due to the overload of material and planning that confuses participants sometimes more than it guarantees accessibility. This is a dilemma since the provision of information is necessary in order to adequately prepare deliberation processes.
Although	the	practices	of	problem	identification	and	agenda	setting	seem	
to	be	balanced	between	efficient	leading	practices	and	inclusive	decision-mak-ing in the FoE network as well, there is also a closing tendency that could be 
observed:	The	 initiation	of	campaigns	at	 the	 local	 level	depends	very	much	on the capacities of local members. It needs motivating, engaged and talented people with time and money to be able to set the agenda for a new campaign 
(e.g.	F7,	P.42).	In	turn,	this	means	that	under-resourced	organizations	in	the	network are more often the ones, who just join an already existing campaign, where the relevant decisions about the agenda are already taken. Thus, organ-izations outside of Europe often participate in campaigns only as passive con-tributors of data, local research or campaign material. As one activist outside 
Europe	put	it: “so they decided to include it [=their campaign material, H.K.] 
in	the	campaign	in	the	project,	and	we	said	YES.”	(F13,	P.57). Thus, the open agenda setting more often does only take place among the European cam-paign partners. Non-European campaign partners are rather asked for con-
tributions,	but	not	extensively	included	in	the	problem	and	agenda	definition	process (F12, F13). However, the procedural, step-by-step character of the ob-served practices can ensure a certain horizontal peer-to-peer democratic con-
trol.	If	one	step	of	the	agenda	setting	process	such	as	problem	identification,	formulation of ideas, brainstorming approaches, has been evaluated by actors as not democratic enough, the process can be opened up again in the following steps of agenda setting, when different actors lead the process. Thus, there is a democratic control mechanism that lies in the procedural character of the practice and the involvement of many different decision-makers in the differ-ent phases of the practice.
Diversity in talk. Many deliberative theorists agree that the Habermasian idea of non-coercion in deliberation processes is rather unrealistic in practice due to the ubiquity of power relations. However, the balancing of arguments 
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is still a normative claim of deliberative theorists. Diverse positions should be included in deliberation processes (see e.g. Fishkin 2009). Deliberation practices are described by interviewees as structured in various ways. The inclusion of all the different organizations in the network into deliberation practices is emphasized. Therefore, actors can choose from a wide repertoire of equalizing deliberation practices and seem to be very much committed to equalizing access to deliberation. This seems to be a very good basis for the practice of inclusive and free deliberation inside the network. Rules that set the marks for balanced deliberation are seen as very important by central actors in the networks. Those rules are in turn evaluated as very complex and overwhelming by new or marginal network members. Due to the lack of knowledge about rules and procedures of deliberation practices, some of these organizations seem to be excluded from certain circles of delibera-
tion	and	decision-making	at	first,	or	even	for	a	longer	period.	In	addition,	the	structuration of the deliberation process depends very much on the capacities 
that	can	be	used	to	hire	a	facilitator.	Second,	the	facilitator’s	own	preferences	
and	mode	of	structuring	can	influence	the	degree	of	inclusion	of	deliberation	practice. The understanding of non-coercive deliberation must not necessari-ly be shared by every facilitator, as one interviewee states. Thus, there is a high contingency at the level of individual facilitators.Moreover, the balance of arguments during deliberation practices is hin-dered by the inequality in language skills and by the differences of delibera-
tion	styles,	specifically	between	European	and	non-European	organizations.	The language gap does produce inequalities that are not only caused by the inability to speak English like a native speaker, but more importantly by the lack of attention paid to language issues. This evokes the question of dom-inance and exclusion problems in deliberation. Although the imbalance of arguments through language barriers is not a problem that could be easily 
solved	by	the	modification	of	collective	practices,	it	seems	very	problematic,	that central actors do not recognize this as a problem. This neglect makes de-liberation practices not very sensitive towards balancing arguments across language barriers. Deliberation in transnational networks is practiced in a space of geo-graphical dispersion. Disembodied practices result as a consequence of it. However, the democratic anchor in deliberation practices is seen in the direct, not computer-mediated deliberation. Only the regular face-to-face delibera-tion in the two networks establishes commitment of participants, reliability among participants of deliberation and an honest and deep deliberation. Face-to-face deliberation holds many more opportunities for organizers to struc-ture, balance and focus the deliberation process. Since online deliberation is taking place solely on Skype, which means a situation similar to a telephone conference with frequent interruptions caused by bad internet connections or 
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technology errors, the potential for a balanced and equalized deliberation is limited here. Online deliberation narrows down the access to individuals that 
have	fast	Internet	connections.	Otherwise,	deliberation	practices	are	modified	in a way that questions the idea of inclusive and free deliberation, for example when people can only write in the chat protocol without hearing what others are saying.Furthermore, many network members state that they need the personal 
meeting,	the	look	into	the	faces	of	deliberation	partners	in	order	to	find	con-sensus among diverging positions, make more timely decisions and be more 
encouraged	 to	participate	 in	 the	 future	 (C11,	F8,	F2).	On	 the	one	hand,	on-line computer-mediated deliberation is increasingly used in both networks. It contributes to more equality because more people can easily participate in deliberation processes without having to bear the costs of traveling. On the other hand, online deliberation practice does not necessarily contribute to equal will-formation and effective decision-making inside these two net-works due to the technological restrictions and the impracticability of mod-erating and following discussions. Without the distinction marks of space and vision the participation rate in online deliberation is limited to a handful of persons. If deliberation participants cannot see the person behind the voice and all voices come from the same angle (the computer loud speaker), it is 
practically	 impossible	 to	have	more	 than	 five	participants	 in	 a	deliberation	exercise. Furthermore, the decisions made in Skype deliberation are not that far-reaching as face-to-face deliberation at international meetings. Thus, also deliberation practices need the direct contact between participants in order to secure equality and balance of voice during deliberation. This need of per-sonal meetings and face-to-face communication is expressed by almost every interviewed network member. Face-to-face situations provide actors with 
more	opportunities	to	create	reliability	among	participants:	“obviously	face-
to-face	meeting	is	a	much	STRONGer	way	of	getting	people’s	engagement,	be-
cause	once	you’ve	gotten	in	the	room	effectively	shut	the	door	and	then	they	
are	there	for	EIGHT	hours	of	discussion	they	can’t	get	away”	(F2,	P.34).	Fur-
thermore,	 face-to-face	 situations	 enable	participants	 of	 deliberation	 to	 find	consensus through non-verbal adjustment or expressions of disagreement (C11, P.25).
Considered judgment.	 Various	 kinds	 of	 decisions	must	 be	made	 during	the different stages of campaign work. A dynamic circle of people often make these different kinds of decisions. Actors have different opportunities to set 
the	goals	of	a	deliberation	process:	they	can	follow	a	practice	of	making	stra-tegic choices for arguments, they can conduct a practice of honestly reasoning about what they see as rational arguments (understood in the way that Offe 
and	Preuss	 (1991)	defined	rational	decisions)	or	 they	can	deliberate	about	the very roles, identities and differences that exist in the networks. The last 
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option can be observed in the network quite often when differences are ob-vious. It is strongly connected to empowering processes in which actors feel strengthened by the exchange of different positions in the network. It makes 
them	 ‘feel’	 the	powerful	network	as	 a	whole	and	all	 their	diverse	voices	 in	it. They are more empathetic. Thus, rational and enlightened decisions are not always mentioned as the outcome of deliberation and are also by critical 
democratic	theorists	seen	as	undermining	diversity	(see	e.g.	Sanders	1997).	
Furthermore,	finding	consensus	is	by	itself	a	challenging	and	ambiguous	task	and in recent deliberation theory relativized in favor of more moderate forms such as the “meta-consensus”, i.e. agreeing on the disagreement (Niemeyer 
and	Dryzek	2007).	However,	some	decisions	need	be	agreed	upon	consensual.	
This	can	be	an	infinite	back	and	forth	between	the	different	levels	of	national	
groups	and	transnational	meetings.	The	need	to	find	a	consensus	is	seen	by	some interviewees in the FoE network as a burden. Some differences cannot be overcome by deliberation, as also deliberation theory suggests (Niemeyer 
and	Dryzek	2007).	
The	diversity	of	the	network	creates	barriers	for	the	network	members’	capability to act. If there is no clear position for a certain issue, many net-
work	members	complain	that	it	is	difficult	to	campaign	on	it	or	represent	the	network publicly. This is why some network members and also moderators in both networks justify their practice of circumventing the ideals of delib-
eration	 for	 the	sake	of	efficiency.	This	practice	of	 steering	deliberation	 into	
certain	strategic	directions	and	a	specific	decision	 is	at	 the	same	time	criti-cized by deliberation participants in the CCC-network for example who would welcome real “deep” deliberation (C3). Thus, there is a conscious addressing of deliberation norms such as honestly weighing arguments besides strategic 
talk.	Critical	reflection	upon	deliberation	as	such	influences	the	deliberation	practice and the goals set for deliberation. 
The	practice	of	making	considerate	decisions	is	further	influenced	by	the	use of online deliberation. This form of communication leads to a disembod-
ied	 practice	 of	 deliberation,	which	 is	 evaluated	 as	 difficult	 especially	when	decisions have to be made. Without the non-verbal notions of fellow delibera-
tion	participants	it	is	hard	or	very	time-consuming	to	find	out	the	individuals	
positions	on	a	specific	topic.	Thus,	decision-making	can	only	work,	according	to some interviewees, if the individuals involved have met each other before-
hand.	 Thus,	 for	 the	 collective	 considered	 judgment	 over	 a	 specific	 topic,	 it	needs more than a well-structured and balanced deliberation. The face-to-face experience seems to be a crucial factor in the deliberation process. It could be observed that people are more prone to show signs of consent or dissent with gestures and mimics than to explicitly express their opinion verbally. If this is the case, then deliberation on Skype also changes the quality of the decision in that it is a decision made by those few who talk most.
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Disembodied Deliberation: ConclusionsNorms of deliberative democracy play different roles in the deliberation prac-tices in the two transnational civil society networks. While the inclusion of all interested is formalized in almost all cases in the two networks, arguments must not always be balanced due to different capacities, mainly in language and technology. Furthermore, the goal to arrive at a considered judgment after 
deliberation	is	often	torn	between	the	very	idealistic	claim	to	find	consensus	and the pragmatic considerations of moderators and participants. The delib-
eration	practices	in	the	two	networks	are	the	most	difficult	practices	for	par-ticipants.Deliberation practices are often conducted in a very sincere and planned manner. This makes them quite formal, which furthers formal access to de-liberation. As many democratic theorists would argue, stability and formal-ity can ensure democratic quality (MacDonald and MacDonald 2010). Also, 
the	agendas	for	deliberation	are	often	kept	very	open	for	participants’	input,	
which	defines	a	democratic	norm	of	deliberation	(see	Benhabib	1996).	At	the	same time, the extensive planning and structuration of deliberation deters participants who have different understandings of debate. These can be par-ticipants who would like to discuss more “political” and less goal-oriented or participants, who are not used to these kinds of structured, focused and ra-tional discussions or participants, who do not have the capacities to read the material and prepare for the deliberation with their organization “at home”. Moreover, the strict focus on consensus can lead moderators to frame delib-eration processes and steer the discussion into a certain direction. This lim-its the equality of arguments. Thus, the very strong commitment of central members of the networks to formality in deliberation can have ambiguous effects. In this regard, it can exclude alternative forms of input that are often regarded as very valuable to solve problems through deliberation (Saretzki 
1997,	Polletta	2006).The use of Skype as a tool to deliberate online is conducive to equally considering different arguments in the deliberation practice as people from around the world can meet on Skype as frequent as they want to. Skype broad-
ens	participation	 in	deliberation.	 This	marks	 first	 of	 all	 a	 gain	 in	 openness	and accessibility of communication processes within the network. However, the disembodied online deliberation, which is more and more practiced in both networks, impedes the equal structuration of deliberation processes. In contrast, face-to-face deliberation can be more balanced because it is easier to be structured and balanced by a facilitator. This facilitator can work more effectively to encourage all people to articulate arguments in a face-to-face situation. Furthermore, the seemingly equal access of all kinds of alternative discussants to online deliberation is not always as equal as it seems. Due to 
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lacking technological capacities, Skype calls are not manageable for many ac-tivists outside Europe or the Skype deliberation is so immensely affected by bad Internet connections and breakdowns, that an equalized deliberation and the consideration of all voices is virtually impossible.
6.3 Representative Norms and PracticesWhile the selection and instruction of representatives is a highly arbitrary 
practice,	 the	 representatives’	 practices	 with	 regard	 to	 gaining	 knowledge	and being accountable to the constituency are often skillfully tailored to the different constituencies in the networks. Representation practices are char-acterized by trustful bonds between peer-organizations within the network and a careful representation practice toward local volunteers and an almost complete absence of representative claims toward a general constituency. It can be observed that the stronger the bonds between representatives and rep-resented, the fewer control mechanisms are implemented in representation practices. Representation practices are perceived as organic processes. This points to the non-linearity of the representation practice and the different “organs” involved with different roles to play, which complement each oth-er in the representation practice. (1) The responsibility of representatives, (2) accountability and (3) considerate claims as norms of democratic rep-resentation will be discussed here.
Responsibility of representatives. Representation practices in transnation-al civil society networks are rooted in a direct horizontal democratic control. Since there are no hierarchical institutions of democratic government and control, accountability and balance of power is established and controlled through peer-to-peer practices. Whereas state democracy is thought of as a control of the many over the few, where the few have more power and re-sponsibilities and must be accountable to the many, in transnational networks there is no such hierarchical differentiation. Formally all members in the network have similar power and responsibilities. There are temporary rep-resentatives, who have more responsibilities, but these positions can change from one project to the next one, or even from one meeting to another.In reference to practice theoretical accounts, it can be observed that representation is “like a game whose rules change with use” (Lord and Pol-
lak	 2010:	 119).	 This	 gives	more	 responsibility	 to	 the	 representatives,	who	better oversee the issues under discussion at transnational meetings. This greater responsibility necessitates that representatives are trusted by their accountability holders. Due to shared interests in civil society networks be-tween representatives and represented, trusteeship models of representa-
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tion are common. Trust becomes even more relevant as these transnational civil society networks can seem complex and opaque to individual members, which can result in rather uncrystallized interests on matters such as which 
strategic	decision	to	take	on	a	specific	network	campaign	that	the	individual	member may only barely know about. Mansbridge (1999) argued that under these conditions, representation by deliberation among representatives and a resemblance of representative and represented is the better way to practice representation. This can be clearly observed in the network. Even so we can observe instances of gyroscopic representation, when representatives with 
much	experience	use	their	own	knowledge	to	make	‘good’	decisions.	Due	to	time constrains, different priority settings and lack of resources, the extensive deliberation processes that Mansbridge envisioned cannot always be imple-mented. Although representation based on trust is, as Castiglione and Warren (2006) argued, a good way to solve the problem of time-consuming control mechanisms, this can only be realized through instantaneous and direct rep-resentation practices. This can be clearly observed in network practice.
Accountability. As recent representation theory works (Castiglione and Warren 2006, Saward 2010) pointed out, a two-way dialogue between rep-resentatives and represented is a way to hold representatives accountable in contexts of non-electoral representation. Acceptance or dissatisfaction of the represented is an expression of adequate representation by their representa-tives. As authorization is not extensively practiced in the FoE-network, it could be plausible that representatives are held accountable during representation, as theorists of non-electoral representation suggest (Castiglione and Warren 2006). What can be observed is that the accountability of representatives is shifted horizontally. This practice of handing over the representation respon-sibility to a peer network member follows again the logic of trusteeship and descriptive representation, since these responsibilities are often handed to peers that resemble the own organization without giving a clear mandate to this peer-representative. As noted in representation theory, trust plays a very important role in representation practices, especially in civil society (see Cas-tiglione and Warren 2006). Due the complexity of the network structure, the resemblance of representatives and represented in horizontal representation practices such as the ones in the FoE-network are important substitutes for accountability mechanisms. Through descriptive representation, representa-tives can assume much better, what the interests of the represented are. Also, making the decision to trust the other network member organization in rep-resenting their interests is very important in this regard because such kind of trusteeship can be described as approximating forms of democratic rep-resentation (Castiglione and Warren 2006).In the CCC-network, the perceived role of a representative is more care-
fully	practiced	in	regard	to	workers’	representation	than	in	regard	to	the	rep-
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resentation of network member groups at international meetings for example. 
The	concern	about	workers’	interests	is	very	high	and	thus	information	supply	and the sense of accountability towards workers is perceived as much more important than the accountability towards European network member or-ganizations, where representatives rely much more on trust than on control. Thus, we can see two different approaches of practicing representation in this regard. They follow different logics and are practiced under completely dif-ferent preconditions. The accountability toward and knowledge about work-ers is seen as a crucial aspect of representation practices in the CCC-network. 
However,	it	is	more	difficult	to	gain	this	knowledge	than	the	accountability	to-ward and knowledge about European organizations. Because the knowledge of the European constituency is quite solid, central actors do not consider ac-countability mechanisms as that important, in contrast to the accountability toward workers.
Representative	dialogues	are	defined	by	the	sequential	timing	of	reporting	and communicating back and forth between representatives and represented, which is sometimes complicated by the different and overlapping schedules of international and national campaigns. This is partly solved by the extensive use of e-mail communication, which is independent of time sequences. How-
ever,	E-mail	communication	is	easy	in	the	way	that	the	representative	fulfills	their duty of reporting back to the constituency, but these practices seem to be without any effects in providing a channel of communication for the rep-resented. The disembodiment of the communication between representatives and represented leads to a decreasing bindingness of representational prac-tice. Only the personal conversation is effective in managing the mandate of the representative because only in face-to-face communication the relation-ship between representative and represented can be built as a reliable and mutual dialogue. The representation of volunteers differs considerably to the representa-tional dialogue between employed members of the organizations and their representatives. The relationship between volunteers and their representa-tives is very close and certain. The expression of an informed opinion of vol-unteers is taken very seriously. In this case, the representative relationship is practiced as a mandated delegate relationship. Consultation between rep-
resentative	and	constituency	(volunteers)	is	practiced	frequently.	Volunteers	are informed and are able to form an opinion about decisive matters. The rel-evancy of this kind of delegate representation is not perceived at the level of organization employees. Here, the mode of representation dialogue changes from delegation to trusteeship. The expression of the represented is not that frequently and thoroughly practiced. The medium of communication is also very different. While the dialogue with volunteers is always local and face-to-face, the communication with different national organizations and board 
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members for example is often done by e-mail. It can be said that the form of communication reinforces the tight bonds between volunteers and represent-atives and the loose relationship between representatives and other national stakeholders. 
Considerate claims. The representative claims within the two networks are 
what	Saward	defines	as	claims	of	“wider	interests	and	new	voices”	(2010: 99).	He further subdivides these claims into categories, one of them being stake-
holder	claims:	“based	on	the	notion	that	one	stands	for	or	speaks	for	a	group	that has a material stake in a process or a decision” (ibid.). The representative claims made in the FoE-network are often very con-siderate and well-founded. Network members are cautious in making too bold representative claims and are rather relating their claims to the federation of FoE or the own organization, but never to a concrete external constituen-cy. The only claim that is made in this direction is vaguely referring to giving more voice to the environment. Thus, network members in the FoE-network are very cautious in claims-making and back up every claim by reasonable ar-gumentations and the reference to the legitimacy of their claim. While internal representative claims made by national representatives in the CCC-network 
are	articulated	in	a	quite	confident	manner,	the	claims	to	represent	the	wider	causes and people for whom or which campaigns are made for are articulated much more cautious. 
A	second	interesting	finding	in	the	networks	is	that	those	cautious	rep-resentative claims are complemented by claims that target abstract concepts such as corporate social responsibility or sustainability. Representing such 
abstract	concepts	is	also	a	consequence	of	the	lack	of	a	well-defined	constit-uency. The dissolving borders in and between constituencies lead to repre-
sentative	claims	of	for	example	workers’	rights,	which	can	be	applied	to	many	different constituencies without running the risk of making too bold claims 
about	 a	 specific	 constituency	 of	 people.	 Thus,	 representatives	 in	 both	 net-works are very aware of the necessity to make claims that position themselves in the role of democratically legitimate representatives.
Dissolved Boundaries in and between Constituents and 
Representatives: ConclusionsHorizontal accountability means that representatives are equally accountable horizontally to their colleagues in other countries at the transnational level on the one hand, and practice peer-to-peer monitoring as holding unelected representatives accountable (see Castiglione and Warren 2006; Sørensen and 
Torfing	2010)	 in	the	national	organization	and	in	the	network	across	coun-try borders on the other hand. Thus, the circle of accountability holders for 
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one representative is widened and the roles of accountability holders and ac-
countability	holdees	are	not	fixed	(see	Esmark	2007).	When	representatives	of national organizations for example go to transnational meetings and prac-tice representation, there is often no clear point in time before or after rep-resentation practices, when representatives are either authorized beforehand or held accountable afterwards. There are instances of authorization and ac-countability, but these instances are practiced in a continuous and not always clearly timed form of interaction between representatives and the represent-ed. As one interviewee noticed, this form of giving representative a mandate 
or	hold	them	accountable	is	an	“organic”	process	(see	F4)	that	develops	over	time but not in a pre-determined mannerSince representation is already a form of indirect democracy, the indi-rect contact between representatives and represented further deteriorates the bindingness of representation. The mediated communication via e-mail for example loosens the bond of accountability. The necessity for prompt re-sponsiveness is literally not given. This is true for both sides of representation. Thus, the horizontal representation practices need the direct contact between representatives and constituency in order to enforce accountability.
Regarding	the	representation	of	affected	or	beneficiary	constituencies,	it	is clearly avoided by network members to make representative claims about 
“external”	constituencies,	e.g.	all	workers	in	a	specific	industry	or	all	popula-tions affected by climate change. This is not to say that the existence of affected constituencies is denied. Representative claims are rather articulated on a me-ta-level. Network members claim to represent concepts such as a living wage or sustainable agriculture instead of concrete, real constituencies. Thus, there is no direct accountability-giver in the sense of democratic representation. It can be observed that accountability functions as accountability-by-proxy (Koenig-Archibugi and Macdonald 2013). Since activists, as solidaristic prox-ies hold companies and political decision-makers accountable on behalf of the affected constituency in a way that is very sensitive towards the affected con-stituency, one can speak of an indirect accountability within the network. As argued throughout this chapter, representation practices in the two networks are the most inventive forms of practice, which show many productive re-in-
terpretations	of	democratic	representation	that	are	configured	to	the	specific	contexts.
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7  Conclusions:  
Transnational Democratic Practice
In	a	world	(…)	where	transnational	actors	and	forces	cut	across	the	bounda-ries of national communities in diverse ways, the questions of who should be accountable to whom, and on what grounds, do not easily resolve themselves. 
Overlapping	spheres	of	influence,	interference,	and	interest	create	fundamen-tal problems at the centre of democratic thought, problems which ultimately 
concern	the	very	basis	of	democratic	authority.	(Held	2003:	522)
David	Held	identifies	the	main	struggle	of	democracy	in	the	difficult	realiza-
tion	 of	 accountability	 in	 transnational	 spheres:	 Dissolving	 boundaries	 and	overlapping responsibilities and interests create a problem of equivocal ac-countabilities. Democracy is originally thought of as a principle to govern in 
a	community	that	needs	to	be	rooted	in	defined	borders.	These	borders	are	crossed in transnational democracy and thus, Held speaks of “fundamental problems at the centre of democratic thought”(ibid.). These fundamental problems of democratic thought also relate to the main research interest of this study. In transnational civil society networks, the tensions between practices and institutions, between stability and tem-porality become apparent. While democratic theorists argue that democracy is and should be always subject to change (Saward	2000:	3),	many	democrat-
ic	institutions	gain	their	democratic	quality	from	their	stability.	The	findings	of this study speak to this democratic tension. In this regard, the contribu-
tion	 of	 this	 study	 is	 two-fold:	 (1)	 Through	 integrating	 practice	 theory	 into	the broader framework of process-oriented democratic theory I have argued throughout the book for a shift from institutions to practices in conceptual-izing transnational democracy. In addressing the tensions and fundamental problems in democratic theory, I developed a practice theoretical account for studying democratic norms and political practice in transnational civil soci-ety. With these means I also argue that the practice theoretical methodology can enrich and inspire a rethinking about normativity more broadly. (2) The practice lens enables the exploration of a number of characteristic political practices in the two transnational civil society networks. The reconstruction of leading practices in participation, disembodied deliberation practice or horizontal representation adds new insights to the question of how democra-cy can evolve in the transnational sphere.The transnational civil society networks observed in this study can be distinguished from institutionalized democracy systems by their geograph-
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ical dispersion, dissolution of boundaries and multiple interferences. Those transnational network characteristics translate into a re-interpretation of 
democratic	practice.	This	can	be	observed	in	indistinct	roles	and	fluid	respon-sibilities, disembodied communication and a multiplication of interaction fo-rums. 
Dissolved	boundaries	are	reflected	 for	example	 in	representation	practices:	the boundaries between constituents and representatives blur; the constitu-
ency	as	a	territorially	defined	demos	does	not	exist.	However,	indistinct	roles	
and	 fluid	 responsibilities	 in	 representation	 are	 productively	 re-interpreted	in new forms of peer-to-peer-representation or representative claims about 
more	general	concepts	of	sustainability	and	workers’	rights	than	about	con-crete constituencies. Due to the necessity of online communication between network mem-bers, dispersed in different countries and continents, practices of deliberation, representation and participation become disentangled from face-to-face com-munication and personal contacts. This disembodied communication is un-derstood as communication mediated through technical devices, computers or telephones, in which the bodily presence is excluded from talk. Disembod-ied communication has the advantage of gaining a broader scope, and reach-ing broader circles of persons and organizations. Such online communication as a daily practice in transnational networks can work in order to provide and distribute information, keep in touch and update involved persons about the current situation of a campaign. Such practices can thus further equality and transparency in the network. At the same time, this expansion of participation can diminish the bindingness and democratic control opportunities within practices. It limits opportunities to equalize and balance in deliberation prac-tice due to the lacking opportunities of moderation and structuration of talk. The opportunities to hold representatives accountable are weaker due to the lack of bindingness and reciprocity in communication. These kinds of practic-es cannot account for democratic legitimation, be it control or accountability. Thus, the binding character of democracy is even more in need of actualiza-tions and reinforcements (through frequent direct interaction, for example), 
in	 the	 fluid	and	digital	 spheres	of	 transnational	 civil	 society	networks	 than	in institutionalized democracy. Although both civil society networks are com-mitted to democratic norms, there is a need to actualize the binding character of these norms through face-to-face political practices.Multiple interferences affect political practices in a way that they become more interactive between different levels of interaction while at the same time 
becoming	more	complex	and	difficult	to	time.	Virtually	every	political	practice	within those networks is interactive. Mutual dialogue prevails over a unidi-
rectional	 chain	 of	 command.	 Information	 flows	 and	 a	 stimulating	 diversity	
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among network members contribute to a very pro-active form of democratic decision-making. This leads to a very participatory and open practice on the one hand, and a tendency toward over-complexity and disembodiment on the other. While the network actors have a clear understanding of their participa-tory democratic values and the opportunities to live this inclusive democra-cy, they are at the same time constrained by the overwhelming complexity of coordination practices and the forms of disembodied online communication. As it has been observed, “the nature and quality of democracy within a par-ticular community and the nature and quality of democratic relations among 
communities	are	interlocked”	(Held	2003:	524).	The	transnational	civil	soci-ety networks examined in this study are networks of different local commu-
nities.	Their	local	forms	of	practicing	democracy	influence	the	transnational	network level and vice versa. Thus, the complexity of multi-level interactions 
influences	democratic	practices	and	challenges	the	formulation	of	democratic	norms in practice.Democratic practice can be observed in both of the two networks in var-ious forms, mostly dependent on the commitment and capacity of the actors involved and the structural preconditions of these networks. While the struc-
tural	 influencing	 factors	are	similar	 in	both	networks,	 the	commitment	and	capacities of actors make up for changing practices within and between net-works. Although democracy can be practiced without the prior existence of institutions, it can be observed that democratic norms inherent in democratic practices are in need of constant actualizations (see Blee 2012). The exploration of political practice in the two networks does not con-
firm	 the	assumption	 that	 fluid,	 temporary	and	complex	network	structures	generally deteriorate democratic norms. It could indeed be observed that the complexity of the network structures and the overlapping spheres of deci-
sion-making	make	 it	more	difficult	 for	network	 actors	 to	participate,	make	democratic decisions or hold their representative accountable. However, the 
findings	 of	 the	 interview	 analysis	 also	 show	 that	 democratic	 practices	 can	evolve through the innovative ideas of actors who try to cope with constraints on the one hand, and can be guided by an implicit normativity that creates 
very	stable	democratic	practices	on	the	other.	This	confirms	the	argument	by	Nullmeier and Pritzlaff (2010) that an explicit normativity must be comple-mented by an implicit normativity which comes into being in political prac-tices (ibid.). Considering this implicit normativity in political practices allows us to detect democratic practice, where it would otherwise be overseen. The conceptual focus on practices can help theorize the forms of democracy that 
occur	below	the	level	of	 institutions	(Nullmeier	2003:	18).	The	“in-process”	
normativity	of	practices	(Nullmeier	and	Pritzlaff	2010:	357)	becomes	espe-cially relevant in spheres where explicit normativity as formal rules hardly exists. Although democratic practices and democratic institutions cannot be 
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seen as mutually exclusive concepts, the practice lens makes crucial demo-cratic practices visible that can contribute to a better understanding of the functioning of democracy at the transnational level.Sometimes – perhaps more often than is commonly realized – the tasks of political theory require immersion in the context of material political worlds and the frames through which participants interpret those worlds. (Saward 
2010:	154)	Saward argues for political theorists to immerse in material contexts and ask whether the participants of representative claims-making (or in the present case study, democratic practice more generally) evaluate those practices as democratic. This, so he argues from the background of feminist standpoint theories, better considers the perspectives of marginalized groups, which dif-
fer	from	the	‘false	universalist’	criteria	of,	for	example,	democratic	quality	(see	also Young 1990). Why is this a fruitful approach for studying democracy as 
practice?	Practice	theory	takes	into	account	the	complexity	of	the	transnation-al sphere and fruitfully translates categories of practice, knowledge and rules 
into	a	new	analytical	angle	from	which	we	can	explore	how	actors	are	“‘doing’	
in	and	on	the	world”	(Adler	and	Pouliot	2011:	3).	In	exploring	the	transnation-al sphere from the perspective of practice, norms become much more dynamic 
and	contestable,	too	(see	e.g.	Wiener	2014).	This	contextualized	character	of	norms in turn necessitates a rethinking of the normative evaluation of static 
criteria.	A	political	 theorist’s	 task	 is	here	 to	 step	back	 from	 judging	 from	a	supposedly outside perspective, and rather pursue the research strategy of “immersion in the context of material political worlds and the frames through 
which	participants	interpret	those	worlds”	(Saward	2010:	154).	Taking	over	the citizen standpoint (Disch 2015) generates new questions and allows po-litical theorists to study those areas that are often overlooked by standard ac-
counts	of	analysis	and	evaluation.	Thus,	the	field	of	transnational democratic 
practice opens up new research perspectives that can shed light on the work-ings of transnational actors on the ground, and the practices that take place in-between broader institutions and single actions. 
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